fela claim in Illinois

2007Ass’n, 30 F.3d 877, 878 (7th Cir. 1994) (court held that employee’s filing of his own FELA claim with his employer does not constitute the voluntary furnishing of information to a person in interest about an employee’s injury within the meaning of section 10 of the FELA); Mayon v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 805 F.2d 1250, 1252-53 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[0]ne who helps a co-worker file an FELA claim may have a cause of action under §60 for retaliatory discharge.

2005It has long been held that the FELA provisions do not in themselves prohibit the discharge of an employee for invoking their protections and benefits. 2 See Shrader v. CSX Transportation Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257-58 (2d Cir. 1995) (an employee discharged for filing his or her own FELA claim does not have a cause of action under the FELA for retaliatory discharge); accord Mayon v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 805 F.2d 1250, 1252-53 (5th Cir. 1986) (“one who helps a co-worker file an FELA claim may have a cause of action under [the FELA] for retaliatory discharge.

2007In addition, defendant Metra argued that under the holding in Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 145 Ill.2d 492, 499 , 164 Ill.Dec. 892 , 584 N.E.2d 104, 107-08 (1991), plaintiff could not claim retaliatory discharge because, as matter of law, an in-house counsel in Illinois does not have an action for retaliatory discharge even if the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy.

2007In addition, defendant Metra argued that under the holding in Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 145 Ill.2d 492, 499 , 164 Ill.Dec. 892 , 584 N.E.2d 104, 107-08 (1991), plaintiff could not claim retaliatory discharge because, as matter of law, an in-house counsel in Illinois does not have an action for retaliatory discharge even if the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy.

2005It has long been held that the FELA provisions do not in themselves prohibit the discharge of an employee for invoking their protections and benefits. (footnote: 2) See Shrader v. CSX Transportation Inc. , 70 F.3d 255, 257-58 (2nd Cir 1995) (an employee discharged for filing his or her own FELA claim does not have a cause of action under the FELA for retaliatory discharge); accord Mayon v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. , 805 F.2d 1250, 1252-53 (5th Cir. 1986) ("one who helps a co-worker file an FELA claim may have a cause of action under [the FELA] for retaliatory discharge.

2005It has long been held that the FELA provisions do not in themselves prohibit the discharge of an employee for invoking their protections and benefits. 2 See Shrader v. CSX Transportation Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257-58 (2d Cir. 1995) (an employee discharged for filing his or her own FELA claim does not have a cause of action under the FELA for retaliatory discharge); accord Mayon v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 805 F.2d 1250, 1252-53 (5th Cir. 1986) (“one who helps a co-worker file an FELA claim may have a cause of action under [the FELA] for retaliatory discharge.

2005Koehler, 109 Ill. 2d at 474, 476 , 488 N.E.2d at 543, 544 .

2005Koehler, 109 Ill. 2d at 474, 476 , 488 N.E.2d at 543, 544 .

1999See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174 , 69 S.Ct. 1018, 1026-27 , 93 L.Ed. 1282 , 1295 (1949) (holding that what constitutes negligence under the FELA is to be decided based on federal decisional law, "not varying in accordance with the differing conceptions of negligence applicable under state and local laws").

1999See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174 , 93 L.

2024See Thate, 595 S.W.2d at 596 n.1 (“Neither party to this action presented the dual employment theory and consequently, we do not consider it.”); Mason, 2011 IL App (5th) 100399, ¶¶ 3-4 (plaintiff filed a negligence action against defendants after successful workers’ compensation claim). ¶ 37 With respect to Barrera (which was decided five years before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kelley), the federal trial court in that case found that the plaintiff was estopped from asserting a claim against the railroad under the FELA because he had successfully prosecuted a claim under the

2024See Thate, 595 S.W.2d at 596 n.1 (“Neither party to this action presented the dual employment theory and consequently, we do not consider it.”); Mason, 2011 IL App (5th) 100399, ¶¶ 3-4 (plaintiff filed a negligence action against defendants after successful workers’ compensation claim). ¶ 37 With respect to Barrera (which was decided five years before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kelley), the federal trial court in that case found that the plaintiff was estopped from asserting a claim against the railroad under the FELA because he had successfully prosecuted a claim under the

2024This limitations period is a “ ‘material element’ ” in the operation of the statute and is “designed to produce national uniformity.” Burnett v. New York Central Railroad Company, 380 U.S. 424, 433 (1965), quoting Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 39 (1926).

2024This limitations period is a “ ‘material element’ ” in the operation of the statute and is “designed to produce national uniformity.” Burnett v. New York Central Railroad Company, 380 U.S. 424, 433 (1965), quoting Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 39 (1926).

2024This limitations period is a “ ‘material element’ ” in the operation of the statute and is “designed to produce national uniformity.” Burnett v. New York Central Railroad Company, 380 U.S. 424, 433 (1965), quoting Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 39 (1926).

2024This limitations period is a “ ‘material element’ ” in the operation of the statute and is “designed to produce national uniformity.” Burnett v. New York Central Railroad Company, 380 U.S. 424, 433 (1965), quoting Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 39 (1926).

2024See Thate, 595 S.W.2d at 596 n.1 (“Neither party to this action presented the dual employment theory and consequently, we do not consider it.”); Mason, 2011 IL App (5th) 100399, ¶¶ 3-4 (plaintiff filed a negligence action against defendants after successful workers’ compensation claim). ¶ 37 With respect to Barrera (which was decided five years before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kelley), the federal trial court in that case found that the plaintiff was estopped from asserting a claim against the railroad under the FELA because he had successfully prosecuted a claim under the

2024See Thate, 595 S.W.2d at 596 n.1 (“Neither party to this action presented the dual employment theory and consequently, we do not consider it.”); Mason, 2011 IL App (5th) 100399, ¶¶ 3-4 (plaintiff filed a negligence action against defendants after successful workers’ compensation claim). ¶ 37 With respect to Barrera (which was decided five years before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kelley), the federal trial court in that case found that the plaintiff was estopped from asserting a claim against the railroad under the FELA because he had successfully prosecuted a claim under the

2019Sims, Jr., Inc., 241 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 2001) (FELA excessive speed claim precluded by the FRSA); McCain v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 2d 494, 504 (E.D.

2019Sims, Jr., Inc., 241 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 2001) (FELA excessive speed claim precluded by the FRSA); McCain v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 2d 494, 504 (E.D.

2019Co. v. Lunsford, 297 U.S. 398, 402 (1936); Mosco v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 817 F.2d 1088, 1091 (4th Cir. 1987)). ¶ 58 Bahus argues that his FELA claim is not precluded by the LIA based on the recent United States Supreme Court case POM Wonderful, 573 U.S. ___ , 134 S. Ct. 2228 .

2019Co. v. Denson, 774 So. 2d 549, 556 (Ala. 2000) (no duty under the FELA, FRSA, or LIA to equip locomotives with air conditioning).

2019Co. v. Denson, 774 So. 2d 549, 556 (Ala. 2000) (no duty under the FELA, FRSA, or LIA to equip locomotives with air conditioning).

2019Co., 635 S.E.2d 179, 182-83 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (the FRSA precluded the plaintiff’s FELA claim that railroad should have used smaller ballast); Norfolk Southern Ry.

2019Co., 635 S.E.2d 179, 182-83 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (the FRSA precluded the plaintiff’s FELA claim that railroad should have used smaller ballast); Norfolk Southern Ry.

2019Co. v. Lunsford, 297 U.S. 398, 402 (1936); Mosco v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 817 F.2d 1088, 1091 (4th Cir. 1987)). ¶ 58 Bahus argues that his FELA claim is not precluded by the LIA based on the recent United States Supreme Court case POM Wonderful, 573 U.S. ___ , 134 S. Ct. 2228 .

2019For example, in Monheim, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 400-01 , the plaintiff alleged that the railroad should have equipped the train with a deadman’s switch or alerter, a cab wired for signal, and an ejection-proof seat.

2019Co., 788 F. Supp. 2d 394, 401 (W.D.

2019Pa. 2011); see Nickels v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., Inc., 560 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2009) (plaintiffs’ FELA claim that railroad was negligent for failing to provide smaller and easier to walk on ballast was precluded by the FRSA); Lane v. R.A.

2015Fulk, 22 F.3d at 125 ("the question of whether a duty exists in the first place remains with the court").

2015Fulk, 22 F.3d at 125 ("the question of whether a duty exists in the first place remains with the court").