purely legal claim in California

2026Ch. 2003) 824 A.2d 917, 929 . 20 investigation and conclusions [is] a purely legal inquiry,” and then cite, without discussion or analysis, two cases: In Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. Superior Court (2020) 9 Cal.5th 279 and People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe (1951) 37 Cal.2d 283 .

2026Ch. 2003) 824 A.2d 917, 929 . 20 investigation and conclusions [is] a purely legal inquiry,” and then cite, without discussion or analysis, two cases: In Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. Superior Court (2020) 9 Cal.5th 279 and People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe (1951) 37 Cal.2d 283 .

2025(Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 902; People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723 .) “When construing probation conditions, we consider their context and we use common sense.” (Smith, at p. 902.) 10 Given B.L.’s assertion that his claims involve facial challenges that present pure questions of law, we limit our review of B.L.’s claims to the purely legal inquiry of whether the challenged conditions are unconstitutional on their face.

2025(See Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 885, fn. 5 & pp. 888–889 [facial constitutional challenges permitted regardless of a failure to object at trial].) 19 2.

2022(See People v. Cuevas (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374 , 383–384 [certificate of probable cause required to present a purely legal challenge to the negotiated maximum sentence imposed as part of the plea bargain, implicating the validity of the plea itself].) III.

2022For these same reasons, we are not persuaded by Torres’s related argument that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is not subject to forfeiture principles.8 Although we agree with Torres that the doctrine “serves to guard the integrity of the judicial system and prevent the use of unfair strategies” (Lee, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 630 ), its application is discretionary even where all its elements are established (Blix Street Records, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 47).

2021The court’s role at that point is to review the petition and decide if it supports a prima facie claim for relief, resorting only to the petition itself and the record of conviction. (§ 1170.95, subd. (c); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970-971.) At the prima facie stage, “‘“the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.

2021(People v. Rouse, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 299-300.) Similarly, when eligibility under Proposition 47 depends on a factual question such as the value of stolen property, the defendant has a right to be present. ( Simms, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 996-998.) By way of contrast, a prima facie review under section 1170.95 is a purely legal inquiry to determine whether the petitioner has met the requirements for eligibility.

2021(People v. Rouse, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 299-300.) Similarly, when eligibility under Proposition 47 depends on a factual question such as the value of stolen property, the defendant has a right to be present. ( Simms, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 996-998.) By way of contrast, a prima facie review under section 1170.95 is a purely legal inquiry to determine whether the petitioner has met the requirements for eligibility.

2019Contrary to his assertion, he does not present a pure question of law based on undisputed facts. ( People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93 , 118, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 , 72 P.3d 1166 .) Rather, he requests a factual determination of his alleged inability to pay based on a record that contains nothing more than his reliance on appointed counsel at trial.

2019Contrary to his assertion, he does not present a pure question of law based on undisputed facts. ( People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93 , 118, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 , 72 P.3d 1166 .) Rather, he requests a factual determination of his alleged inability to pay based on a record that contains nothing more than his reliance on appointed counsel at trial.

2019Both Castellano and Johnson involved situations in which the trial court imposed the statutory minimum restitution fine. ( Castellano, supra , 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 488, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 138 ; *1033 Johnson, supra , 35 Cal.App.5th at pp. 137-138 and fn. 5, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .) In this case, as in Frandsen , the trial court imposed the statutory maximum restitution fine.

2015(Id. at p. 1182.) Because Zuniga addresses the same arguments and authorities raised here, we quote from the court’s opinion at length: “In People v. Arwood (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 167 (Arwood), the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of forcible rape and admitted a prior felony conviction for assault with a deadly weapon involving personal use of the deadly weapon under section 667, which provided for a five-year enhancement for prior serious or violent felonies. ( Arwood, supra, at p. 170 .) On appeal, the defendant argued that his prior conviction was not a serious felony within the

2015(Id. at p. 1182.) Because Zuniga addresses the same arguments and authorities raised here, we quote from the court’s opinion at length: “In People v. Arwood (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 167 (Arwood), the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of forcible rape and admitted a prior felony conviction for assault with a deadly weapon involving personal use of the deadly weapon under section 667, which provided for a five-year enhancement for prior serious or violent felonies. ( Arwood, supra, at p. 170 .) On appeal, the defendant argued that his prior conviction was not a serious felony within the

2015(Id. at p. 1182.) Because Zuniga addresses the same arguments and authorities raised here, we quote from the court’s opinion at length: “In People v. Arwood (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 167 (Arwood), the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of forcible rape and admitted a prior felony conviction for assault with a deadly weapon involving personal use of the deadly weapon under section 667, which provided for a five-year enhancement for prior serious or violent felonies. ( Arwood, supra, at p. 170 .) On appeal, the defendant argued that his prior conviction was not a serious felony within the

2015(Id. at p. 1182.) Because Zuniga addresses the same arguments and authorities raised here, we quote from the court’s opinion at length: “In People v. Arwood (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 167 (Arwood), the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of forcible rape and admitted a prior felony conviction for assault with a deadly weapon involving personal use of the deadly weapon under section 667, which provided for a five-year enhancement for prior serious or violent felonies. ( Arwood, supra, at p. 170 .) On appeal, the defendant argued that his prior conviction was not a serious felony within the

2008Cir. 2006) 370 U.S. App.D.C. 137 [ 440 F.3d 459, 464 ].) Such a purely legal challenge to the Commission’s authority is therefore fit for decision now.