time rebutting presumption in Illinois

1929In Keener v. Crull, supra, the court further said: “The new promise may arise -out of facts such as identify the debt, the subject of the promise, with such certainty as will clearly determine its character, fix the amount due, and show a present unqualified willingness and intention to pay it, at the time acted upon and acceded to by the creditor, the promisee.” In Carroll v. Forsyth, 69 Ill. 127 , the court uses this language: “To remove the bar of the statute of limitations, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove an express promise to pay the money, or a conditional promise with a perfor

1924The simple question in this case is whether there was an acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor at any time after August 21, 1909, — such an acknowledgment as amounted to “an unqualified admission that the debt is due and unpaid, nothing being said or done at the time rebutting the presumption of a promise to pay.” Carroll v. Forsyth, 69 Ill. 127 ; Coulson v. Hartz, 47 Ill.

1929In Keener v. Crull, supra, the court further said: “The new promise may arise -out of facts such as identify the debt, the subject of the promise, with such certainty as will clearly determine its character, fix the amount due, and show a present unqualified willingness and intention to pay it, at the time acted upon and acceded to by the creditor, the promisee.” In Carroll v. Forsyth, 69 Ill. 127 , the court uses this language: “To remove the bar of the statute of limitations, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove an express promise to pay the money, or a conditional promise with a perfor

1902Nothing was said or done at the time rebutting the presumption of a promise to pay, and Wachter v. Albee, 80 Ill. 47 , Norton v. Colby, 52 id. 198, and Ennis v. Pullman Palace Car Co. 165 id. 161, cited by appellant, are therefore not in point.

1929In Keener v. Crull, supra, the court further said: “The new promise may arise -out of facts such as identify the debt, the subject of the promise, with such certainty as will clearly determine its character, fix the amount due, and show a present unqualified willingness and intention to pay it, at the time acted upon and acceded to by the creditor, the promisee.” In Carroll v. Forsyth, 69 Ill. 127 , the court uses this language: “To remove the bar of the statute of limitations, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove an express promise to pay the money, or a conditional promise with a perfor

1883The same was held in Keener v. Crull, 19 Ill. 189 , and in Ayers v. Richards, 12 Ill. 147 .

1916Ayers v. Richards, 12 Ill. 146 .

1896(Ayers v. Richards, 12 Ill. 146 ; Parsons v. N. I.

1924The simple question in this case is whether there was an acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor at any time after August 21, 1909, — such an acknowledgment as amounted to “an unqualified admission that the debt is due and unpaid, nothing being said or done at the time rebutting the presumption of a promise to pay.” Carroll v. Forsyth, 69 Ill. 127 ; Coulson v. Hartz, 47 Ill.

1896It must be of such a character as to clearly show a recognition of the debt and an intention to pay it,”—citing, as sustaining this case, Parsons v. Northern Illinois Coal and Iron Co. 38 Ill. 430 , Ayers v. Richards, 12 id. 146, and Norton v. Colby, 52 id. 198.