sensible rule in Missouri

2024Instead, we lay down a more sensible rule: A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” Id. at 385–86. 11 Recognizing the Scott Court suggests that a balancing test is appropriate when determining if law enforcement owes a duty to a fleeing motorist under the Fourth Amendment, we take this into consideration when applying the Hoover’s Dairy analysis and concluding that a duty does not exist.

2001In any event, there is no reason to depart from this Court's precedent or create a new exception to a sensible rule: "An intent to terminate the joint tenancy agreement cannot be equated with actual termination." LaGarce, 487 S.W.2d at 501 .

2001In any event, there is no reason to depart from this Court’s precedent or create a new exception to a sensible rule: “An intent to terminate the joint tenancy agreement cannot be equated with actual termination.” LaGarce, 487 S.W.2d at 501 .

1907But a sequence of that rule has been adopted and applied by this court as a sensible rule in the administration of justice, to-wit: If a witness be incompetent and if the party insisting on his incompetency nevertheless examines him on new matter not touched or brought out in chief, then, as to such new matter, his incompetency is waived. [Edwards v. Latimer, 183 Mo. l. c. 627, et seq.; Ayers v. Railroad, 190 Mo. l. c. 236; Johnston v. Johnston, 173 Mo. l. c. 120, et seq.; Hume v. Hopkins, 140 Mo. 65 ; Miller v. Miller’s Admr., 92 Va. 510 ; Banking House v. Rood, 132 Mo. l. c. 264.] Effect wil

1907It is manifest there was no' such “identity of the thing demanded;” there was no such “identity of the cause of demand;” and there was no such identity of the “parties in the character in which they are litigants,” as meets the essential conditions upon which the plea of res judicata proceeds under the sensible rule announced by Mr. Herman, heretofore quoted; and this opinion might conclude at this point were it not for two cases decided by the Court of Appeals of Kansas City, Brown v. Railroad, 96 Mo. App. 164 , and Morris v. Kansas City, 117 Mo. App. 298 , in which another view was entertain

1907It is manifest there was no' such “identity of the thing demanded;” there was no such “identity of the cause of demand;” and there was no such identity of the “parties in the character in which they are litigants,” as meets the essential conditions upon which the plea of res judicata proceeds under the sensible rule announced by Mr. Herman, heretofore quoted; and this opinion might conclude at this point were it not for two cases decided by the Court of Appeals of Kansas City, Brown v. Railroad, 96 Mo. App. 164 , and Morris v. Kansas City, 117 Mo. App. 298 , in which another view was entertain

1907But a sequence of that rule has been adopted and applied by this court as a sensible rule in the administration of justice, to-wit: If a witness be incompetent and if the party insisting on his incompetency nevertheless examines him on new matter not touched or brought out in chief, then, as to such new matter, his incompetency is waived. [Edwards v. Latimer, 183 Mo. l. c. 627, et seq.; Ayers v. Railroad, 190 Mo. l. c. 236; Johnston v. Johnston, 173 Mo. l. c. 120, et seq.; Hume v. Hopkins, 140 Mo. 65 ; Miller v. Miller’s Admr., 92 Va. 510 ; Banking House v. Rood, 132 Mo. l. c. 264.] Effect wil

1906Funkhouser v. Spencer, 164 Mo. 23 , in an opinion written by Marshall, J. — followed by another opinion written by the same learned Judge in the same case. [ 166 Mo. 271 .] It is true that “every court authorized to determine contested elections shall hear and determine the same in a summary manner, without formal pleading . . . .” [R.

1906Funkhouser v. Spencer, 164 Mo. 23 , in an opinion written by Marshall, J. — followed by another opinion written by the same learned Judge in the same case. [ 166 Mo. 271 .] It is true that “every court authorized to determine contested elections shall hear and determine the same in a summary manner, without formal pleading . . . .” [R.

1900It is safe to assume that our juries are men of average intelligence, and if they were in this case they certainly comprehended the meaning of the phrase ‘a morbid and insane delusion;’ Farmer v. Farmer, 129 Mo. 538 .” In accordance with this sensible rule the appellate courts of the state have held that it was not error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury as to the meaning of the word “carelessly,” (Warder v. Henry, 117 Mo. 530 ); the phrase “diligent inquiry” ( 100 Mo. 397 ); the term “reasonable care and diligence” (Johnson v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 340 ); the words “remotely,” “prud

1900It is safe to assume that our juries are men of average intelligence, and if they were in this case they certainly comprehended the meaning of the phrase ‘a morbid and insane delusion;’ Farmer v. Farmer, 129 Mo. 538 .” In accordance with this sensible rule the appellate courts of the state have held that it was not error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury as to the meaning of the word “carelessly,” (Warder v. Henry, 117 Mo. 530 ); the phrase “diligent inquiry” ( 100 Mo. 397 ); the term “reasonable care and diligence” (Johnson v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 340 ); the words “remotely,” “prud

1900It is safe to assume that our juries are men of average intelligence, and if they were in this case they certainly comprehended the meaning of the phrase ‘a morbid and insane delusion;’ Farmer v. Farmer, 129 Mo. 538 .” In accordance with this sensible rule the appellate courts of the state have held that it was not error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury as to the meaning of the word “carelessly,” (Warder v. Henry, 117 Mo. 530 ); the phrase “diligent inquiry” ( 100 Mo. 397 ); the term “reasonable care and diligence” (Johnson v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 340 ); the words “remotely,” “prud

1900It is safe to assume that our juries are men of average intelligence, and if they were in this case they certainly comprehended the meaning of the phrase ‘a morbid and insane delusion;’ Farmer v. Farmer, 129 Mo. 538 .” In accordance with this sensible rule the appellate courts of the state have held that it was not error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury as to the meaning of the word “carelessly,” (Warder v. Henry, 117 Mo. 530 ); the phrase “diligent inquiry” ( 100 Mo. 397 ); the term “reasonable care and diligence” (Johnson v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 340 ); the words “remotely,” “prud

1900It is safe to assume that our juries are men of average intelligence, and if they were in this case they certainly comprehended the meaning of the phrase ‘a morbid and insane delusion;’ Farmer v. Farmer, 129 Mo. 538 .” In accordance with this sensible rule the appellate courts of the state have held that it was not error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury as to the meaning of the word “carelessly,” (Warder v. Henry, 117 Mo. 530 ); the phrase “diligent inquiry” ( 100 Mo. 397 ); the term “reasonable care and diligence” (Johnson v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 340 ); the words “remotely,” “prud

1900It is safe to assume that our juries are men of average intelligence, and if they were in this case they certainly comprehended the meaning of the phrase ‘a morbid and insane delusion;’ Farmer v. Farmer, 129 Mo. 538 .” In accordance with this sensible rule the appellate courts of the state have held that it was not error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury as to the meaning of the word “carelessly,” (Warder v. Henry, 117 Mo. 530 ); the phrase “diligent inquiry” ( 100 Mo. 397 ); the term “reasonable care and diligence” (Johnson v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 340 ); the words “remotely,” “prud

1900It is safe to assume that our juries are men of average intelligence, and if they were in this case they certainly comprehended the meaning of the phrase ‘a morbid and insane delusion;’ Farmer v. Farmer, 129 Mo. 538 .” In accordance with this sensible rule the appellate courts of the state have held that it was not error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury as to the meaning of the word “carelessly,” (Warder v. Henry, 117 Mo. 530 ); the phrase “diligent inquiry” ( 100 Mo. 397 ); the term “reasonable care and diligence” (Johnson v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 340 ); the words “remotely,” “prud