ten-day requirement in Indiana

1999We concluded that “[i]t is the filing of the answer which triggers the running of the ten day rule and not notice thereof.” Id.

1995It is the filing of the answer which triggers the running of the ten day rule and not notice thereof.” Annon II, 597 N.E.2d at 324 .

2016See Naugle v. Beech Grove City Schools, 864 N.E.2d 1058, 1068 (Ind.2007) (finding ambiguity when asked to consider whether the word “day” as used in the Wage Payment Statute’s ten-day rule meant business days or calendar days).

2014See also Stephens v. State, 544 N.E.2d 137, 139 (Ind. 1989) (rejecting the defendant’s assertion that there should be an exception to the ten-day requirement under the Rape Shield Statute that permits “res gestae statements” because “approval of such an exception would open the door for evading the statute entirely”).

2010Co., 628 P.2d 96, 99 (Colo.1981) (observing that "[al majority of the courts hold that a notice of cancellation which purports to cancel a policy of insurance at a time earlier than that fixed by the policy results in the postponement of cancellation until the time period set forth in the policy has expired" and holding that a notice of cancellation that stated an effective date before the ten-day requirement in the insurance policy was still an effective cancellation subject to any extension to meet the ten-day requirement); Travelers Indem.

2010Co. v. Guess, 243 Ga. 559 , 255 S.E.2d 55, 56 (Ga.1979) (holding that the methods adopted by the legislature were intended to assure actual notice of cancellation to an insured and where it is admitted such notice was received, the purpose of the statute has been accomplished); Zakrajshek v. Shuster, 307 Minn. 327 , 239 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn.1976) (addressing a worker's compensation insurance policy and a statute which provided that "[such cancellation or termination shall not become effective until 30 days after written notice has been filed with the commissioner of the department of labor an

2010Co. v. Guess, 243 Ga. 559 , 255 S.E.2d 55, 56 (Ga.1979) (holding that the methods adopted by the legislature were intended to assure actual notice of cancellation to an insured and where it is admitted such notice was received, the purpose of the statute has been accomplished); Zakrajshek v. Shuster, 307 Minn. 327 , 239 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn.1976) (addressing a worker's compensation insurance policy and a statute which provided that "[such cancellation or termination shall not become effective until 30 days after written notice has been filed with the commissioner of the department of labor an

2010Co. v. Guess, 243 Ga. 559 , 255 S.E.2d 55, 56 (Ga.1979) (holding that the methods adopted by the legislature were intended to assure actual notice of cancellation to an insured and where it is admitted such notice was received, the purpose of the statute has been accomplished); Zakrajshek v. Shuster, 307 Minn. 327 , 239 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn.1976) (addressing a worker's compensation insurance policy and a statute which provided that "[such cancellation or termination shall not become effective until 30 days after written notice has been filed with the commissioner of the department of labor an

2010Co. v. Guess, 243 Ga. 559 , 255 S.E.2d 55, 56 (Ga.1979) (holding that the methods adopted by the legislature were intended to assure actual notice of cancellation to an insured and where it is admitted such notice was received, the purpose of the statute has been accomplished); Zakrajshek v. Shuster, 307 Minn. 327 , 239 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn.1976) (addressing a worker's compensation insurance policy and a statute which provided that "[such cancellation or termination shall not become effective until 30 days after written notice has been filed with the commissioner of the department of labor an

1980Thacker v. Whitehead, 548 F.2d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 1977); Oppenheimer v. Morton Hotel Corp., 324 F.2d 766, 768 (6th Cir. 1963).” (emphasis supplied) 570 F.2d at 119 .

1980Thacker v. Whitehead, 548 F.2d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 1977); Oppenheimer v. Morton Hotel Corp., 324 F.2d 766, 768 (6th Cir. 1963).” (emphasis supplied) 570 F.2d at 119 .