Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
10 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Noblegreen2 sentences2015“Generally speaking, the Commonwealth is not required to provide legal instructions on the elements of an offense for which it seeks an indictment, out of a concern that such a requirement ‘would add delay and complexity without serving any significant purpose.’ ” Commonwealth v. Rex, 469 Mass. 36 , 41 n.10 (2014), quoting from Commonwealth v. Noble, 429 Mass. 44, 48 (1999). 2014Generally speaking, the Commonwealth is not required to provide legal instructions on the elements of an offense for which it seeks an indictment, out of a concern that such a requirement “would add delay and complexity without serving any significant purpose.” Commonwealth v. Noble, 429 Mass. 44, 48 (1999). | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Raymond Luc Levasseur, A/K/A John, Jack, Jake and George, United States v. Raymond Luc Levasseur, Etc.green2 sentences1999Bank v. Wheeler, 422 Mass. 621, 623 (1996), quoting Gordon v. Lewitsky, 333 Mass. 379, 381 (1955). “ ‘The primary concern of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial process.’ United States v. Levasseur, 846 F.2d 786, 792 (1st Cir.[), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 894 (]1988). 1993“The primary concern of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial process.” United States v. Levasseur, 846 F.2d 786, 792 (1st Cir. 1988). | 2 | 2 |
Correia v. DeSimonegreen2 sentences1999That concern would be ill served if those intimately involved in that process, litigants, attorneys, and judges, could not rely on declarations of settlement made to the court.” Correia v. DeSimone, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 604 (1993). 1996Correia v. DeSimone, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 604 (1993). | 2 | 2 |
Attorney General v. Pelletiergreen1 sentence2012Almost a century ago, we set out that “it is the duty of the district attorney in appropriate instances to advise [the grand jury] concerning the law.” Attorney Gen. v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 307 (1922). | 1 | 1 |
East Cambridge Savings Bank v. Wheelergreen1 sentence1999Bank v. Wheeler, 422 Mass. 621, 623 (1996), quoting Gordon v. Lewitsky, 333 Mass. 379, 381 (1955). “ ‘The primary concern of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial process.’ United States v. Levasseur, 846 F.2d 786, 792 (1st Cir.[), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 894 (]1988). | 1 | 1 |
Gordon v. Lewitskygreen1 sentence1999Bank v. Wheeler, 422 Mass. 621, 623 (1996), quoting Gordon v. Lewitsky, 333 Mass. 379, 381 (1955). “ ‘The primary concern of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial process.’ United States v. Levasseur, 846 F.2d 786, 792 (1st Cir.[), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 894 (]1988). | 1 | 1 |
United States ex rel. Feldt v. Follettegreen1 sentence1982See e.g., People v. Feldt, supra; State v. Koch, supra. Underlying many of the decisions, however, is the concern that an instruction which singles out the testimony of the child witness for special scrutiny may infringe upon the jury’s exclusive role as arbiter of credibility. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Rodriguezgreen1 sentence1982See, e.g., Lewis v. State, supra; People v. Cunningham, supra. This concern derives from general principles long recognized in our own cases which were expressed in Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 738, 742-743 (1978), S.C., 378 Mass. 296 (1979), in this fashion: “There is nothing improper in a judge’s pointing out factors to be considered by the jury in weighing the credibility of oral testimony so long as he does so fairly, gives the jury no indication of whom he believes, and clearly places the function of ultimate appraisal of the testimony on the jury. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Fernandes
green
1 sentence2019Post at ----, 130 N.E.3d 696 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Lampron
green
1 sentence2018At the motion hearing, in response to the judge's concern that defense counsel's supplemental affidavit did not demonstrate that the victim had undergone counselling and did not provide a basis, apart from conjecture, that any such records were relevant and likely admissible at trial, defense counsel conceded that "unfortunately we do not have the details to provide to the [c]ourt." Pressed further by the judge on the absence of evidence, defense counsel expressed her "hope" that relevant counselling records would exist when a doctor or therapist prescribed "antipsychotic medication." Defense | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board
green
1 sentence2016Moreover, where the ultimate concern in this analysis lies in sufficient “notice and clarity about whether registration is required” due to the potential of criminal penalties, Doe No. 151564, 456 Mass. at 618 , it is noteworthy that upon the plaintiffs release from confinement, he signed a form acknowledging his receipt of notice of his obligation to register as a sex offender. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Commonwealth v. Rex
green
1 sentence2015“Generally speaking, the Commonwealth is not required to provide legal instructions on the elements of an offense for which it seeks an indictment, out of a concern that such a requirement ‘would add delay and complexity without serving any significant purpose.’ ” Commonwealth v. Rex, 469 Mass. 36 , 41 n.10 (2014), quoting from Commonwealth v. Noble, 429 Mass. 44, 48 (1999). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Parez v. United States District Court
green
1 sentence1999Bank v. Wheeler, 422 Mass. 621, 623 (1996), quoting Gordon v. Lewitsky, 333 Mass. 379, 381 (1955). “ ‘The primary concern of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial process.’ United States v. Levasseur, 846 F.2d 786, 792 (1st Cir.[), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 894 (]1988). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez
green
1 sentence1982See, e.g., Lewis v. State, supra; People v. Cunningham, supra. This concern derives from general principles long recognized in our own cases which were expressed in Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 738, 742-743 (1978), S.C., 378 Mass. 296 (1979), in this fashion: “There is nothing improper in a judge’s pointing out factors to be considered by the jury in weighing the credibility of oral testimony so long as he does so fairly, gives the jury no indication of whom he believes, and clearly places the function of ultimate appraisal of the testimony on the jury. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
People v. Cunningham
green
1 sentence1982See, e.g., Lewis v. State, supra; People v. Cunningham, supra. This concern derives from general principles long recognized in our own cases which were expressed in Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 738, 742-743 (1978), S.C., 378 Mass. 296 (1979), in this fashion: “There is nothing improper in a judge’s pointing out factors to be considered by the jury in weighing the credibility of oral testimony so long as he does so fairly, gives the jury no indication of whom he believes, and clearly places the function of ultimate appraisal of the testimony on the jury. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Koch
green
1 sentence1982See e.g., People v. Feldt, supra; State v. Koch, supra. Underlying many of the decisions, however, is the concern that an instruction which singles out the testimony of the child witness for special scrutiny may infringe upon the jury’s exclusive role as arbiter of credibility. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.