public trust doctrine in Montana

2025Schaffer’s contention that he has a right to drive his large ski boat into the cove, Painted Rocks insists, falls outside the parameters of the public trust doctrine, which does not guarantee that access must be as “convenient, productive, and comfortable as possible.” Galt, 225 Mont. at 147 , 731 P.2d at 915 . ¶20 Section 75-7-208, MCA, does not mandate denial of a permit when a project has any of the listed effects.

2025Schaffer’s contention that he has a right to drive his large ski boat into the cove, Painted Rocks insists, falls outside the parameters of the public trust doctrine, which does not guarantee that access must be as “convenient, productive, and comfortable as possible.” Galt, 225 Mont. at 147 , 731 P.2d at 915 . ¶20 Section 75-7-208, MCA, does not mandate denial of a permit when a project has any of the listed effects.

2012In contrast, “the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law.” PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, ___U.S.___, ____, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 . ¶18 The United States Supreme Court has made this distinction clear: While equal footing cases have noted that the State takes title to the navigable waters and their beds in trust for the public, the contours of that public trust do not depend upon the Constitution.

2012In contrast, “the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law.” PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana,_U.S._,_, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 . ¶18 The United States Supreme Court has made this distinction clear: While equal footing cases have noted that the State takes title to the navigable waters and their beds in trust for the public, the contours of that public trust do not depend upon the Constitution.

2005We thus concluded that, despite the lack of a physical taking, regulation of the use of private property was nonetheless “confiscation.” Likewise, in Knight v. City of Missoula (1992), 252 Mont. 232 , 827 P.2d 1270 , we concluded that a taking could occur by way of ‘Increased traffic and the resultant increase in noise, dust, and fumes, etc., when no physical taking has occurred.” Knight, 252 Mont. at 241 , 827 P.2d at 1275 .

2005We thus concluded that, despite the lack of a physical taking, regulation of the use of private property was nonetheless “confiscation.” Likewise, in Knight v. City of Missoula (1992), 252 Mont. 232 , 827 P.2d 1270 , we concluded that a taking could occur by way of ‘Increased traffic and the resultant increase in noise, dust, and fumes, etc., when no physical taking has occurred.” Knight, 252 Mont. at 241 , 827 P.2d at 1275 .

2005We thus concluded that, despite the lack of a physical taking, regulation of the use of private property was nonetheless “confiscation.” Likewise, in Knight v. City of Missoula (1992), 252 Mont. 232 , 827 P.2d 1270 , we concluded that a taking could occur by way of ‘Increased traffic and the resultant increase in noise, dust, and fumes, etc., when no physical taking has occurred.” Knight, 252 Mont. at 241 , 827 P.2d at 1275 .

2005We thus concluded that, despite the lack of a physical taking, regulation of the use of private property was nonetheless “confiscation.” Likewise, in Knight v. City of Missoula (1992), 252 Mont. 232 , 827 P.2d 1270 , we concluded that a taking could occur by way of ‘Increased traffic and the resultant increase in noise, dust, and fumes, etc., when no physical taking has occurred.” Knight, 252 Mont. at 241 , 827 P.2d at 1275 .

1987We further pointed out in Curran that under the public trust doctrine as first enunciated in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois (1892), 146 U.S. 387 , 13 S.Ct. 110 , 36 L.Ed. 1018 , the United States Supreme Court said “. . .

1987We further pointed out in Curran that under the public trust doctrine as first enunciated in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois (1892), 146 U.S. 387 , 13 S.Ct. 110 , 36 L.Ed. 1018 , the United States Supreme Court said “. . .

1987The majority finds Sections 23-2-301, et seq., MCA, an impermissible enlargement of the public trust doctrine and this Court’s holdings in Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran (Mont. 1984), [ 210 Mont. 38 ,] 682 P.2d 163 , 41 St.

1987The majority finds §§ 23-2-301, et seq., MCA, an impermissible enlargement of the public trust doctrine and this Court's holdings in Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran (Mont. 1984), 682 P.2d 163 , 41 St.Rep. 906 , and Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth (Mont. 1984), 684 P.2d 1088 , 41 St.Rep. 1192 .