10 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Fickergreen2 sentences2009Comm’n v. Ficker, 399 Md. 445, 454-56 , 924 A.2d 1105, 1111 (2007), we concluded that where an attorney filed an entry of appearance on behalf of a client when the attorney knew he would be unable to represent the client on the hearing date and was absent from the scheduled trial was prejudicial to the administration of justice. 2009Comm’n v. Ficker, 399 Md. 445, 454-56 , 924 A.2d 1105, 1111 (2007), we concluded that where an attorney filed an entry of appearance on behalf of a client when the attorney knew he would be unable to represent the client on the hearing date and was absent from the scheduled trial was prejudicial to the administration of justice. | 1 | 1 |
Stevens v. Drugggreen1 sentence1998Corp. v. Driscoll, 315 Mass. 360, 364-365 , 52 N.E.2d 970, 973 (1944) (insurance company was subrogated to an insured’s cause of action for property damage to the insured’s car, and therefore had the “right to receive the proceeds” of any cause of action for that property damage; insured’s attorney held liable to insurer for distribut *519 ing settlement proceeds to the insured which were specifically marked as being for property damage). | 1 | 1 |
Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webbgreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Aguiluz, 47 Cal.App.4th 302, 305 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 666 (1996) (“an attorney on notice of a third party’s contractual right to funds received on behalf of his client disburses those funds to his client at his own risk”); Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb, 104 Idaho 234, 237 , 657 P.2d 1102, 1105 (1983) (holding a law firm “liable to the creditor for funds relinquished to the client in violation of the assignment”); Frontier Enterprises, Inc. v. Anchor Co. of Marblehead, 404 Mass. 506, 511 , 536 N.E.2d 352, 355 (1989) (stating that “[a]n attorney 1998See, e.g., Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Aguiluz, 47 Cal.App.4th 302, 305 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 666 (1996) (“an attorney on notice of a third party’s contractual right to funds received on behalf of his client disburses those funds to his client at his own risk”); Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb, 104 Idaho 234, 237 , 657 P.2d 1102, 1105 (1983) (holding a law firm “liable to the creditor for funds relinquished to the client in violation of the assignment”); Frontier Enterprises, Inc. v. Anchor Co. of Marblehead, 404 Mass. 506, 511 , 536 N.E.2d 352, 355 (1989) (stating that “[a]n attorney | 1 | 1 |
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Aguiluzgreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Aguiluz, 47 Cal.App.4th 302, 305 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 666 (1996) (“an attorney on notice of a third party’s contractual right to funds received on behalf of his client disburses those funds to his client at his own risk”); Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb, 104 Idaho 234, 237 , 657 P.2d 1102, 1105 (1983) (holding a law firm “liable to the creditor for funds relinquished to the client in violation of the assignment”); Frontier Enterprises, Inc. v. Anchor Co. of Marblehead, 404 Mass. 506, 511 , 536 N.E.2d 352, 355 (1989) (stating that “[a]n attorney 1998See, e.g., Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Aguiluz, 47 Cal.App.4th 302, 305 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 666 (1996) (“an attorney on notice of a third party’s contractual right to funds received on behalf of his client disburses those funds to his client at his own risk”); Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb, 104 Idaho 234, 237 , 657 P.2d 1102, 1105 (1983) (holding a law firm “liable to the creditor for funds relinquished to the client in violation of the assignment”); Frontier Enterprises, Inc. v. Anchor Co. of Marblehead, 404 Mass. 506, 511 , 536 N.E.2d 352, 355 (1989) (stating that “[a]n attorney | 1 | 1 |
Frontier Enterprises, Inc. v. Anchor Co. of Marbleheadgreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Aguiluz, 47 Cal.App.4th 302, 305 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 666 (1996) (“an attorney on notice of a third party’s contractual right to funds received on behalf of his client disburses those funds to his client at his own risk”); Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb, 104 Idaho 234, 237 , 657 P.2d 1102, 1105 (1983) (holding a law firm “liable to the creditor for funds relinquished to the client in violation of the assignment”); Frontier Enterprises, Inc. v. Anchor Co. of Marblehead, 404 Mass. 506, 511 , 536 N.E.2d 352, 355 (1989) (stating that “[a]n attorney 1998See, e.g., Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Aguiluz, 47 Cal.App.4th 302, 305 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 666 (1996) (“an attorney on notice of a third party’s contractual right to funds received on behalf of his client disburses those funds to his client at his own risk”); Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb, 104 Idaho 234, 237 , 657 P.2d 1102, 1105 (1983) (holding a law firm “liable to the creditor for funds relinquished to the client in violation of the assignment”); Frontier Enterprises, Inc. v. Anchor Co. of Marblehead, 404 Mass. 506, 511 , 536 N.E.2d 352, 355 (1989) (stating that “[a]n attorney | 1 | 1 |
Wong v. Taborgreen1 sentence1983Wong v. Tabor, supra, at 1288 (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Bell
green
2 sentences2016Id. at 560 . 2016Id. at 560 , 69 A.3d 1040 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Davy
green
2 sentences2015Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shuler, 443 Md. 494, 505 , 117 A.3d 38 (2015) (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by neglecting to inform the client that he had not *257 prevailed in his civil appeal); Shapiro, 441 Md. at 385 , 108 A.3d 394 (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by failing to inform a client that her claim had been dismissed and continuing to misrepresent the status of the case over several years); Davy, 435 Md. at 701 , 80 A.3d 322 (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by failing to notify the client that her complaint had been rejected by 2015Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shuler, 443 Md. 494, 505 , 117 A.3d 38 (2015) (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by neglecting to inform the client that he had not *257 prevailed in his civil appeal); Shapiro, 441 Md. at 385 , 108 A.3d 394 (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by failing to inform a client that her claim had been dismissed and continuing to misrepresent the status of the case over several years); Davy, 435 Md. at 701 , 80 A.3d 322 (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by failing to notify the client that her complaint had been rejected by | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Alonso
green
1 sentence2015Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shuler, 443 Md. 494, 505 , 117 A.3d 38 (2015) (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by neglecting to inform the client that he had not *257 prevailed in his civil appeal); Shapiro, 441 Md. at 385 , 108 A.3d 394 (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by failing to inform a client that her claim had been dismissed and continuing to misrepresent the status of the case over several years); Davy, 435 Md. at 701 , 80 A.3d 322 (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by failing to notify the client that her complaint had been rejected by | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Shapiro
green
1 sentence2015Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shuler, 443 Md. 494, 505 , 117 A.3d 38 (2015) (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by neglecting to inform the client that he had not *257 prevailed in his civil appeal); Shapiro, 441 Md. at 385 , 108 A.3d 394 (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by failing to inform a client that her claim had been dismissed and continuing to misrepresent the status of the case over several years); Davy, 435 Md. at 701 , 80 A.3d 322 (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by failing to notify the client that her complaint had been rejected by | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Shuler
green
2 sentences2015Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shuler, 443 Md. 494, 505 , 117 A.3d 38 (2015) (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by neglecting to inform the client that he had not *257 prevailed in his civil appeal); Shapiro, 441 Md. at 385 , 108 A.3d 394 (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by failing to inform a client that her claim had been dismissed and continuing to misrepresent the status of the case over several years); Davy, 435 Md. at 701 , 80 A.3d 322 (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by failing to notify the client that her complaint had been rejected by 2015Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shuler, 443 Md. 494, 505 , 117 A.3d 38 (2015) (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by neglecting to inform the client that he had not *257 prevailed in his civil appeal); Shapiro, 441 Md. at 385 , 108 A.3d 394 (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by failing to inform a client that her claim had been dismissed and continuing to misrepresent the status of the case over several years); Davy, 435 Md. at 701 , 80 A.3d 322 (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by failing to notify the client that her complaint had been rejected by | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Newman v. State
green
1 sentence2011Id. (citations omitted). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Monfried
green
1 sentence2008Id. at 392, 393 , 794 A.2d at 103 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp.
green
2 sentences2006The Court of Appeals reviewed the development of the discovery rule in Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 333 Md. 324, 336-37 , 635 A.2d 394 (1994), and noted that mere constructive knowledge is not adequate to start the running of the limitations period: The discovery rule requires that the plaintiff must have notice of a claim to start the running of limitations. 2006The Court of Appeals reviewed the development of the discovery rule in Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 333 Md. 324, 336-37 , 635 A.2d 394 (1994), and noted that mere constructive knowledge is not adequate to start the running of the limitations period: The discovery rule requires that the plaintiff must have notice of a claim to start the running of limitations. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Bank of New York v. Sheff
green
2 sentences2006And unlike the client in the Sheff case who received several post-settlement communications that put the client on inquiry notice of the alleged legal malpractice, 382 Md. at 246-47 , 854 A.2d 1269 , there was no evidence before the motion court in Meeks’s case that would support a finding as a matter of law that something happened prior to 2001 that would have put Meeks on inquiry notice to investigate whether the signed prenuptial agreement contained the waiver-of-alimony provision he had seen in the draft. 2006And unlike the client in the Sheff case who received several post-settlement communications that put the client on inquiry notice of the alleged legal malpractice, 382 Md. at 246-47 , 854 A.2d 1269 , there was no evidence before the motion court in Meeks’s case that would support a finding as a matter of law that something happened prior to 2001 that would have put Meeks on inquiry notice to investigate whether the signed prenuptial agreement contained the waiver-of-alimony provision he had seen in the draft. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Finnesey
green
2 sentences2006Grievance Com’n v. Finnesey, 283 Md. 541, 547 , 391 A.2d 434 (1978)[,] the Court found a violation of this communication rule when an attorney told a client a hearing was rescheduled when it was actually dismissed. 2006Grievance Com’n v. Finnesey, 283 Md. 541, 547 , 391 A.2d 434 (1978)[,] the Court found a violation of this communication rule when an attorney told a client a hearing was rescheduled when it was actually dismissed. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Harrison v. State
green
2 sentences2004This development effectively ended the use of the "point of honor." During the latter half of the eighteenth century another theory evolved which recognized that the client held a privilege which prohibited the disclosure of client secrets by the attorney, rather than simply permitting the attorney to keep "the client's confidences as a professional prerogative." Id. 2004This development effectively ended the use of the “point of honor.” During the latter half of the eighteenth century another theory evolved which recognized that the client held a privilege which prohibited the disclosure of client secrets by the attorney, rather than simply permitting the attorney to keep “the client’s confidences as a professional prerogative.” Id. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
General Exchange Insurance v. Driscoll
green
1 sentence1998Corp. v. Driscoll, 315 Mass. 360, 364-365 , 52 N.E.2d 970, 973 (1944) (insurance company was subrogated to an insured’s cause of action for property damage to the insured’s car, and therefore had the “right to receive the proceeds” of any cause of action for that property damage; insured’s attorney held liable to insurer for distribut *519 ing settlement proceeds to the insured which were specifically marked as being for property damage). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.