purely legal inquiry (Texas) · Go Syfert
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purely legal inquiry in Texas

10 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1991–2016 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
City of Waco v. Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commissiongreen
texapp · 2002 · cited in 8 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2006–2010
2 sentences

2007Compare City of Waco, 83 S.W.3d at 175-77 (holding that UDJA claim that agency acted beyond statutory authority "presents a purely legal inquiry" that "will not benefit from the development of additional facts in connection with a specific permit application"), with Esquire Deposition Servs., 240 S.W.3d at 92, 2007 WL 2066178, *9 (statutory authority issue required consideration of specific facts within agency expertise and not yet presented) and Beacon Nat'l Ins.

2007Compare City of Waco, 83 S.W.3d at 175-77 (holding that UDJA claim that agency acted beyond statutory authority “presents a purely legal inquiry” that “will not benefit from the development of additional facts in connection with a specific permit application”), with Esquire Deposition Servs., 240 S.W.3d at 92 , 2007 WL 2066178, *9 (statutory authority issue required consideration of specific facts within agency expertise and not yet presented) and Beacon Nat’l Ins.

78
Beacon National Insurance Co. v. Montemayorgreen
texapp · 2002 · cited in 6 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Co., 86 S.W.3d at 268 (distinguishing City of Waco and holding that UDJA claims there "require[d] determination of several factual matters which have not been sufficiently developed").

2007Co., 86 S.W.3d at 268 (distinguishing City of Waco and holding that UDJA claims there “requirefd] determination of several factual matters which have not been sufficiently developed”).

66
Texas Court Reporters Certification Board v. Esquire Deposition Services, L.L.C.green
texapp · 2007 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Compare City of Waco, 83 S.W.3d at 175-77 (holding that UDJA claim that agency acted beyond statutory authority “presents a purely legal inquiry” that “will not benefit from the development of additional facts in connection with a specific permit application”), with Esquire Deposition Servs., 240 S.W.3d at 92 , 2007 WL 2066178, *9 (statutory authority issue required consideration of specific facts within agency expertise and not yet presented) and Beacon Nat’l Ins.

2007Compare City of Waco, 83 S.W.3d at 175-77 (holding that UDJA claim that agency acted beyond statutory authority “presents a purely legal inquiry” that “will not benefit from the development of additional facts in connection with a specific permit application”), with Esquire Deposition Servs., 240 S.W.3d at 92 , 2007 WL 2066178, *9 (statutory authority issue required consideration of specific facts within agency expertise and not yet presented) and Beacon Nat’l Ins.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (2)

CaseCitedYears
Landers v. State green
texcrimapp · 2013
1 sentence

2016But we held in Landers v. State that a motion for new trial is not required to preserve error for a purely legal challenge to the imposition of costs. 402 S.W.3d at 255 .

12016–2016
Peat Marwick Main v. Haass green
texapp · 1989
2 sentences

1991The court of appeals held that the client acquisition cost provision operated as a restraint of trade and was therefore unenforceable, that the “client reimbursement provision” was reasonable and enforceable, requiring that a portion of the trial court’s judgment be reversed and remanded for determination of MH’s damages under that provision and attorney’s fees, 6 but affirmed the trial court judgment that Haass recover his capital account subject to a $15,000 remittitur of attorneys’ fees. 775 S.W.2d at 711 .

1991The court of appeals held that the client acquisition cost provision operated as a restraint of trade and was therefore unenforceable, that the "client reimbursement provision" was reasonable and enforceable, requiring that a portion of the trial court's judgment be reversed and remanded for determination of MH's damages under that provision and attorney's fees, [6] but affirmed the trial court judgment that Haass recover his capital account subject to a $15,000 remittitur of attorneys' fees. 775 S.W.2d at 711 .

11991–1991

Statutes the citing opinions construe

TX § Tex. Ins. Code § 2501.002 (3) TX § Tex. Ins. Code § 2501.006 (3) TX § Tex. Ins. Code § 2703.203 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 59 (1917–2026) OH 14 (1993–2025) CA 14 (2008–2026) TX 10 (1991–2016) WA 10 (2005–2024) MD 10 (1989–2015) DE 6 (1938–2025) PA 6 (2002–2023) AL 5 (1912–1998) WI 5 (1987–2001) IA 5 (2022–2024) VA 4 (1852–2019) FL 4 (1937–2019) OR 3 (1922–1985) KS 3 (2020–2020) TN 2 (1975–1990) MS 2 (1999–2002) MI 2 (1920–2006) DC 2 (1995–2023) NY 2 (2015–2015) GA 2 (1928–1959) NM 2 (2009–2010) NJ 2 (2001–2005) NV 2 (2016–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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