public trust doctrine in Massachusetts

2020Protection, 448 Mass. 340, 342 (2007), quoting Trio Algarvio, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Envtl.

2015Protection, 448 Mass. 340, 342 (2007).

2010We also agree with the Alliance that under the public trust doctrine, “only the Commonwealth, or an entity to which the Legislature properly has delegated authority, may administer public trust rights.” Fafard, supra at 199 .

2010At oral argument, the assistant Attorney General, as counsel for the Energy Facilities Siting Board (siting board) and DEP, argued that “a delegation of authority by the Legislature to license facilities in tidelands need not refer to the public trust doctrine to be effective,” pointing to dicta in Fafard, supra at 199 n.10.

2015Protection, 440 Mass. 94, 97 (2003).

2010Protection, 440 Mass. 94, 97 (2003).

2024See Navy Yard Four Assocs., LLC v. Department of Env't Prot., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 213,221 (2015).

2010The court references the holding of the United States Supreme Court that “control and disposition” of lands beneath the sea “in the first instance are the business of the Federal Government rather than the States,” United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 522 (1975), and cases cited, and notes that under Federal law the Commonwealth’s claim to title to the three mile margin of seabed off its seacoast derives from the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (2006).

2003See Treasurer & Receiver Gen. v. Revere Sugar Refinery, 247 Mass. 483 (1924); Bradford v. Metcalf, 185 Mass. 205 (1904); Bradford v. McQuesten, 182 Mass. 80 (1902). 4 We granted the department’s application for further appellate review, noting that the scope of review should “include, but not be limited to, the effect, if any, of the public trust doctrine ... on the assessment of the [department’s] displacement fees or tideland occupation fees.” 2.

2001To have a property interest in a license, an applicant must ‘have a legitimate [statutory or regulatory] claim of entitlement to it’ ”); Derby Refining Co. v. Board of Aldermen of Chelsea, 407 Mass. 718, 722 (1990) (“Once a license already has issued ... it becomes a vested property right of the licensee, and may be revoked only when due process protections are complied with”); Foster from Gloucester, Inc. v. City Council of Gloucester, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 284, 291 (1980) (“There is no longer room for doubt that a license granted under a statutory provision . . . is a property right which can be

2001To have a property interest in a license, an applicant must ‘have a legitimate [statutory or regulatory] claim of entitlement to it’ ”); Derby Refining Co. v. Board of Aldermen of Chelsea, 407 Mass. 718, 722 (1990) (“Once a license already has issued ... it becomes a vested property right of the licensee, and may be revoked only when due process protections are complied with”); Foster from Gloucester, Inc. v. City Council of Gloucester, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 284, 291 (1980) (“There is no longer room for doubt that a license granted under a statutory provision . . . is a property right which can be

2001Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629, 632-638 (1979) (under the public trust doctrine the citizens of Massachusetts are entitled to the rights to use an upland owner’s flats for the purposes of “free fishing” and materially unimpaired navigation); Roslindale Motor Sales, Inc. v. Police Commr. of Boston, 405 Mass. 79, 82 (1989) (“Due process requirements are implicated when licensing decisions affect a property interest ....

2001Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629, 632-638 (1979) (under the public trust doctrine the citizens of Massachusetts are entitled to the rights to use an upland owner’s flats for the purposes of “free fishing” and materially unimpaired navigation); Roslindale Motor Sales, Inc. v. Police Commr. of Boston, 405 Mass. 79, 82 (1989) (“Due process requirements are implicated when licensing decisions affect a property interest ....