10 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Schwartz v. Maryland Department of Natural Resourcesgreen2 sentences2010In considering such an agency decision, however, “[w]e frequently give weight to an agency’s experience in interpretation of a statute that it administers.” Schwartz, 385 Md. at 554 , 870 A.2d at 180 ; see also Board of Physician Quality Assur. v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69 , 729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999) (“Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative agency.”). 2010In considering such an agency decision, however, “[w]e frequently give weight to an agency’s experience in interpretation of a statute that it administers.” Schwartz, 385 Md. at 554 , 870 A.2d at 180 ; see also Board of Physician Quality Assur. v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69 , 729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999) (“Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative agency.”). | 2 | 3 |
Miller v. Comptroller of Marylandgreen2 sentences2011Miller v. Comptroller of Md., 398 Md. 272, 280 , 920 A.2d 467, 472 (2007) (“[T]he question is one of statutory interpretation and [is], therefore, a purely legal inquiry.”) (internal quotes and citations omitted); State Dep’t of Assessments and Tax’n v. N. Balt. 2011Miller v. Comptroller of Md., 398 Md. 272, 280 , 920 A.2d 467, 472 (2007) (“[T]he question is one of statutory interpretation and [is], therefore, a purely legal inquiry.”) (internal quotes and citations omitted); State Dep’t of Assessments and Tax’n v. N. Balt. | 2 | 2 |
State Department of Assessments & Taxation v. North Baltimore Center, Inc.green2 sentences2010See Miller v. Comptroller of Md., 398 Md. 272, 280-81 , 920 A.2d 467, 472 (2007) (“[T]he question is one of statutory interpretation and [is], therefore, a purely legal inquiry.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation v. North Baltimore Ctr., Inc., 129 Md.App. 588, 595 , 743 A.2d 759, 763 (2000) (“The interpretation of a statute normally presents a question of law.”) (citations omitted). 2010See Miller v. Comptroller of Md., 398 Md. 272, 280-81 , 920 A.2d 467, 472 (2007) (“[T]he question is one of statutory interpretation and [is], therefore, a purely legal inquiry.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation v. North Baltimore Ctr., Inc., 129 Md.App. 588, 595 , 743 A.2d 759, 763 (2000) (“The interpretation of a statute normally presents a question of law.”) (citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Davis v. Slatergreen2 sentences2015“This is a purely legal inquiry; therefore, we construe Rule 2-325(a) withbut giving deference to [the circuit court’s or] the intermediate appellate court’s interpretation.” Duckett, 428 Md. at 477 , 52 A.3d at 87 (citing Davis, 383 Md. at 604 , 861 A.2d at 80-81 ). 2015“This is a purely legal inquiry; therefore, we construe Rule 2-325(a) withbut giving deference to [the circuit court’s or] the intermediate appellate court’s interpretation.” Duckett, 428 Md. at 477 , 52 A.3d at 87 (citing Davis, 383 Md. at 604 , 861 A.2d at 80-81 ). | 1 | 4 |
Duckett v. Rileygreen2 sentences2015“This is a purely legal inquiry; therefore, we construe Rule 2-325(a) withbut giving deference to [the circuit court’s or] the intermediate appellate court’s interpretation.” Duckett, 428 Md. at 477 , 52 A.3d at 87 (citing Davis, 383 Md. at 604 , 861 A.2d at 80-81 ). 2015“This is a purely legal inquiry; therefore, we construe Rule 2-325(a) withbut giving deference to [the circuit court’s or] the intermediate appellate court’s interpretation.” Duckett, 428 Md. at 477 , 52 A.3d at 87 (citing Davis, 383 Md. at 604 , 861 A.2d at 80-81 ). | 1 | 2 |
Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banksgreen2 sentences2010In considering such an agency decision, however, “[w]e frequently give weight to an agency’s experience in interpretation of a statute that it administers.” Schwartz, 385 Md. at 554 , 870 A.2d at 180 ; see also Board of Physician Quality Assur. v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69 , 729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999) (“Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative agency.”). 2010In considering such an agency decision, however, “[w]e frequently give weight to an agency’s experience in interpretation of a statute that it administers.” Schwartz, 385 Md. at 554 , 870 A.2d at 180 ; see also Board of Physician Quality Assur. v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69 , 729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999) (“Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative agency.”). | 1 | 1 |
Ross v. State Board of Electionsgreen2 sentences2009See also Ross, 387 Md. at 668-70 , 876 A.2d 692 (discussing the history of the equitable doctrine of laches). 2009See also Ross, 387 Md. at 668-70 , 876 A.2d 692 (discussing the history of the equitable doctrine of laches). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Gehring
green
2 sentences1989The “merger” of law and equity procedures achieved by Md.Rule 2-301 has not affected the viability or the applicability of this doctrine, [citations omitted] In Smith v. Gehring, 64 Md.App. 359, 370-72 , 496 A.2d 317 (1985), we said: We hold that neither Md.Rule 2-301, nor Md.Rule 2-323(g), nor any combination of them makes the doctrine of latches available as a defense to a purely legal claim---- Those purposes do not extend ... to a legal claim as opposed to an equitable claim. 1989The “merger” of law and equity procedures achieved by Md.Rule 2-301 has not affected the viability or the applicability of this doctrine, [citations omitted] In Smith v. Gehring, 64 Md.App. 359, 370-72 , 496 A.2d 317 (1985), we said: We hold that neither Md.Rule 2-301, nor Md.Rule 2-323(g), nor any combination of them makes the doctrine of latches available as a defense to a purely legal claim---- Those purposes do not extend ... to a legal claim as opposed to an equitable claim. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.