Burgett principle in Maryland

1996Id. at 175 , 263 A.2d 232 . *26 Having determined that the Burgett principle was applicable to the impeachment of a defendant by proof of prior convictions, Judge Orth then enunciated the procedure to be followed: We hold that it is incumbent upon the defendant, when his objection to evidence of a prior conviction is on the ground that the conviction was constitutionally void to state his reasons to the court to enable it properly to determine the issue.

1996Id. at 175 , 263 A.2d 232 . *26 Having determined that the Burgett principle was applicable to the impeachment of a defendant by proof of prior convictions, Judge Orth then enunciated the procedure to be followed: We hold that it is incumbent upon the defendant, when his objection to evidence of a prior conviction is on the ground that the conviction was constitutionally void to state his reasons to the court to enable it properly to determine the issue.

1977As this Court held in Bailey v. State, 263 Md. 424, 428 , 283 A. 2d 360 (1971), even where the basis for the objection is a so-called “non-traditional” one, such as the Burgett principle, it is unnecessary to state the basis unless requested by the court.

1977As this Court held in Bailey v. State, 263 Md. 424, 428 , 283 A. 2d 360 (1971), even where the basis for the objection is a so-called “non-traditional” one, such as the Burgett principle, it is unnecessary to state the basis unless requested by the court.

2006It would defy logic and any notion of fundamental justice and of judicial economy if this case were to be reversed solely on the ground of a violation of the Burgett principle [Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 , 88 S.Ct. 258 , 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967) ], when it is a fact of public record that appellant was represented by counsel in connection with the prior conviction and, as appears from the decision of the Court of Appeals in Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350 , 289 A.2d 575 (1972), reversing Gill v. State, 11 Md.App. 378 , 274 A.2d 667 (1971), we are not permitted the alternative of a remand, without a

2006It would defy logic and any notion of fundamental justice and of judicial economy if this case were to be reversed solely on the ground of a violation of the Burgett principle [Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 , 88 S.Ct. 258 , 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967) ], when it is a fact of public record that appellant was represented by counsel in connection with the prior conviction and, as appears from the decision of the Court of Appeals in Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350 , 289 A.2d 575 (1972), reversing Gill v. State, 11 Md.App. 378 , 274 A.2d 667 (1971), we are not permitted the alternative of a remand, without a

1977We therefore do not consider it.” ( 31 Md.

1976App. 271 , 356 A. 2d 277 (1976), the State argues that appellant’s objection did not present to the trial court nor preserve for appeal the question of a violation of the Burgett principle.

2006It would defy logic and any notion of fundamental justice and of judicial economy if this case were to be reversed solely on the ground of a violation of the Burgett principle [Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 , 88 S.Ct. 258 , 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967) ], when it is a fact of public record that appellant was represented by counsel in connection with the prior conviction and, as appears from the decision of the Court of Appeals in Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350 , 289 A.2d 575 (1972), reversing Gill v. State, 11 Md.App. 378 , 274 A.2d 667 (1971), we are not permitted the alternative of a remand, without a

2006It would defy logic and any notion of fundamental justice and of judicial economy if this case were to be reversed solely on the ground of a violation of the Burgett principle [Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 , 88 S.Ct. 258 , 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967) ], when it is a fact of public record that appellant was represented by counsel in connection with the prior conviction and, as appears from the decision of the Court of Appeals in Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350 , 289 A.2d 575 (1972), reversing Gill v. State, 11 Md.App. 378 , 274 A.2d 667 (1971), we are not permitted the alternative of a remand, without a

2006It would defy logic and any notion of fundamental justice and of judicial economy if this case were to be reversed solely on the ground of a violation of the Burgett principle [Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 , 88 S.Ct. 258 , 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967) ], when it is a fact of public record that appellant was represented by counsel in connection with the prior conviction and, as appears from the decision of the Court of Appeals in Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350 , 289 A.2d 575 (1972), reversing Gill v. State, 11 Md.App. 378 , 274 A.2d 667 (1971), we are not permitted the alternative of a remand, without a

1986We also set forth a mandatory procedure, Carroll, supra, 19 Md.

1976App. 357, 360-61 , 345 A. 2d 440 (1975)); that appellant’s counsel was not accorded a timely opportunity to articulate fully all grounds for his objection, cf. von Lusch, supra; and that the trial court itself recognized no other possible basis for an objection except lack of authenticity.

1976As we read the record, it seems clear that appellant challenged the Parole Order in a manner sufficient to raise the Burgett principle (see, Chenault v. Director, 28 Md.

1973The State also asserted that even if the Burgett principle were applicable to the sentencing stage, Johnson requires that the defendant “assert under oath that he was without the assistance of counsel in the prior proceedings and did not waive the right to counsel before it becomes the burden of the State to prove that the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel was not infringed at the prior proceedings.” In any event, the State claimed, Jordan v. State, 5 Md.