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74 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1917–2025 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jernigangreen2 sentences2023To that end, “if the record reflects that the judge clearly understood the type of instruction the [d]efendant wanted and understood the tendered instruction needed to be modified to correctly state the law, then the issue is deemed preserved for appellate review.” Id. 2023To that end, “if the record reflects 16 that the judge clearly understood the type of instruction the [d]efendant wanted and 17 understood the tendered instruction needed to be modified to correctly state the law, 18 then the issue is deemed preserved for appellate review.” Id. | 9 | 24 |
State v. Baxendalegreen2 sentences2019See State v. Baxendale, 2016-NMCA-048, ¶ 11 , 370 P.3d 813 (“Generally, to preserve error on a district court’s refusal to give a tendered instruction, the defendant must tender a legally correct statement of law.”). 9 1 fundamental error only. 2019See State v. Baxendale, 2016-NMCA-048, ¶ 11 , 370 P.3d 813 (“[T]o preserve error on a district court’s refusal to give a tendered instruction, the defendant must tender a legally correct statement of the law.”). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Laragreen2 sentences2018See Rule 5-608(D) NMRA (stating that to 3 1 preserve an error for “failure to instruct on any issue, a correct written instruction 2 must be tendered before the jury is instructed”); State v. Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003 , 3 ¶ 10, 139 N.M. 1 , 127 P.3d 537 (“Generally, to preserve error on a trial court’s refusal 4 to give a tendered instruction, the [a]ppellant must tender a legally correct statement 5 of the law.”); State v. Lara, 1990-NMCA-075 , ¶¶ 28-30, 110 N.M. 507 , 797 P.2d 296 6 (stating that in order to premise error on a refused instruction, the defendant must have 7 tendered a legally c 2018See Rule 5-608(D) NMRA (stating that to 3 1 preserve an error for “failure to instruct on any issue, a correct written instruction 2 must be tendered before the jury is instructed”); State v. Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003 , 3 ¶ 10, 139 N.M. 1 , 127 P.3d 537 (“Generally, to preserve error on a trial court’s refusal 4 to give a tendered instruction, the [a]ppellant must tender a legally correct statement 5 of the law.”); State v. Lara, 1990-NMCA-075 , ¶¶ 28-30, 110 N.M. 507 , 797 P.2d 296 6 (stating that in order to premise error on a refused instruction, the defendant must have 7 tendered a legally c | 2 | 3 |
State v. Riveragreen2 sentences2023See id. (stating a defendant is entitled to his requested instruction if evidence supports it); see also Rivera, 2009-NMCA-132, ¶ 36 (stating that a tendered instruction is correctly denied if it misstates the law). {33} Since we hold that the securities offenses are general intent crimes, refusing Defendant’s request to instruct the jury on a higher level of intent was not reversible error. 2023See id. (stating 14 1 a defendant is entitled to his requested instruction if evidence supports it); see also 2 Rivera, 2009-NMCA-132, ¶ 36 (stating that a tendered instruction is correctly denied 3 if it misstates the law). 4 {33} Since we hold that the securities offenses are general intent crimes, refusing 5 Defendant’s request to instruct the jury on a higher level of intent was not reversible 6 error. 7 B. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Boyettgreen2 sentences2023See id. (stating a defendant is entitled to his requested instruction if evidence supports it); see also Rivera, 2009-NMCA-132, ¶ 36 (stating that a tendered instruction is correctly denied if it misstates the law). {33} Since we hold that the securities offenses are general intent crimes, refusing Defendant’s request to instruct the jury on a higher level of intent was not reversible error. 2023See id. (stating 14 1 a defendant is entitled to his requested instruction if evidence supports it); see also 2 Rivera, 2009-NMCA-132, ¶ 36 (stating that a tendered instruction is correctly denied 3 if it misstates the law). 4 {33} Since we hold that the securities offenses are general intent crimes, refusing 5 Defendant’s request to instruct the jury on a higher level of intent was not reversible 6 error. 7 B. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Skippingsgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Skippings, 2011- NMSC-021, ¶ 25, 150 N.M. 216 , 258 P.3d 1008 (explaining that “while it is true that a defendant must generally tender a legally correct instruction to preserve the issue on appeal, Rule 5-608 [NMRA] is subject to flexible enforcement that is consistent with its underlying rationale” and that “if the record reflects that the judge clearly understood the type of instruction the [d]efendant wanted and understood the tendered instruction needed to be modified to correctly state the law, then the issue is deemed preserved for appellate review” (alteration, emphasis, i 2025See State v. Skippings, 2011- NMSC-021, ¶ 25, 150 N.M. 216 , 258 P.3d 1008 (explaining that “while it is true that a defendant must generally tender a legally correct instruction to preserve the issue on appeal, Rule 5-608 [NMRA] is subject to flexible enforcement that is consistent with its underlying rationale” and that “if the record reflects that the judge clearly understood the type of instruction the [d]efendant wanted and understood the tendered instruction needed to be modified to correctly state the law, then the issue is deemed preserved for appellate review” (alteration, emphasis, i | 1 | 2 |
State v. Benallygreen2 sentences2019See State v. Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶ 10 , 139 N.M. 1 , 127 P.3d 537 (“Generally, to preserve error on a trial court’s refusal to give a tendered instruction, the [a]ppellant must tender a legally correct statement of the law.”); State v. Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12 , 131 N.M. 258 , 34 P.3d 1134 (stating that unpreserved issues regarding jury instructions are reviewed for fundamental error); Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. 2019See State v. Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶ 10 , 139 N.M. 1 , 127 P.3d 537 (“Generally, to preserve error on a trial court’s refusal to give a tendered instruction, the [a]ppellant must tender a legally correct statement of the law.”); State v. Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12 , 131 N.M. 258 , 34 P.3d 1134 (stating that unpreserved issues regarding jury instructions are reviewed for fundamental error); Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Padillagreen2 sentences2004The Court noted that the trial court refused the defendant’s tendered instruction, which stated, “If you find the defendant was legally sane, then the Court instructs you that as an additional defense if you find ... whether by reason of a disease or defect of the mind the defendant was incapable of thinking over the fatal act beforehand with a calm and reflective mind (or with a fixed and settled deliberation and coolness of mind) then, you shall find the defendant not guilty of first degree murder and will pass on to the question of whether he is guilty of second degree murder.” Id. at 293 , 2004The Court noted that the trial court refused the defendant’s tendered instruction, which stated, “If you find the defendant was legally sane, then the Court instructs you that as an additional defense if you find ... whether by reason of a disease or defect of the mind the defendant was incapable of thinking over the fatal act beforehand with a calm and reflective mind (or with a fixed and settled deliberation and coolness of mind) then, you shall find the defendant not guilty of first degree murder and will pass on to the question of whether he is guilty of second degree murder.” Id. at 293 , | 1 | 2 |
State v. Ortegared2 sentences2020See State v. Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084 , ¶ 72, 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 (concluding that where all of the defendant’s proffered instructions concerned witness credibility, witness bias and hostility, witness interest in outcome of the case, testimony of accomplices called by the state, immunity of the state’s witnesses, and the plea agreement entered into with witnesses or codefendants, the district court did not err in denying such instructions where it gave UJI 14-5020), abrogated on other grounds by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 17-18 , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 ; State v. Gallegos, 2020See State v. Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084 , ¶ 72, 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 (concluding that where all of the defendant’s proffered instructions concerned witness credibility, witness bias and hostility, witness interest in outcome of the case, testimony of accomplices called by the state, immunity of the state’s witnesses, and the plea agreement entered into with witnesses or codefendants, the district court did not err in denying such instructions where it gave UJI 14-5020), abrogated on other grounds by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 17-18 , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 ; State v. Gallegos, | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences2019See State v. Garcia, 1968- NMSC-119, ¶ 9, 79 N.M. 367 , 443 P.2d 860 (discussing the inconsistent defense doctrine and stating the entrapment defense “is not available to a defendant who denies committing the offense, because [its invocation] necessarily assumes the commission of at least some elements of the offense”). {11} Our Supreme Court has rejected the inconsistent defense doctrine “where the defendant has admitted some elements of an offense, although not all, and where the denial of the other elements is not factually repugnant to the defense of entrapment[.]” Martinez v. State, 1978- 2019See State v. Garcia, 1968- NMSC-119, ¶ 9, 79 N.M. 367 , 443 P.2d 860 (discussing the inconsistent defense doctrine and stating the entrapment defense “is not available to a defendant who denies committing the offense, because [its invocation] necessarily assumes the commission of at least some elements of the offense”). {11} Our Supreme Court has rejected the inconsistent defense doctrine “where the defendant has admitted some elements of an offense, although not all, and where the denial of the other elements is not factually repugnant to the defense of entrapment[.]” Martinez v. State, 1978- | 1 | 1 |
Headley v. Morgan Management Corp.green2 sentences2019Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15 , 137 N.M. 339 , 110 P.3d 1076 (“We will not review unclear arguments, or guess at what [a party’s] arguments might be.”). {11} Based on the foregoing, we conclude the district court did not err in giving jury instructions premised on Southworth. 2019Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15 , 137 N.M. 339 , 110 P.3d 1076 (“We will not review unclear arguments, or guess at what [a party’s] arguments might be.”). {11} Based on the foregoing, we conclude the district court did not err in giving jury instructions premised on Southworth. | 1 | 1 |
Martinez v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See State v. Garcia, 1968- NMSC-119, ¶ 9, 79 N.M. 367 , 443 P.2d 860 (discussing the inconsistent defense doctrine and stating the entrapment defense “is not available to a defendant who denies committing the offense, because [its invocation] necessarily assumes the commission of at least some elements of the offense”). {11} Our Supreme Court has rejected the inconsistent defense doctrine “where the defendant has admitted some elements of an offense, although not all, and where the denial of the other elements is not factually repugnant to the defense of entrapment[.]” Martinez v. State, 1978- 2019See State v. Garcia, 1968- NMSC-119, ¶ 9, 79 N.M. 367 , 443 P.2d 860 (discussing the inconsistent defense doctrine and stating the entrapment defense “is not available to a defendant who denies committing the offense, because [its invocation] necessarily assumes the commission of at least some elements of the offense”). {11} Our Supreme Court has rejected the inconsistent defense doctrine “where the defendant has admitted some elements of an offense, although not all, and where the denial of the other elements is not factually repugnant to the defense of entrapment[.]” Martinez v. State, 1978- | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cabezuelagreen1 sentence2018See Cabezuela, 2011-NMSC-041 , 14 ¶ 21. 15 {39} The district court refused UJI 14-2823 based on the instruction’s use note, 16 which states, “No instruction on this subject shall be given.” We held in State v. Smith 17 that “the trial court did not err when it followed the mandate of this Court and 18 refused” the mere presence instruction based on the use note. 2001-NMSC-004, ¶ 30 , 19 130 N.M. 117 , 19 P.3d 254 ; see also UJI Criminal General Use Note (“No instruction 25 1 shall be given on a subject which a use note directs that no instruction be given.”). 2 Smith controls this case, and we | 1 | 1 |
Hourigan v. Cassidygreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., Hourigan v. Cassidy, 2001- 7 NMCA-085, ¶ 33, 131 N.M. 141 , 33 P.3d 891 (concluding that a tendered jury 8 instruction that was duplicative and did not provide the guidance that the party 9 contended the jury needed was not error). 10 {6} Accordingly, for the reasons stated in our notice of proposed disposition and 11 here, we affirm Defendant’s conviction. 12 {7} IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 ___________________________________ 14 J. 2018See, e.g., Hourigan v. Cassidy, 2001- 7 NMCA-085, ¶ 33, 131 N.M. 141 , 33 P.3d 891 (concluding that a tendered jury 8 instruction that was duplicative and did not provide the guidance that the party 9 contended the jury needed was not error). 10 {6} Accordingly, for the reasons stated in our notice of proposed disposition and 11 here, we affirm Defendant’s conviction. 12 {7} IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 ___________________________________ 14 J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2018See Cabezuela, 2011-NMSC-041 , 14 ¶ 21. 15 {39} The district court refused UJI 14-2823 based on the instruction’s use note, 16 which states, “No instruction on this subject shall be given.” We held in State v. Smith 17 that “the trial court did not err when it followed the mandate of this Court and 18 refused” the mere presence instruction based on the use note. 2001-NMSC-004, ¶ 30 , 19 130 N.M. 117 , 19 P.3d 254 ; see also UJI Criminal General Use Note (“No instruction 25 1 shall be given on a subject which a use note directs that no instruction be given.”). 2 Smith controls this case, and we 2018See Cabezuela, 2011-NMSC-041 , 14 ¶ 21. 15 {39} The district court refused UJI 14-2823 based on the instruction’s use note, 16 which states, “No instruction on this subject shall be given.” We held in State v. Smith 17 that “the trial court did not err when it followed the mandate of this Court and 18 refused” the mere presence instruction based on the use note. 2001-NMSC-004, ¶ 30 , 19 130 N.M. 117 , 19 P.3d 254 ; see also UJI Criminal General Use Note (“No instruction 25 1 shall be given on a subject which a use note directs that no instruction be given.”). 2 Smith controls this case, and we | 1 | 1 |
State v. Caldwellgreen2 sentences2014See State v. Caldwell, 2008- 17 NMCA-049, ¶ 24, 143 N.M. 792 , 182 P.3d 775 (“When a uniform jury instruction 18 exists, that instruction must be used without substantive modification.”). 2014See State v. Caldwell, 2008- 17 NMCA-049, ¶ 24, 143 N.M. 792 , 182 P.3d 775 (“When a uniform jury instruction 18 exists, that instruction must be used without substantive modification.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hornbeckgreen2 sentences2009See Hornbeck, 2008-NMCA-039, ¶ 32 , 143 N.M. 562 , 178 P.3d 847 (stating that a tendered instruction that misstated the law on exemptions was properly refused). {37} Nor did the court err in refusing Defendant’s requested mistake-of-fact instruction. 2009See Hornbeck, 2008-NMCA-039, ¶ 32 , 143 N.M. 562 , 178 P.3d 847 (stating that a tendered instruction that misstated the law on exemptions was properly refused). {37} Nor did the court err in refusing Defendant’s requested mistake-of-fact instruction. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Meadorsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Garciagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ruizgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mireles v. Broderickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Noblegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Isiahred | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lucerogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mozert v. Noedinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. McCrarygreen | 1 | 1 |
| LaBarge v. Stewartgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Blakleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| ZARAFONETIS v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Zarafonetisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Burkettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hill
green
2 sentences2015See State v. Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶ 10 , 139 N.M. 1 , 127 P.3d 537 (“[I]f 7 the record reflects that the judge clearly understood the type of instruction the 8 [d]efendant wanted and understood the tendered instruction needed to be modified to 9 correctly state the law, then the issue is deemed preserved for appellate review.”); 10 State v. Hill, 2001-NMCA-094, ¶ 7 , 131 N.M. 195 , 34 P.3d 139 (stating that the 11 purpose of the rule requiring the tender of a correct instruction “is to alert the trial 12 court to the defendant’s argument”). 2015See State v. Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶ 10 , 139 N.M. 1 , 127 P.3d 537 (“[I]f 7 the record reflects that the judge clearly understood the type of instruction the 8 [d]efendant wanted and understood the tendered instruction needed to be modified to 9 correctly state the law, then the issue is deemed preserved for appellate review.”); 10 State v. Hill, 2001-NMCA-094, ¶ 7 , 131 N.M. 195 , 34 P.3d 139 (stating that the 11 purpose of the rule requiring the tender of a correct instruction “is to alert the trial 12 court to the defendant’s argument”). | 4 | 2005–2016 |
State v. Jones
neutral
2 sentences1980State v. Jones, 1948, 52 N.M. 235 , 195 P.2d 1020 . 1980State v. Jones, 1948, 52 N.M. 235 , 195 P.2d 1020 . | 2 | 1959–1980 |
State v. Gammill
green
2 sentences2025Nevertheless, we remain unpersuaded that the district court erred in declining to instruct the jury as to self-defense. {4} In our calendar notice, we proposed to affirm on the basis that the evidence did not support a self-defense instruction. [CN 6-7] Defendant maintains, however, that his “testimony made the case for all three of the elements required for a self-defense instruction.” [MIO 14] See State v. Gammill, 1985-NMCA-014 , ¶ 17, 102 N.M. 652 , 699 P.2d 125 (providing that an instruction for self-defense involving the use of deadly force “is only warranted when the evidence shows that 2025Nevertheless, we remain unpersuaded that the district court erred in declining to instruct the jury as to self-defense. {4} In our calendar notice, we proposed to affirm on the basis that the evidence did not support a self-defense instruction. [CN 6-7] Defendant maintains, however, that his “testimony made the case for all three of the elements required for a self-defense instruction.” [MIO 14] See State v. Gammill, 1985-NMCA-014 , ¶ 17, 102 N.M. 652 , 699 P.2d 125 (providing that an instruction for self-defense involving the use of deadly force “is only warranted when the evidence shows that | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Munoz
green
2 sentences2023Defendant 20 argues that counsel alerted the district court that he sought a voluntary manslaughter 7 1 instruction through the request for a provocation instruction because the lesser 2 offense of second-degree murder is manslaughter under a jury finding of 3 provocation. 4 {14} We agree that Defendant sufficiently alerted the district court of his intention 5 to obtain a manslaughter instruction because “[t]he critical difference between 6 murder and voluntary manslaughter is the existence of legally sufficient 7 provocation.” State v. Munoz, 1992-NMCA-004 , ¶ 5, 113 N.M. 489 , 827 P.2d 1303 2023Defendant 20 argues that counsel alerted the district court that he sought a voluntary manslaughter 7 1 instruction through the request for a provocation instruction because the lesser 2 offense of second-degree murder is manslaughter under a jury finding of 3 provocation. 4 {14} We agree that Defendant sufficiently alerted the district court of his intention 5 to obtain a manslaughter instruction because “[t]he critical difference between 6 murder and voluntary manslaughter is the existence of legally sufficient 7 provocation.” State v. Munoz, 1992-NMCA-004 , ¶ 5, 113 N.M. 489 , 827 P.2d 1303 | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Munoz
green
2 sentences2022State v. Munoz, 2004-NMCA- 103, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 235 , 96 P.3d 796 . {6} As a preliminary matter and although the third factor, we address and reject the State’s argument that Defendant failed to preserve this issue by not tendering an appropriate jury instruction. “[I]f the record reflects that the judge clearly understood the type of instruction the [d]efendant wanted and understood the tendered instruction needed to be modified to correctly state the law, then the issue is deemed preserved for appellate review.” Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶ 10 . 2022State v. Munoz, 2004-NMCA- 103, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 235 , 96 P.3d 796 . {6} As a preliminary matter and although the third factor, we address and reject the State’s argument that Defendant failed to preserve this issue by not tendering an appropriate jury instruction. “[I]f the record reflects that the judge clearly understood the type of instruction the [d]efendant wanted and understood the tendered instruction needed to be modified to correctly state the law, then the issue is deemed preserved for appellate review.” Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶ 10 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Gallegos
green
2 sentences2020See State v. Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084 , ¶ 72, 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 (concluding that where all of the defendant’s proffered instructions concerned witness credibility, witness bias and hostility, witness interest in outcome of the case, testimony of accomplices called by the state, immunity of the state’s witnesses, and the plea agreement entered into with witnesses or codefendants, the district court did not err in denying such instructions where it gave UJI 14-5020), abrogated on other grounds by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 17-18 , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 ; State v. Gallegos, 2020See State v. Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084 , ¶ 72, 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 (concluding that where all of the defendant’s proffered instructions concerned witness credibility, witness bias and hostility, witness interest in outcome of the case, testimony of accomplices called by the state, immunity of the state’s witnesses, and the plea agreement entered into with witnesses or codefendants, the district court did not err in denying such instructions where it gave UJI 14-5020), abrogated on other grounds by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 17-18 , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 ; State v. Gallegos, | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Kersey v. Hatch
green
2 sentences2020See State v. Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084 , ¶ 72, 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 (concluding that where all of the defendant’s proffered instructions concerned witness credibility, witness bias and hostility, witness interest in outcome of the case, testimony of accomplices called by the state, immunity of the state’s witnesses, and the plea agreement entered into with witnesses or codefendants, the district court did not err in denying such instructions where it gave UJI 14-5020), abrogated on other grounds by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 17-18 , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 ; State v. Gallegos, 2020See State v. Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084 , ¶ 72, 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 (concluding that where all of the defendant’s proffered instructions concerned witness credibility, witness bias and hostility, witness interest in outcome of the case, testimony of accomplices called by the state, immunity of the state’s witnesses, and the plea agreement entered into with witnesses or codefendants, the district court did not err in denying such instructions where it gave UJI 14-5020), abrogated on other grounds by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 17-18 , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 ; State v. Gallegos, | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Hogervorst
green
2 sentences2020See State v. Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084 , ¶ 72, 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 (concluding that where all of the defendant’s proffered instructions concerned witness credibility, witness bias and hostility, witness interest in outcome of the case, testimony of accomplices called by the state, immunity of the state’s witnesses, and the plea agreement entered into with witnesses or codefendants, the district court did not err in denying such instructions where it gave UJI 14-5020), abrogated on other grounds by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 17-18 , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 ; State v. Gallegos, 2020See State v. Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084 , ¶ 72, 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 (concluding that where all of the defendant’s proffered instructions concerned witness credibility, witness bias and hostility, witness interest in outcome of the case, testimony of accomplices called by the state, immunity of the state’s witnesses, and the plea agreement entered into with witnesses or codefendants, the district court did not err in denying such instructions where it gave UJI 14-5020), abrogated on other grounds by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 17-18 , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 ; State v. Gallegos, | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Sandoval
green
2 sentences2019When this Court reviews jury instructions for fundamental error, we will reverse the jury verdict only if doing so is “necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” State v. Sandoval, 2011-NMSC-022, ¶ 13 , 150 N.M. 224 , 258 P.3d 1016 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2019When this Court reviews jury instructions for fundamental error, we will reverse the jury verdict only if doing so is “necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” State v. Sandoval, 2011-NMSC-022, ¶ 13 , 150 N.M. 224 , 258 P.3d 1016 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Barber
green
2 sentences2019See State v. Jernigan, 2006- NMSC-003, ¶ 10, 139 N.M. 1 , 127 P.3d 537 (“Generally, to preserve error on a trial court’s refusal to give a tendered instruction, the [a]ppellant must tender a legally correct statement of the law.”); State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 8 , 135 N.M. 621 , 92 P.3d 633 (“Because [the d]efendant failed to preserve any error . . . we review only for fundamental error.”). {8} Fundamental error occurs in “cases with defendants who are indisputably innocent, and cases in which a mistake in the process makes a conviction fundamentally unfair notwithstanding the apparent gu 2019See State v. Jernigan, 2006- NMSC-003, ¶ 10, 139 N.M. 1 , 127 P.3d 537 (“Generally, to preserve error on a trial court’s refusal to give a tendered instruction, the [a]ppellant must tender a legally correct statement of the law.”); State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 8 , 135 N.M. 621 , 92 P.3d 633 (“Because [the d]efendant failed to preserve any error . . . we review only for fundamental error.”). {8} Fundamental error occurs in “cases with defendants who are indisputably innocent, and cases in which a mistake in the process makes a conviction fundamentally unfair notwithstanding the apparent gu | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Gallegos v. Sandoval
green
1 sentence2015State v. Skippings, 2011-NMSC-021, ¶ 27 , 150 15 N.M. 216 , 258 P.3d 1008 ; Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶ 10 . 16 {28} However, this case is different in that Defendant did not espouse a theory under 17 UJI 14-5161 either in his tendered instruction or in his argument to the district court. 18 Most significantly, his argument admitted the similarity of his two tendered 19 instructions, and he did not assert that he was asserting a different theory with his 15 1 tendered UJI 14-5161 instruction. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Gaines
green
2 sentences2011“The 2 1 propriety of denying a jury instruction is a mixed question of law and fact that we 2 review de novo.” State v. Gaines, 2001-NMSC-036, ¶ 4 , 131 N.M. 347 , 36 P.3d 438 . 3 Defendant’s argument is unavailing because possession of drug paraphernalia 4 is not a lesser-included offense to possession of a controlled substance “under the 5 facts of this case.” The tendered instruction did not provide that the paraphernalia 6 count must be considered if the possession count was rejected. 2011“The 2 1 propriety of denying a jury instruction is a mixed question of law and fact that we 2 review de novo.” State v. Gaines, 2001-NMSC-036, ¶ 4 , 131 N.M. 347 , 36 P.3d 438 . 3 Defendant’s argument is unavailing because possession of drug paraphernalia 4 is not a lesser-included offense to possession of a controlled substance “under the 5 facts of this case.” The tendered instruction did not provide that the paraphernalia 6 count must be considered if the possession count was rejected. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Rudolfo
green
2 sentences2010State v. Rudolfo, 2008-NMSC-036, ¶ 13 , 144 N.M. 305 , 187 P.3d 11 170. 12 1. 2010State v. Rudolfo, 2008-NMSC-036, ¶ 13 , 144 N.M. 305 , 187 P.3d 11 170. 12 1. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Foster red | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Santillanes v. State green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| In Re Consol. Vista Hills Litigation green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Crislip red | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Harless v. Ewing green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Budagher v. Amrep Corp. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Budagher v. Amrep Corp. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Venegas green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| State v. Casteneda green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Gardner v. New Mexico green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| State v. Gardner green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Turner v. McGee green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Mills v. Southwest Builders, Inc. green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Chevron Oil Co. v. Sutton Ex Rel. Sutton green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| State v. Parsons green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| State v. Selgado green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| State v. Beal green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Cave v. Cooley green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Garske v. United States green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| State v. Chesher neutral | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| State v. Dickens green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| State v. Horton green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Russell v. Davis green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Waldroop v. Driver-Miller Plumbing & Heating Corp. green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Parsons v. State green | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Miller v. State green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Shelton v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.