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32 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1913–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Wilsongreen2 sentences2000Ex parte Wilson, 724 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). 2000Ex parte Wilson, 724 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). | 4 | 4 |
Cameron v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Evid. 503(b)(1); see Cameron v. State, 241 S.W.3d 15, 19 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). 2012Evid. 503(b)(2) (providing that, in criminal cases, “a client has a privilege to prevent the lawyer or the lawyer’s representative from disclosing any other fact which came to the knowledge of the lawyer or the lawyer’s representative by reason of the attorney-client relationship”); Cameron, 241 S.W.3d at 19 (noting that work-product privilege falls within “special rule” of section 502(b)(2)); Joseph v. State, 3 S.W.3d 627, 637 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (involving absence of attorney-client privilege when client alleged ineffective assistance of counsel). | 2 | 3 |
West v. Solitogreen2 sentences2018Co., 373 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Tex. 2012); West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240 , 244 n.2 (Tex. 1978). 1994Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 503(b); West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex.1978). | 1 | 2 |
Mallios v. Bakergreen1 sentence2024Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 707-708 (Tex. 1996); see also Mallios v. Baker, 11 S.W.3d 157, 159, 162-172 (Tex. 2000) (Hecht, J., concurring). 2 not. 2 The Client’s claim is its own so long as it retains substantial control over it, whatever interest in Client’s success another may have. 3 To be 2 sure, the trial court must be careful to see that a jury is fully aware of Opponent’s efforts and incentives to advance Client’s position against its Lawyer and not be confused or misled by Opponent’s change of position and financial interest in the outcome. | 1 | 1 |
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandygreen1 sentence2024Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 707-708 (Tex. 1996); see also Mallios v. Baker, 11 S.W.3d 157, 159, 162-172 (Tex. 2000) (Hecht, J., concurring). 2 not. 2 The Client’s claim is its own so long as it retains substantial control over it, whatever interest in Client’s success another may have. 3 To be 2 sure, the trial court must be careful to see that a jury is fully aware of Opponent’s efforts and incentives to advance Client’s position against its Lawyer and not be confused or misled by Opponent’s change of position and financial interest in the outcome. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Living Centers of Texas, Inc.green1 sentence2021See id. | 1 | 1 |
In re XL Specialty Insurance Co.green1 sentence2018Co., 373 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Tex. 2012); West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240 , 244 n.2 (Tex. 1978). | 1 | 1 |
In re Dish Network, LLCgreen1 sentence2018TEX.R.EVID. 503(b)(1); see In re DISH Network, LLC, 528 S.W.3d 177, 181 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2017, orig. proceeding). | 1 | 1 |
Coker v. Cokergreen1 sentence2017To that end, the Client expressly authorizes the Attorneys “to act in his . . . behalf to obtain 3 See also Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (“The jury’s task is to decide a fact issue based on the preponderance of the evidence.”); Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 394 (“When a contract contains an ambiguity, . . . the interpretation of the instrument becomes a fact issue.”) (citing Harris v. Rowe, 593 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tex. 1980)). 2 satisfaction of that claim.” (Emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Rowegreen1 sentence2017To that end, the Client expressly authorizes the Attorneys “to act in his . . . behalf to obtain 3 See also Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (“The jury’s task is to decide a fact issue based on the preponderance of the evidence.”); Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 394 (“When a contract contains an ambiguity, . . . the interpretation of the instrument becomes a fact issue.”) (citing Harris v. Rowe, 593 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tex. 1980)). 2 satisfaction of that claim.” (Emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Cain v. Baingreen1 sentence2017To that end, the Client expressly authorizes the Attorneys “to act in his . . . behalf to obtain 3 See also Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (“The jury’s task is to decide a fact issue based on the preponderance of the evidence.”); Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 394 (“When a contract contains an ambiguity, . . . the interpretation of the instrument becomes a fact issue.”) (citing Harris v. Rowe, 593 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tex. 1980)). 2 satisfaction of that claim.” (Emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Lavrinenkogreen1 sentence2016See Com. v. Lavrinenko, 38 N.E.3d 278 , 284–85 (Mass. 2015). | 1 | 1 |
King v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Robinson, 236 S.W.3d at 269 (citing King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Martinezgreen1 sentence2015The “[i]nvocation of the privilege is dependent upon the existence of an attorney-client relationship, which has been defined as a contractual relationship whereby an attorney agrees to render professional services for a client.” State v. Martinez, 116 S.W.3d 385, 392 (Tex. App. - El Paso 2003, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Arlington Memorial Hospital Foundation, Inc. v. Bartongreen1 sentence2014Found., Inc. v. Barton, 952 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, orig. proceeding). 8 A. Attorney-Client Privilege Texas Rule of Evidence 503 provides that a client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client. | 1 | 1 |
Frausto v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Attorney-Client Privilege The attorney-client privilege gives the client the privilege to prevent the disclosure of 22 See Frausto v. State, 642 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Joseph v. Stategreen1 sentence2012Evid. 503(b)(2) (providing that, in criminal cases, “a client has a privilege to prevent the lawyer or the lawyer’s representative from disclosing any other fact which came to the knowledge of the lawyer or the lawyer’s representative by reason of the attorney-client relationship”); Cameron, 241 S.W.3d at 19 (noting that work-product privilege falls within “special rule” of section 502(b)(2)); Joseph v. State, 3 S.W.3d 627, 637 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (involving absence of attorney-client privilege when client alleged ineffective assistance of counsel). | 1 | 1 |
In re Shunkgreen2 sentences2001In criminal cases, a client has a privilege to prevent the lawyer or lawyer's representative from disclosing any other fact which came to the knowledge of the lawyer or the lawyer's representative by reason of the attorney-client relationship. (emphasis in original) [60] See Rivkind, 791 P.2d at 1044 (two-year suspension); Stauffer, 858 P.2d at 699 (disbarment for felony conviction of cocaine where there were other disciplinary problems); West, 550 So.2d at 463 (automatic suspension of three years reduced to eighteen months); Shunk, 847 S.W.2d at 792 (indefinite suspension with leave to apply 2001See Rivkind, 791 P.2d at 1044 (two-year suspension); Stauffer, 858 P.2d at 699 (disbarment for felony conviction of cocaine where there were other disciplinary problems); West, 550 So.2d at 463 (automatic suspension of three years reduced to eighteen months); Shunk, 847 S.W.2d at 792 (indefinite suspension with leave to apply for reinstatement within six months even though the attorney had already been discharged from his criminal probation); Gibson, 393 S.E.2d at 184 (disbarment); see also Thomas, 472 N.E.2d at 610 (three-year suspension for misdemeanor possession of marijuana); Denton, 598 P | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Rivkindgreen2 sentences2001In criminal cases, a client has a privilege to prevent the lawyer or lawyer's representative from disclosing any other fact which came to the knowledge of the lawyer or the lawyer's representative by reason of the attorney-client relationship. (emphasis in original) [60] See Rivkind, 791 P.2d at 1044 (two-year suspension); Stauffer, 858 P.2d at 699 (disbarment for felony conviction of cocaine where there were other disciplinary problems); West, 550 So.2d at 463 (automatic suspension of three years reduced to eighteen months); Shunk, 847 S.W.2d at 792 (indefinite suspension with leave to apply 2001See Rivkind, 791 P.2d at 1044 (two-year suspension); Stauffer, 858 P.2d at 699 (disbarment for felony conviction of cocaine where there were other disciplinary problems); West, 550 So.2d at 463 (automatic suspension of three years reduced to eighteen months); Shunk, 847 S.W.2d at 792 (indefinite suspension with leave to apply for reinstatement within six months even though the attorney had already been discharged from his criminal probation); Gibson, 393 S.E.2d at 184 (disbarment); see also Thomas, 472 N.E.2d at 610 (three-year suspension for misdemeanor possession of marijuana); Denton, 598 P | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Gibsongreen2 sentences2001In criminal cases, a client has a privilege to prevent the lawyer or lawyer's representative from disclosing any other fact which came to the knowledge of the lawyer or the lawyer's representative by reason of the attorney-client relationship. (emphasis in original) [60] See Rivkind, 791 P.2d at 1044 (two-year suspension); Stauffer, 858 P.2d at 699 (disbarment for felony conviction of cocaine where there were other disciplinary problems); West, 550 So.2d at 463 (automatic suspension of three years reduced to eighteen months); Shunk, 847 S.W.2d at 792 (indefinite suspension with leave to apply 2001See Rivkind, 791 P.2d at 1044 (two-year suspension); Stauffer, 858 P.2d at 699 (disbarment for felony conviction of cocaine where there were other disciplinary problems); West, 550 So.2d at 463 (automatic suspension of three years reduced to eighteen months); Shunk, 847 S.W.2d at 792 (indefinite suspension with leave to apply for reinstatement within six months even though the attorney had already been discharged from his criminal probation); Gibson, 393 S.E.2d at 184 (disbarment); see also Thomas, 472 N.E.2d at 610 (three-year suspension for misdemeanor possession of marijuana); Denton, 598 P | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Thomasgreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stauffergreen2 sentences2001In criminal cases, a client has a privilege to prevent the lawyer or lawyer's representative from disclosing any other fact which came to the knowledge of the lawyer or the lawyer's representative by reason of the attorney-client relationship. (emphasis in original) [60] See Rivkind, 791 P.2d at 1044 (two-year suspension); Stauffer, 858 P.2d at 699 (disbarment for felony conviction of cocaine where there were other disciplinary problems); West, 550 So.2d at 463 (automatic suspension of three years reduced to eighteen months); Shunk, 847 S.W.2d at 792 (indefinite suspension with leave to apply 2001See Rivkind, 791 P.2d at 1044 (two-year suspension); Stauffer, 858 P.2d at 699 (disbarment for felony conviction of cocaine where there were other disciplinary problems); West, 550 So.2d at 463 (automatic suspension of three years reduced to eighteen months); Shunk, 847 S.W.2d at 792 (indefinite suspension with leave to apply for reinstatement within six months even though the attorney had already been discharged from his criminal probation); Gibson, 393 S.E.2d at 184 (disbarment); see also Thomas, 472 N.E.2d at 610 (three-year suspension for misdemeanor possession of marijuana); Denton, 598 P | 1 | 1 |
| In the Matter of Holtgreen | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Dentongreen2 sentences2001In criminal cases, a client has a privilege to prevent the lawyer or lawyer's representative from disclosing any other fact which came to the knowledge of the lawyer or the lawyer's representative by reason of the attorney-client relationship. (emphasis in original) [60] See Rivkind, 791 P.2d at 1044 (two-year suspension); Stauffer, 858 P.2d at 699 (disbarment for felony conviction of cocaine where there were other disciplinary problems); West, 550 So.2d at 463 (automatic suspension of three years reduced to eighteen months); Shunk, 847 S.W.2d at 792 (indefinite suspension with leave to apply 2001See Rivkind, 791 P.2d at 1044 (two-year suspension); Stauffer, 858 P.2d at 699 (disbarment for felony conviction of cocaine where there were other disciplinary problems); West, 550 So.2d at 463 (automatic suspension of three years reduced to eighteen months); Shunk, 847 S.W.2d at 792 (indefinite suspension with leave to apply for reinstatement within six months even though the attorney had already been discharged from his criminal probation); Gibson, 393 S.E.2d at 184 (disbarment); see also Thomas, 472 N.E.2d at 610 (three-year suspension for misdemeanor possession of marijuana); Denton, 598 P | 1 | 1 |
Enochs v. Browngreen1 sentence2001See id. at 317 . | 1 | 1 |
The Florida Bar v. Westgreen2 sentences2001In criminal cases, a client has a privilege to prevent the lawyer or lawyer's representative from disclosing any other fact which came to the knowledge of the lawyer or the lawyer's representative by reason of the attorney-client relationship. (emphasis in original) [60] See Rivkind, 791 P.2d at 1044 (two-year suspension); Stauffer, 858 P.2d at 699 (disbarment for felony conviction of cocaine where there were other disciplinary problems); West, 550 So.2d at 463 (automatic suspension of three years reduced to eighteen months); Shunk, 847 S.W.2d at 792 (indefinite suspension with leave to apply 2001See Rivkind, 791 P.2d at 1044 (two-year suspension); Stauffer, 858 P.2d at 699 (disbarment for felony conviction of cocaine where there were other disciplinary problems); West, 550 So.2d at 463 (automatic suspension of three years reduced to eighteen months); Shunk, 847 S.W.2d at 792 (indefinite suspension with leave to apply for reinstatement within six months even though the attorney had already been discharged from his criminal probation); Gibson, 393 S.E.2d at 184 (disbarment); see also Thomas, 472 N.E.2d at 610 (three-year suspension for misdemeanor possession of marijuana); Denton, 598 P | 1 | 1 |
| Austin v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ballew v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. David O'Malleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| MortgageAmerica Corp. v. American National Bank of Austingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Trousdale v. Henry
green
2 sentences2016Id. at 232 . 2016Similarly, in Trousdale v. Henry, 261 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied), when a client alleged that attorneys failed to inform her that her claims Failing to advise Plaintiffs that the Distressed Debt Strategy was an illegal and abusive tax shelter that the IRS would disallow and assess Plaintiffs with back-taxes, interest, and penalties; Failing to advise Plaintiffs that Plaintiffs’ tax position was weak; [and] Failing to advise Plaintiffs that Plaintiffs would not prevail in the IRS dispute, whether during the audit, appeals, or in court. –14– had been dismissed, | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Robinson v. State
green
1 sentence2015Robinson, 236 S.W.3d at 269 (citing King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Jampole v. Matthews
green
1 sentence2015The only “benefit” they identified were fees associated with the recovery of expenses they incurred in the prosecution of the 3 In Jampole v. Matthews, 857 S.W.2d 57 , 61–63 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied), the court held that the client stated a claim for fraud separate from a negligence claim. 27 Toyota lawsuit—none of which Billy and Freida argue were improper. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Carmona v. State
green
2 sentences2015Rule 503(b)(2) adds a special rule of it wise to present evidence of no waiver.” Id. privilege for criminal cases: “In criminal cases, a client has a privilege to prevent the lawyer or lawyer's representative from disclosing any other [36] [37]We review the trial court's decision on the fact which came to the knowledge of the lawyer or applicability of a privilege for an abuse of discretion. the lawyer's representative by reason of the Id. at 664 . 2015Rule 503(b)(2) adds a special rule of it wise to present evidence of no waiver.” Id. privilege for criminal cases: “In criminal cases, a client has a privilege to prevent the lawyer or lawyer's representative from disclosing any other [36] [37]We review the trial court's decision on the fact which came to the knowledge of the lawyer or applicability of a privilege for an abuse of discretion. the lawyer's representative by reason of the Id. at 664 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Lawrence v. CDB Services, Inc.
red
2 sentences2015The Court criticizes this agreement because it lawyer could not form a reasonable belief that the would benefit the client only when the claim is improved fee is reasonable."). by changing lawyers, but since the client is in control, 4 Lawrence v. CDB Servs., Inc., 44 S.W.3d 544 , benefit to the client should always be intended and, absent 553, 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 554 (Tex. 2001) ("'Public misjudgment, achieved. 2015The Court criticizes this agreement because it lawyer could not form a reasonable belief that the would benefit the client only when the claim is improved fee is reasonable."). by changing lawyers, but since the client is in control, 4 Lawrence v. CDB Servs., Inc., 44 S.W.3d 544 , benefit to the client should always be intended and, absent 553, 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 554 (Tex. 2001) ("'Public misjudgment, achieved. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Martinez v. State
green
1 sentence2013App. 1982) (quoting Martinez v. State, 588 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Austin v. State green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Hernandez v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Fisher v. United States green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Walker v. Packer green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Texas Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Davis green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Barnes v. Whittington green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Weisel Enterprises, Inc. v. Curry green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Emerson v. Scott green | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.