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10 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1995–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBridegreen2 sentences2015Rather, the Court has confirmed that “ Rogers announced a general standard for causation in FELA cases, not one addressed exclusively to injuries involving multiple potentially cognizable causes.” McBride,_U.S. at_, 131 S. Ct. at 2639. ¶50 Moreover, even though some part of the injury may have been caused by negligence occurring prior to the limitations period, and was discovered by the employee more than three years before filing suit, the FELA does not allow for apportionment for any reason other than the employee’s contributory negligence. 2015Rather, the Court has confirmed that “Rogers announced a general standard for causation in FELA cases, not one addressed exclusively to injuries involving multiple potentially cognizable causes.” McBride, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2639. ¶50 Moreover, even though some part of the injury may have been caused by negligence occurring prior to the limitations period, and was discovered by the employee more than three years before filing suit, the FELA does not allow for apportionment for any reason other than the employee’s contributory negligence. | 2 | 2 |
Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshallgreen2 sentences2021See 45 U.S.C. § 51 ; Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542-43 , 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2403-04 (1994) (“[c]ognizant of the physical dangers of railroading that resulted in the death or maiming of thousands of workers every year, Congress crafted a federal remedy that shifted part of the ‘human overhead’ of doing business from employees to their employers” (internal citations omitted)). 38 the facts and circumstances of each case in accordance with the governing FELA standard of liability. ¶56 As previously held in Reidelbach v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 2021See 45 U.S.C. § 51 ; Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542-43 , 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2403-04 (1994) (“[c]ognizant of the physical dangers of railroading that resulted in the death or maiming of thousands of workers every year, Congress crafted a federal remedy that shifted part of the ‘human overhead’ of doing business from employees to their employers” (internal citations omitted)). 38 the facts and circumstances of each case in accordance with the governing FELA standard of liability. ¶56 As previously held in Reidelbach v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. | 1 | 1 |
Am. Nurses Ass'n v. Passaic Gen. Hosp.green2 sentences2021Nurses Ass’n, 471 A.2d at 70-71 (emphasis added).9 Thus, contrary to Dannels’ implied assertion, BNSF is in any event not a “self-insurer” or entity “utilizing self-insurance” for FELA claims as recognized under Montana law and referenced in § 33-18-242(8), MCA. ¶52 At bottom as to FELA claims, whatever the structure of its unregulated subsidiary “BNSF Insurance,” BNSF is neither an “insurer,” nor an entity that “utilizes self-insurance” as narrowly recognized under Montana law. 2021Nurses Ass’n, 471 A.2d at 70-71 (emphasis added).9 Thus, contrary to Dannels’ implied assertion, BNSF is in any event not a “self-insurer” or entity “utilizing self-insurance” for FELA claims as recognized under Montana law and referenced in § 33-18-242(8), MCA. ¶52 At bottom as to FELA claims, whatever the structure of its unregulated subsidiary “BNSF Insurance,” BNSF is neither an “insurer,” nor an entity that “utilizes self-insurance” as narrowly recognized under Montana law. | 1 | 1 |
Lauman v. Leegreen2 sentences2012In other words, “a reversal cannot be predicated upon an error in admission of evidence, where the evidence in question was not of such character to have affected the result.” In re A.N., 2000 MT 35, ¶ 55 , 298 Mont. 237 , 995 P2d 427 ; Mason v. Ditzel, 255 Mont. 364, 371 , 842 P.2d 707, 712 (1992); Lauman v Lee, 192 Mont. 84, 90 , 626 P.2d 830, 834 (1981). ¶26 Liability in a FELA claim is premised on negligence. 2012In other words, “a reversal cannot be predicated upon an error in admission of evidence, where the evidence in question was not of such character to have affected the result.” In re A.N., 2000 MT 35, ¶ 55 , 298 Mont. 237 , 995 P2d 427 ; Mason v. Ditzel, 255 Mont. 364, 371 , 842 P.2d 707, 712 (1992); Lauman v Lee, 192 Mont. 84, 90 , 626 P.2d 830, 834 (1981). ¶26 Liability in a FELA claim is premised on negligence. | 1 | 1 |
Mason v. Ditzelgreen2 sentences2012In other words, “a reversal cannot be predicated upon an error in admission of evidence, where the evidence in question was not of such character to have affected the result.” In re A.N., 2000 MT 35, ¶ 55 , 298 Mont. 237 , 995 P2d 427 ; Mason v. Ditzel, 255 Mont. 364, 371 , 842 P.2d 707, 712 (1992); Lauman v Lee, 192 Mont. 84, 90 , 626 P.2d 830, 834 (1981). ¶26 Liability in a FELA claim is premised on negligence. 2012In other words, “a reversal cannot be predicated upon an error in admission of evidence, where the evidence in question was not of such character to have affected the result.” In re A.N., 2000 MT 35, ¶ 55 , 298 Mont. 237 , 995 P2d 427 ; Mason v. Ditzel, 255 Mont. 364, 371 , 842 P.2d 707, 712 (1992); Lauman v Lee, 192 Mont. 84, 90 , 626 P.2d 830, 834 (1981). ¶26 Liability in a FELA claim is premised on negligence. | 1 | 1 |
Meagher County Newlan Creek Water District, Inc. v. Waltergreen2 sentences2008Accordingly, we begin our analysis with a discussion of whether the dismissal in Illinois on the basis of forum non conveniens had any preclusive effect in the State of Montana-especially given Montana’s open door policy with respect to FELA cases. ¶12 Generally, the doctrine of res judicata (more commonly known as claim preclusion) provides “that a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to causes of action or issues thereby litigated, as to the parties and their privies ....” Brault v. Smith, 209 Mont. 21, 26 , 679 P.2d 236, 238-39 (1984) (citing Me 2008Accordingly, we begin our analysis with a discussion of whether the dismissal in Illinois on the basis of forum non conveniens had any preclusive effect in the State of Montana-especially given Montana’s open door policy with respect to FELA cases. ¶12 Generally, the doctrine of res judicata (more commonly known as claim preclusion) provides “that a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to causes of action or issues thereby litigated, as to the parties and their privies ....” Brault v. Smith, 209 Mont. 21, 26 , 679 P.2d 236, 238-39 (1984) (citing Me | 1 | 1 |
Brault v. Smithgreen2 sentences2008Accordingly, we begin our analysis with a discussion of whether the dismissal in Illinois on the basis of forum non conveniens had any preclusive effect in the State of Montana-especially given Montana’s open door policy with respect to FELA cases. ¶12 Generally, the doctrine of res judicata (more commonly known as claim preclusion) provides “that a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to causes of action or issues thereby litigated, as to the parties and their privies ....” Brault v. Smith, 209 Mont. 21, 26 , 679 P.2d 236, 238-39 (1984) (citing Me 2008Accordingly, we begin our analysis with a discussion of whether the dismissal in Illinois on the basis of forum non conveniens had any preclusive effect in the State of Montana-especially given Montana’s open door policy with respect to FELA cases. ¶12 Generally, the doctrine of res judicata (more commonly known as claim preclusion) provides “that a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to causes of action or issues thereby litigated, as to the parties and their privies ....” Brault v. Smith, 209 Mont. 21, 26 , 679 P.2d 236, 238-39 (1984) (citing Me | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Rath Packing Co.green2 sentences2002Additionally, courts must “determine whether, under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [that State’s] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment, and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Jones, 430 U.S. at 526 (citations omitted). ¶29 The issue of bad faith claims-handling practices of an FELA claim *508 by a railroad employer has not been widely litigated. 2002Additionally, courts must “determine whether, under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [that State’s] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment, and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Jones, 430 U.S. at 526 (citations omitted). ¶29 The issue of bad faith claims-handling practices of an FELA claim *508 by a railroad employer has not been widely litigated. | 1 | 1 |
John M. Atkins v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.green2 sentences1998Atkins v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (9th Cir. 1982), 685 F.2d 1146, 1148 (citations omitted). [C]onduct or representations by the defendant-employer which tend to “lull (the plaintiff) into a false sense of security,” can estop the defendant from raising the statute of limitations, on the general equitable principle that “no man may take advantage of his own wrong.” Atkins, 685 F.2d at 1149 . ¶53 In Fletcher v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (8th Cir. 1980), 621 F.2d 902, 906 , the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a railroad is equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations 1998Atkins v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (9th Cir. 1982), 685 F.2d 1146, 1148 (citations omitted). [C]onduct or representations by the defendant-employer which tend to “lull (the plaintiff) into a false sense of security,” can estop the defendant from raising the statute of limitations, on the general equitable principle that “no man may take advantage of his own wrong.” Atkins, 685 F.2d at 1149 . ¶53 In Fletcher v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (8th Cir. 1980), 621 F.2d 902, 906 , the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a railroad is equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ridley v. Guaranty National Insurance
green
1 sentence2021Likewise, prior to claim settlement, and during the pendency of FELA claim litigation, the UTPA requires self-insured carriers to advance payments for an injured worker’s medical expenses “for which liability has become reasonably clear,” Ridley, 286 Mont. at 338 , 951 P.2d at 994 , and for other damages that “are not reasonably in dispute,” such as “[l]ost wages which are reasonably certain,” DuBray v. Farmers Ins. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
DuBray v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
green
2 sentences2021Exchange, 2001 MT 251, ¶¶ 14-15 , 307 Mont. 134 , 36 P.3d 897 . 2021Exchange, 2001 MT 251, ¶¶ 14-15 , 307 Mont. 134 , 36 P.3d 897 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Reidelbach v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co.
green
2 sentences2021Co., 2002 MT 289 , 312 Mont. 498 , 60 P.3d 418 , and again today, under the erroneous presumption procedurally foisted on the Court by the parties’ stipulation below that the UTPA applies to railroads operating in Montana,14 FELA does not preempt an independent state common law fair claims handling duty implied from the employment contract because FELA neither imposes, nor precludes, such a related but distinct legal duty. 2021Co., 2002 MT 289 , 312 Mont. 498 , 60 P.3d 418 , and again today, under the erroneous presumption procedurally foisted on the Court by the parties’ stipulation below that the UTPA applies to railroads operating in Montana,14 FELA does not preempt an independent state common law fair claims handling duty implied from the employment contract because FELA neither imposes, nor precludes, such a related but distinct legal duty. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Peterson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
green
2 sentences2021Co., 2010 MT 187, ¶ 39 , 357 Mont. 293 , 239 P.3d 904 .15 As in the UTPA context, an ultimate finding by the trier of fact on the elements of a FELA claim has no bearing on whether the railroad earlier reasonably disputed the claim based on the then-available material facts known and applicable law. 2021Co., 2010 MT 187, ¶ 39 , 357 Mont. 293 , 239 P.3d 904 .15 As in the UTPA context, an ultimate finding by the trier of fact on the elements of a FELA claim has no bearing on whether the railroad earlier reasonably disputed the claim based on the then-available material facts known and applicable law. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Ridley v. Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence2021Likewise, prior to claim settlement, and during the pendency of FELA claim litigation, the UTPA requires self-insured carriers to advance payments for an injured worker’s medical expenses “for which liability has become reasonably clear,” Ridley, 286 Mont. at 338 , 951 P.2d at 994 , and for other damages that “are not reasonably in dispute,” such as “[l]ost wages which are reasonably certain,” DuBray v. Farmers Ins. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad
green
2 sentences2015Weber , ¶ 22. ¶14 “The LIA should be liberally construed’ in light of its primary purpose to protect employees and require the use of safe equipment.” Weber , ¶ 21 (citing Lilly, 317 U.S. at 486 , 63 S. Ct. at 351 ). 2015Weber , ¶ 22. ¶14 “The LIA should be liberally construed’ in light of its primary purpose to protect employees and require the use of safe equipment.” Weber , ¶ 21 (citing Lilly, 317 U.S. at 486 , 63 S. Ct. at 351 ). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In re A.N.
green
2 sentences2012In other words, “a reversal cannot be predicated upon an error in admission of evidence, where the evidence in question was not of such character to have affected the result.” In re A.N., 2000 MT 35, ¶ 55 , 298 Mont. 237 , 995 P2d 427 ; Mason v. Ditzel, 255 Mont. 364, 371 , 842 P.2d 707, 712 (1992); Lauman v Lee, 192 Mont. 84, 90 , 626 P.2d 830, 834 (1981). ¶26 Liability in a FELA claim is premised on negligence. 2012In other words, “a reversal cannot be predicated upon an error in admission of evidence, where the evidence in question was not of such character to have affected the result.” In re A.N., 2000 MT 35, ¶ 55 , 298 Mont. 237 , 995 P2d 427 ; Mason v. Ditzel, 255 Mont. 364, 371 , 842 P.2d 707, 712 (1992); Lauman v Lee, 192 Mont. 84, 90 , 626 P.2d 830, 834 (1981). ¶26 Liability in a FELA claim is premised on negligence. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In Re An
green
2 sentences2012In other words, “a reversal cannot be predicated upon an error in admission of evidence, where the evidence in question was not of such character to have affected the result.” In re A.N., 2000 MT 35, ¶ 55 , 298 Mont. 237 , 995 P2d 427 ; Mason v. Ditzel, 255 Mont. 364, 371 , 842 P.2d 707, 712 (1992); Lauman v Lee, 192 Mont. 84, 90 , 626 P.2d 830, 834 (1981). ¶26 Liability in a FELA claim is premised on negligence. 2012In other words, “a reversal cannot be predicated upon an error in admission of evidence, where the evidence in question was not of such character to have affected the result.” In re A.N., 2000 MT 35, ¶ 55 , 298 Mont. 237 , 995 P2d 427 ; Mason v. Ditzel, 255 Mont. 364, 371 , 842 P.2d 707, 712 (1992); Lauman v Lee, 192 Mont. 84, 90 , 626 P.2d 830, 834 (1981). ¶26 Liability in a FELA claim is premised on negligence. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Our Lady of the Rockies, Inc. v. Peterson
green
2 sentences2008Our Lady of the Rockies, Inc. v. Peterson, 2008 MT 110, ¶ 14 , 342 Mont. 393, ¶ 14 , 181 P.3d 631, ¶ 14 . 2008Our Lady of the Rockies, Inc. v. Peterson, 2008 MT 110, ¶ 14 , 342 Mont. 393, ¶ 14 , 181 P.3d 631, ¶ 14 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Toscano v. Burlington Northern Railroad
green
2 sentences2002The court stated that “[t]he FELA presents the exclusive remedy in all actions falling within the ambit of the Act, to the exclusion of the common and statutory law of the several states.” Toscano, 678 F.Supp. at 1479 . ¶31 The Toscano Court concluded that “[t]he desire for uniformity which prompted Congress to enact the FELA” precluded imposing liability on BNSF “for actions relating to an FELA claim” when such liability arose from breach of a duty created by state law. 2002The court stated that “[t]he FELA presents the exclusive remedy in all actions falling within the ambit of the Act, to the exclusion of the common and statutory law of the several states.” Toscano, 678 F.Supp. at 1479 . ¶31 The Toscano Court concluded that “[t]he desire for uniformity which prompted Congress to enact the FELA” precluded imposing liability on BNSF “for actions relating to an FELA claim” when such liability arose from breach of a duty created by state law. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal
green
2 sentences1998Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428 , 85 S.Ct. at 1055 . ¶51 In Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal (1959), 359 U.S. 231, 235 , 79 S.Ct. 760, 763 , 3 L.Ed.2d 770 , the United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff is entitled to have his cause tried on the merits, even though he did not file suit within the limitation period prescribed by FELA, if he could prove that misrepresentations were made by agents of the railroad and that those misrepresentations justifiably misled him into not filing suit within the three-year statutory period. ¶52 Relying on Glus , the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 1998Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428 , 85 S.Ct. at 1055 . ¶51 In Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal (1959), 359 U.S. 231, 235 , 79 S.Ct. 760, 763 , 3 L.Ed.2d 770 , the United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff is entitled to have his cause tried on the merits, even though he did not file suit within the limitation period prescribed by FELA, if he could prove that misrepresentations were made by agents of the railroad and that those misrepresentations justifiably misled him into not filing suit within the three-year statutory period. ¶52 Relying on Glus , the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Burnett v. New York Central Railroad
green
2 sentences1998Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428 , 85 S.Ct. at 1055 . ¶51 In Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal (1959), 359 U.S. 231, 235 , 79 S.Ct. 760, 763 , 3 L.Ed.2d 770 , the United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff is entitled to have his cause tried on the merits, even though he did not file suit within the limitation period prescribed by FELA, if he could prove that misrepresentations were made by agents of the railroad and that those misrepresentations justifiably misled him into not filing suit within the three-year statutory period. ¶52 Relying on Glus , the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 1998Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428 , 85 S.Ct. at 1055 . ¶51 In Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal (1959), 359 U.S. 231, 235 , 79 S.Ct. 760, 763 , 3 L.Ed.2d 770 , the United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff is entitled to have his cause tried on the merits, even though he did not file suit within the limitation period prescribed by FELA, if he could prove that misrepresentations were made by agents of the railroad and that those misrepresentations justifiably misled him into not filing suit within the three-year statutory period. ¶52 Relying on Glus , the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Donald D. Fletcher v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, a Corporation
green
2 sentences1998Atkins v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (9th Cir. 1982), 685 F.2d 1146, 1148 (citations omitted). [C]onduct or representations by the defendant-employer which tend to “lull (the plaintiff) into a false sense of security,” can estop the defendant from raising the statute of limitations, on the general equitable principle that “no man may take advantage of his own wrong.” Atkins, 685 F.2d at 1149 . ¶53 In Fletcher v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (8th Cir. 1980), 621 F.2d 902, 906 , the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a railroad is equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations 1998Atkins v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (9th Cir. 1982), 685 F.2d 1146, 1148 (citations omitted). [C]onduct or representations by the defendant-employer which tend to “lull (the plaintiff) into a false sense of security,” can estop the defendant from raising the statute of limitations, on the general equitable principle that “no man may take advantage of his own wrong.” Atkins, 685 F.2d at 1149 . ¶53 In Fletcher v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (8th Cir. 1980), 621 F.2d 902, 906 , the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a railroad is equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Bevacqua v. Burlington Northern, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences1995In Bevacqua v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (1979), 183 Mont. 237 , 598 P.2d 1124 , a non-resident FELA case filed and subsequently dismissed in Cascade County on forum non conveniens grounds, we reversed the district court citing LaBella and Montana's "open door" (open court) policy. 1995In Bevacqua v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (1979), 183 Mont. 237 , 598 P.2d 1124 , a non-resident FELA case filed and subsequently dismissed in Cascade County on forum non conveniens grounds, we reversed the district court citing LaBella and Montana's "open door" (open court) policy. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.