Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
14 California opinions name it 3 courts 1960–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pecsok v. Blackgreen2 sentences2017Such a rule will enable trial courts to resolve issues . . . without expensive and time consuming litigation.” (Pecsok v. Black (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 456, 462 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 ]; id. at pp. 458-159, 462-163 [judgment consisting of attorney fees, costs, and additional “ ‘litigation expenses’ ” authorized by contract, including expert witness fees, was stayed without the need for an undertaking].) The Source of Confusion Mere months later, our Supreme Court held that a costs-only judgment, which included expert witness fees awarded under section 998, was not stayed pending appeal without an und 2017Such a rule will enable trial courts to resolve issues . . . without expensive and time consuming litigation.” (Pecsok v. Black (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 456, 462 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 ]; id. at pp. 458-159, 462-163 [judgment consisting of attorney fees, costs, and additional “ ‘litigation expenses’ ” authorized by contract, including expert witness fees, was stayed without the need for an undertaking].) The Source of Confusion Mere months later, our Supreme Court held that a costs-only judgment, which included expert witness fees awarded under section 998, was not stayed pending appeal without an und | 1 | 1 |
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyergreen2 sentences2000It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." (Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer (1952) 343 U.S. 579, 635 [ 72 S.Ct. 863, 870 , 96 L.Ed. 1153 ] (cone. opn. of Jackson, J.).) We have, in short, practiced a sensible doctrine of shared powers, rather than strictly separated powers. 2000It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." (Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer (1952) 343 U.S. 579, 635 [ 72 S.Ct. 863, 870 , 96 L.Ed. 1153 ] (cone. opn. of Jackson, J.).) We have, in short, practiced a sensible doctrine of shared powers, rather than strictly separated powers. | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.green2 sentences1999We should say what we mean and mean what we say.'" ( American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 428 , 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 210 , 940 P.2d 797 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.), quoting Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 57 , 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 .) Applying this sensible principle in this case, we should either candidly reexamine Brigham and Moles or follow their holdings here. 1999We should say what we mean and mean what we say.'" ( American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 428 , 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 210 , 940 P.2d 797 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.), quoting Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 57 , 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 .) Applying this sensible principle in this case, we should either candidly reexamine Brigham and Moles or follow their holdings here. | 1 | 1 |
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungrengreen2 sentences1999We should say what we mean and mean what we say.'" ( American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 428 , 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 210 , 940 P.2d 797 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.), quoting Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 57 , 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 .) Applying this sensible principle in this case, we should either candidly reexamine Brigham and Moles or follow their holdings here. 1999We should say what we mean and mean what we say.'" ( American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 428 , 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 210 , 940 P.2d 797 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.), quoting Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 57 , 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 .) Applying this sensible principle in this case, we should either candidly reexamine Brigham and Moles or follow their holdings here. | 1 | 1 |
Simpson v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1960As was said in Simpson v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.2d 271, 277 [ 253 P.2d 464 ] : “Courts are reluctant to defeat a fair expression of popular will in elections and will not do so unless required by the plain mandate of the law. [Citing three cases.]” This sensible principle is expressly made applicable to elections for the approval of contracts between irrigation districts and the federal government. 1960As was said in Simpson v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.2d 271, 277 [ 253 P.2d 464 ] : “Courts are reluctant to defeat a fair expression of popular will in elections and will not do so unless required by the plain mandate of the law. [Citing three cases.]” This sensible principle is expressly made applicable to elections for the approval of contracts between irrigation districts and the federal government. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Valencia
green
2 sentences2021It also goes against the sensible principle cautioning courts that they should not “ ‘ “construe statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute ‘with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is a part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 384 .) Given that we are dealing with an extensive statutory scheme of almost fiendish complexity, it is appropriate to take this canon of statutory construction to heart, particularly because section 7522.72 is not even in CERL (which commences with section 31450 and conc 2018It also goes against the sensible principle cautioning courts that they should not " ' "construe statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute 'with *843 reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is a part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.' " ' " ( People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347 , 384, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 230 , 397 P.3d 936 .) Given that we are dealing with an extensive statutory scheme of almost fiendish complexity, it is appropriate to take this canon of statutory construction to heart, particularly because section 7522.72 is not even in CERL ( | 3 | 2018–2021 |
People v. Craig
green
2 sentences2000Instead, we are persuaded by the sensible rule formulated in People v. Craig, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at page 1449 , 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 659 , "that when a sentence is a mix of time and money each must be measured against like components of the earlier sentence for the purposes of determining whether the aggregate sentence has been increased." (See People v. Jones, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1784-1785, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 .) Any other approach would depend to an unacceptable degree on the subjective assessments of trial and appellate courts. 2000Instead, we are persuaded by the sensible rule formulated in People v. Craig, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at page 1449 , 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 659 , "that when a sentence is a mix of time and money each must be measured against like components of the earlier sentence for the purposes of determining whether the aggregate sentence has been increased." (See People v. Jones, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1784-1785, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 .) Any other approach would depend to an unacceptable degree on the subjective assessments of trial and appellate courts. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
In re Taylor
green
2 sentences2021One decision that has survived our Supreme Court’s grants of review that speaks to the issue of a prima facie case for resentencing under section 1170.95 is People v. Taylor (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543 .9 Taylor provides a working definition of what a prima facie case is for the purposes of section 1170.95: “Upon receiving a petition that is supported by the petitioner’s declaration that all three conditions are met and that makes a ‘prima facie showing that the petitioner falls within the provisions of [section 1170.95],’ the sentencing court must issue an order to show cause. (§ 1170.95, subd. 2021One decision that has survived our Supreme Court’s grants of review that speaks to the issue of a prima facie case for resentencing under section 1170.95 is People v. Taylor (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543 .9 Taylor provides a working definition of what a prima facie case is for the purposes of section 1170.95: “Upon receiving a petition that is supported by the petitioner’s declaration that all three conditions are met and that makes a ‘prima facie showing that the petitioner falls within the provisions of [section 1170.95],’ the sentencing court must issue an order to show cause. (§ 1170.95, subd. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Bell v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
green
1 sentence2013Exchange (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 715, 743 , where the court inquired whether the unharmed class members represented only a "marginal element" in the class. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Jones
green
1 sentence2000Instead, we are persuaded by the sensible rule formulated in People v. Craig, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at page 1449 , 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 659 , "that when a sentence is a mix of time and money each must be measured against like components of the earlier sentence for the purposes of determining whether the aggregate sentence has been increased." (See People v. Jones, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1784-1785, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 .) Any other approach would depend to an unacceptable degree on the subjective assessments of trial and appellate courts. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Moles v. Regents of University of California
green
2 sentences1999We should not pretend they do not say something they do, in fact, say. [3] NOTES [1] Civil Code section 846 states in pertinent part: "An owner of any estate or any other interest in real property ... owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose.... [¶] A `recreational purpose,' as used in this section, includes such activities as ... riding, including animal riding....." [2] Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. [3] Rule 56(b) of the California Rules of Court states in part: "The court in its dis 1999We should not pretend they do not say something they do, in fact, say. [3] NOTES [1] Civil Code section 846 states in pertinent part: "An owner of any estate or any other interest in real property ... owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose.... [¶] A `recreational purpose,' as used in this section, includes such activities as ... riding, including animal riding....." [2] Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. [3] Rule 56(b) of the California Rules of Court states in part: "The court in its dis | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Brigham
green
2 sentences1999We should not pretend they do not say something they do, in fact, say. [3] NOTES [1] Civil Code section 846 states in pertinent part: "An owner of any estate or any other interest in real property ... owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose.... [¶] A `recreational purpose,' as used in this section, includes such activities as ... riding, including animal riding....." [2] Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. [3] Rule 56(b) of the California Rules of Court states in part: "The court in its dis 1999We should not pretend they do not say something they do, in fact, say. [3] NOTES [1] Civil Code section 846 states in pertinent part: "An owner of any estate or any other interest in real property ... owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose.... [¶] A `recreational purpose,' as used in this section, includes such activities as ... riding, including animal riding....." [2] Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. [3] Rule 56(b) of the California Rules of Court states in part: "The court in its dis | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Miranda
green
1 sentence1989We therefore conclude a defendant must still tender the issue of the illegality of a search to the superior court in order to obtain review of the issue on appeal to this court. (§ 1538.5, subd. (m); People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 80 ; People v. Lilienthal, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 896 .) II Defendant argues that if he was required to tender the search issue to the superior court, he did so. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences1983The more sensible rule, it appears to us, would have been, that by the act of severance the thief had converted the property into a chattel; and if he then removed it, with a felonious intent, he would be guilty of a larceny, whatever dispatch may have been employed in the removal." ( People v. Williams (1868) 35 Cal. 671, 676 .) But while the rule could no longer command the respect of reason, it was nevertheless honored by time, and on that basis alone the court felt compelled to follow it. 1983The more sensible rule, it appears to us, would have been, that by the act of severance the thief had converted the property into a chattel; and if he then removed it, with a felonious intent, he would be guilty of a larceny, whatever dispatch may have been employed in the removal.” (People v. Williams (1868) 35 Cal. 671, 676 .) But while the rule could no longer command the respect of reason, it was nevertheless honored by time, and on that basis alone the court felt compelled to follow it. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Riley v. Turpin
green
2 sentences1961In Riley v. Turpin (1956), 47 Cal.2d 152 [ 301 P.2d 834 ], a remainderman brought an action for partition of real property between himself and the life tenant. 1961In Riley v. Turpin (1956), 47 Cal.2d 152 [ 301 P.2d 834 ], a remainderman brought an action for partition of real property between himself and the life tenant. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.