public trust doctrine in California

2025Public Trust Doctrine From Roman and English common law comes “the concept of the public trust, under which the sovereign owns ‘all of its navigable waterways and the lands lying beneath them “as trustee of a public trust for the benefit of the people.” ’ ” (National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 419, 433-434 (Audubon).) An important corollary to this premise is that “parties acquiring rights in trust property generally hold those rights subject to the trust, and can assert no vested right to use those rights in a manner harmful to the trust.” (Audubon, supra, 33 Cal.3d at

2025Public Trust Doctrine From Roman and English common law comes “the concept of the public trust, under which the sovereign owns ‘all of its navigable waterways and the lands lying beneath them “as trustee of a public trust for the benefit of the people.” ’ ” (National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 419, 433-434 (Audubon).) An important corollary to this premise is that “parties acquiring rights in trust property generally hold those rights subject to the trust, and can assert no vested right to use those rights in a manner harmful to the trust.” (Audubon, supra, 33 Cal.3d at

2018We *569 summarize Baykeeper I 's discussion of this issue, with the understanding that its conclusions constitute the law of the case. 4 California holds title to submerged lands under the Bay as trustee for the public pursuant to the requirements of the public trust doctrine. ( Baykeeper I , supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 232 , 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 ; see also Berkeley v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 515 , 521, 162 Cal.Rptr. 327 , 606 P.2d 362 .) This common law doctrine is comprised of a set of principles that protect the public's right to use and enjoy property held within the public trust.

2018We *569 summarize Baykeeper I 's discussion of this issue, with the understanding that its conclusions constitute the law of the case. 4 California holds title to submerged lands under the Bay as trustee for the public pursuant to the requirements of the public trust doctrine. ( Baykeeper I , supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 232 , 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 ; see also Berkeley v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 515 , 521, 162 Cal.Rptr. 327 , 606 P.2d 362 .) This common law doctrine is comprised of a set of principles that protect the public's right to use and enjoy property held within the public trust.

2023CalFire demurred to this cause of action on the ground White did not, and could not, state a claim for violation of the public trust doctrine, and we agree. “ ‘While the public trust doctrine has evolved primarily around the rights of the public with respect to tidelands and navigable waters, the doctrine is not so limited.’ [Citation.] More than ‘ “a set of rules about tidelands,” ’ or ‘ “a restraint on alienation by the government,” ’ this doctrine functions ‘ “largely as a public property right of access to certain public trust natural resources for various public purposes.” [Citation.]’ [C

2023In addition, there is “no set ‘procedural matrix’ for determining state compliance with the public trust doctrine.” (San Francisco Baykeeper, supra, 18 As we have noted, the trial court granted CalFire’s request for judicial notice of these government documents. 43 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 234 .) And in the trial court, CalFire maintained that its Forest Management Plan (and Road Management Plan set forth therein), evidence that it did consider recreational uses in the course of preparing these plans and the ensuing NOE implementing these plans.

2025(Id. at p. 1359.) The appeal in FPL Group was “directed solely to the propriety of the [trial] court’s ruling … that ‘[n]o statutory or common law authority supports a cause of action by a private party for violation of the public trust doctrine arising from the destruction of wild animals.’” (FPL Group, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356 .) Most of the opinion is devoted to explaining why the trial court erred in that regard.

2025(Id. at p. 1359.) The appeal in FPL Group was “directed solely to the propriety of the [trial] court’s ruling … that ‘[n]o statutory or common law authority supports a cause of action by a private party for violation of the public trust doctrine arising from the destruction of wild animals.’” (FPL Group, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356 .) Most of the opinion is devoted to explaining why the trial court erred in that regard.

2025(See Young v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 397, 404 .) “[O]nce rights to use water are acquired, they become vested property rights.” (United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 82, 101 (United States).) This water rights regime operates alongside another legal principle: the public trust doctrine.

2018First is the rule of reasonableness: "the overriding constitutional limitation that the water be used as reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served." ( United States , supra , 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 105 , 227 Cal.Rptr. 161 .) Second is the public trust doctrine.

2018We *569 summarize Baykeeper I 's discussion of this issue, with the understanding that its conclusions constitute the law of the case. 4 California holds title to submerged lands under the Bay as trustee for the public pursuant to the requirements of the public trust doctrine. ( Baykeeper I , supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 232 , 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 ; see also Berkeley v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 515 , 521, 162 Cal.Rptr. 327 , 606 P.2d 362 .) This common law doctrine is comprised of a set of principles that protect the public's right to use and enjoy property held within the public trust.

2018We *569 summarize Baykeeper I 's discussion of this issue, with the understanding that its conclusions constitute the law of the case. 4 California holds title to submerged lands under the Bay as trustee for the public pursuant to the requirements of the public trust doctrine. ( Baykeeper I , supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 232 , 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 ; see also Berkeley v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 515 , 521, 162 Cal.Rptr. 327 , 606 P.2d 362 .) This common law doctrine is comprised of a set of principles that protect the public's right to use and enjoy property held within the public trust.

2018Wks. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 408, 416-417 .) “The range of public trust uses is broad, encompassing not just navigation, commerce, and fishing, but also the public right to hunt, bathe or swim. [Citation.] Furthermore, the concept of a public use is flexible, accommodating changing public needs. [Citation.] For example, an increasingly important public use is the preservation of trust lands ‘ “in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect t

2011Wks. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 408, 419 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 401 , 432 P.2d 3 ] [upholding power of the state to “deal with its navigable waters in any manner consistent” with its public trust interest and rejecting claims by riparian owners that bridges would significantly impact their use of the waterway].) But even assuming some obligation to “consider” other public trust uses, neither National Audubon nor Carstens impress into the public trust doctrine any kind of procedural matrix.

2014(See, e.g., Golden Feather Community Assn. v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1276, 1283-1284 [in general, the public trust doctrine posits that the state holds all navigable waters and the lands beneath them in trust for the public purposes of navigation and fishery]; California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 585, 630 [a variety of public trust interests also pertain to non- navigable streams that sustain a fishery] (California Trout); see also National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 419, 445-447 [setting forth the

2014For example, Fish and Game Code section 5937, which has been recognized as a legislative expression of the public trust doctrine protecting fish as trust resources, provides, in part, “The owner of any dam shall allow sufficient water . . . to pass over, around or through the dam, to keep in good condition any fish that may be 12 planted or exist below the dam.” (Italics added.) (See California Trout, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 626, 631.) V.

2023The Forest Management Plan states “[T]he primary purpose of [the Jackson Demonstration State Forest] is to conduct innovative demonstrations, experiments, and education in forest management; that timber production will be the primary land use on [the forest], and that recreation is recognized as a secondary but compatible land use on [the forest].”18 The courts have also recognized that “[t]his inherently discretionary doctrine generally does not allow for intervention by the courts other than in the context of judicial review of administrative decisions. ‘ “Intervention by the courts [through

2022“As a matter of practical necessity the state may have to approve appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public trust uses.” (National Audubon, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 446 .) The public trust doctrine necessarily involves the exercise of discretion by state agencies. “[T]he state is free to choose between public trust uses and that selecting one trust use ‘in preference to . . . [an]other cannot reasonably be said to be an abuse of . . . discretion.’ [Citation.]” (Citizens for East Shore Parks v. State Lands Com. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 549, 577 .) Accordingly, the relevant governing case la

2023Davis L.Rev. 693, 723–724 [extending the public trust doctrine beyond its “current water-based focus” to “dry land would represent a major expansion in its scope”]; Golden Feather Community Assn. v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1276, 1284 [public trust doctrine generally does not extend to nonnavigable waterways].) More recently, a California court has extended the doctrine to “undomesticated birds and wildlife,” because they have historically “ ‘been held to belong to no one and therefore to belong to everyone in common.’ ” (Center for Biological Diversity, supra, 166 Cal

2014(See, e.g., Golden Feather Community Assn. v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1276, 1283-1284 [in general, the public trust doctrine posits that the state holds all navigable waters and the lands beneath them in trust for the public purposes of navigation and fishery]; California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 585, 630 [a variety of public trust interests also pertain to non- navigable streams that sustain a fishery] (California Trout); see also National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 419, 445-447 [setting forth the

2016(See also California Fish, supra, 166 Cal. at p. 588 , 138 P. 79 ["Since the adoption of that Constitution in 1879, if not before, grants of such lands by the state carry, at most, only the title to the soil subject to the public right of navigation"].) *533 14 Indeed, the State Amici acknowledge that " Article X, section 4 and much legislation enacted pursuant thereto can be characterized as 'embodiments' of the public trust doctrine." Forestier belies Friends' argument that Article X, section 4 is unrelated to the public trust doctrine.

2016(See also California Fish, supra, 166 Cal. at p. 588 , 138 P. 79 ["Since the adoption of that Constitution in 1879, if not before, grants of such lands by the state carry, at most, only the title to the soil subject to the public right of navigation"].) *533 14 Indeed, the State Amici acknowledge that " Article X, section 4 and much legislation enacted pursuant thereto can be characterized as 'embodiments' of the public trust doctrine." Forestier belies Friends' argument that Article X, section 4 is unrelated to the public trust doctrine.

2018The dispute in Mansell involved tidelands the Legislature freed from the public trust, thereby cutting them off from water resources. ( Mansell, supra , 3 Cal.3d at p. 482 , 91 Cal.Rptr. 23 , 476 P.2d 423 .) The dispositive issue was whether the Legislature's action violated a state constitutional provision prohibiting the grant to private persons of tidelands within two miles of any city. ( Id . at p. 478, 91 Cal.Rptr. 23 , 476 P.2d 423 .) The Supreme Court examined the relationship between the constitutional provision and the public trust doctrine, noting that although public trust tidelands

2018The dispute in Mansell involved tidelands the Legislature freed from the public trust, thereby cutting them off from water resources. ( Mansell, supra , 3 Cal.3d at p. 482 , 91 Cal.Rptr. 23 , 476 P.2d 423 .) The dispositive issue was whether the Legislature's action violated a state constitutional provision prohibiting the grant to private persons of tidelands within two miles of any city. ( Id . at p. 478, 91 Cal.Rptr. 23 , 476 P.2d 423 .) The Supreme Court examined the relationship between the constitutional provision and the public trust doctrine, noting that although public trust tidelands

2020(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, § 659, et seq.) A second limit on water rights is "the public trust doctrine." (Channelkeeper, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1184 .) This doctrine derives from the principle that water is a shared resource, and has been applied to find that " 'parties acquiring rights in trust property,' such as water flowing in a stream, 'generally hold those rights subject to the trust . . . .' " (Id. at p. 1186.) b.

2020(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, § 659, et seq.) A second limit on water rights is "the public trust doctrine." (Channelkeeper, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1184 .) This doctrine derives from the principle that water is a shared resource, and has been applied to find that " 'parties acquiring rights in trust property,' such as water flowing in a stream, 'generally hold those rights subject to the trust . . . .' " (Id. at p. 1186.) b.

2018Co. (1884) 66 Cal. 138 , 4 P. 1152 ( Gold Run ), the state utilizing the public trust doctrine enjoined a mining company from dumping sand and gravel into an nonnavigable stream that flowed into the navigable Sacramento River, because the dumping raised the bed of the Sacramento River impairing navigation. ( National Audubon, supra , 33 Cal.3d at p. 436 , 189 Cal.Rptr. 346 , 658 P.2d 709 .) Focusing on whether the activity had deleterious impacts on navigable waterways, the Supreme Court concluded: " 'If the public trust doctrine applies to constrain fills which destroy navigation and other pu

2018Co. (1884) 66 Cal. 138 , 4 P. 1152 ( Gold Run ), the state utilizing the public trust doctrine enjoined a mining company from dumping sand and gravel into an nonnavigable stream that flowed into the navigable Sacramento River, because the dumping raised the bed of the Sacramento River impairing navigation. ( National Audubon, supra , 33 Cal.3d at p. 436 , 189 Cal.Rptr. 346 , 658 P.2d 709 .) Focusing on whether the activity had deleterious impacts on navigable waterways, the Supreme Court concluded: " 'If the public trust doctrine applies to constrain fills which destroy navigation and other pu

1991In a companion case decided on the same day as State of California v. Superior Court (Lyon), supra, 29 Cal.3d 210 , which had dealt with the application of the public trust doctrine to Clear Lake, our Supreme Court ruled in State of California v. Superior Court (Fogerty) (1981) 29 Cal.3d 240, 247-249 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 713 , 625 P.2d 256 ] that public rights in the shore-zone of Lake Tahoe (i.e., public ownership of the fee below the level of low water, and public trust rights between the low-water and high-water marks) should be determined based upon the current condition of that lake, not its l

1991In a companion case decided on the same day as State of California v. Superior Court (Lyon), supra, 29 Cal.3d 210 , which had dealt with the application of the public trust doctrine to Clear Lake, our Supreme Court ruled in State of California v. Superior Court (Fogerty) (1981) 29 Cal.3d 240, 247-249 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 713 , 625 P.2d 256 ] that public rights in the shore-zone of Lake Tahoe (i.e., public ownership of the fee below the level of low water, and public trust rights between the low-water and high-water marks) should be determined based upon the current condition of that lake, not its l

2024The determinative fact is whether the amendments have an impact on “water that is imbued with the public trust.” (Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 844, 859, 861 .) Our review of the department’s determination is “limited to determining whether the [department’s decision] was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether it failed to follow appropriate procedures. [Citation.] We do not reweigh the evidence, substitute our judgment for that of the [department], or inquire into the soundness of the [department’

2024The determinative fact is whether the amendments have an impact on “water that is imbued with the public trust.” (Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 844, 859, 861 .) Our review of the department’s determination is “limited to determining whether the [department’s decision] was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether it failed to follow appropriate procedures. [Citation.] We do not reweigh the evidence, substitute our judgment for that of the [department], or inquire into the soundness of the [department’

1996In administering the trust the state is not burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization over another.' [Citation.]" (Fns. omitted.) The powers and duties of a trustee of public trust lands were addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois (1892) 146 U.S. 387 , still regarded as the seminal case on the scope of the public trust doctrine.6 In Illinois Central the court held that the State of Illinois could not grant a major portion of the Chicago waterfront to a railroad company, stating in part: ". . .

1986We find nothing supportive of Lyon’s innovative holding in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois (1892) 146 U.S. 387 [ 36 L.Ed. 1018 , 13 S.Ct. 110 ], described by Lyon (29 Cal.3d p. 227) as the “seminal case on the scope of the public trust doctrine.” Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois concerned the interstate, navigable, freshwater, nontidal (see Lyon, 29 Cal.3d p. 227), Lake Michigan.

1991In a companion case decided on the same day as State of California v. Superior Court (Lyon), supra, 29 Cal.3d 210 , which had dealt with the application of the public trust doctrine to Clear Lake, our Supreme Court ruled in State of California v. Superior Court (Fogerty) (1981) 29 Cal.3d 240, 247-249 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 713 , 625 P.2d 256 ] that public rights in the shore-zone of Lake Tahoe (i.e., public ownership of the fee below the level of low water, and public trust rights between the low-water and high-water marks) should be determined based upon the current condition of that lake, not its l

1982(See Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. State of Illinois (1892) 146 U.S. 387, 452-454 [ 36 L.Ed. 1018, 1042-1043 , 13 S.Ct. 110 ]; Martin v. Waddell (1842) 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 409-414 [ 10 L.Ed. 997, 1012-1014 ]; cf. People v. California Fish Co. (1913) 166 Cal. 576, 584-587 [ 138 P. 79 ]; City of Berkeley v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 515, 521-525 [ 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 , 606 P.2d 362 ]; State of California v. Superior Court ( Lyon ) (1981) 29 Cal.3d 210, 226-231 [172 *317 Cal. Rptr. 696, 625 P.2d 239 ].) Thus, if — as a matter of federal law — California never owned these tidelands in t

2018The report also noted that the Joint Proposal addressed "policy concerns associated with the shutdown of the DCPP in 2025, including replacement energy ..., workforce transition, and community impacts." It ultimately concluded that the lease replacement "will not significantly interfere with the trusts upon which [public] lands are held or substantially impair the public rights to navigation, fisheries, or other Public Trust needs *308 and values at this time, at this location, and for the limited-term lease beginning June 28, 2016 and ending August 26, 2025." "There is no set 'procedural matr

2018The report also noted that the Joint Proposal addressed "policy concerns associated with the shutdown of the DCPP in 2025, including replacement energy ..., workforce transition, and community impacts." It ultimately concluded that the lease replacement "will not significantly interfere with the trusts upon which [public] lands are held or substantially impair the public rights to navigation, fisheries, or other Public Trust needs *308 and values at this time, at this location, and for the limited-term lease beginning June 28, 2016 and ending August 26, 2025." "There is no set 'procedural matr

2008Code, § 3490; McLean v. Llewellyn Iron Works, at p. 350.) VIL Finally, we turn to state respondents’ suggestion that any acknowledgement of Zack’s easement interest in Humboldt Avenue would violate the public trust doctrine because that doctrine vests in the trustee “absolute power” to *1192 determine the use to which tidelands will be put. 18 This idea rests upon the statement in Marks v. Whitney, supra, 6 Cal.3d 251 , that “[t]he power of [a public trustee] to control, regulate and utilize its navigable waterways and the lands lying beneath them, when acting within the terms of the trust, is

2002(Marks v. Whitney, supra, 6 Cal.3d 251, 260-261 .) In addition, the public trust doctrine has been expanded beyond its traditional common law emphasis on commerce, navigation, and fisheries; it is now construed as “sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs” (id. at p. 259), such as concern for the environment, expanding recreational uses, and aesthetic preservation.

2018(See State Water Resources Control Bd. Cases (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 674 , 776, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 189 ; Citizens for East Shore Parks , supra , 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 577-578, 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 162 .) But CEQA review of a project does not necessarily or automatically satisfy the agency's affirmative duties to take the trust into account and protect public trust uses whenever feasible. ( Baykeeper I , supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 241-242, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 .) With this extensive guidance, Baykeeper I remanded this case to the superior court so that the SLC could comply with the public trust doctr

2018(See State Water Resources Control Bd. Cases (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 674 , 776, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 189 ; Citizens for East Shore Parks , supra , 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 577-578, 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 162 .) But CEQA review of a project does not necessarily or automatically satisfy the agency's affirmative duties to take the trust into account and protect public trust uses whenever feasible. ( Baykeeper I , supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 241-242, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 .) With this extensive guidance, Baykeeper I remanded this case to the superior court so that the SLC could comply with the public trust doctr

2010Similarly, it obtained a ruling that the Incidental Take Permit was invalid “inasmuch as it included ‘no surprises’ clauses inconsistent with Pacific Lumber’s statutory duty to fully mitigate the impacts of its incidental take.” (EPIC II, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 526 .) Although the California Supreme Court rejected EPIC’s arguments that the Incidental Take Permit was invalid because it violated the public trust doctrine and was unsupported by adequate CESA findings (EPIC II, at pp. 515-517), EPIC obtained the result it sought in challenging the permit (see Sokolow, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p.

2008The statement in National Audubon Society recognizing the standing of members of the public applied without qualification to “a claim of harm to the public trust.” (National Audubon Society, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 431, fn. 11 .) In EPIC, supra, 44 Cal.4th 459 , the Supreme Court assumed the standing of two environmental organizations to challenge, under the public trust doctrine, the issuance by the Department of Fish and Game of a permit authorizing the incidental take of two bird species. 15 The concept of a public trust over natural resources unquestionably supports exercise of the police p

2018We *569 summarize Baykeeper I 's discussion of this issue, with the understanding that its conclusions constitute the law of the case. 4 California holds title to submerged lands under the Bay as trustee for the public pursuant to the requirements of the public trust doctrine. ( Baykeeper I , supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 232 , 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 ; see also Berkeley v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 515 , 521, 162 Cal.Rptr. 327 , 606 P.2d 362 .) This common law doctrine is comprised of a set of principles that protect the public's right to use and enjoy property held within the public trust.

2018We *569 summarize Baykeeper I 's discussion of this issue, with the understanding that its conclusions constitute the law of the case. 4 California holds title to submerged lands under the Bay as trustee for the public pursuant to the requirements of the public trust doctrine. ( Baykeeper I , supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 232 , 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 ; see also Berkeley v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 515 , 521, 162 Cal.Rptr. 327 , 606 P.2d 362 .) This common law doctrine is comprised of a set of principles that protect the public's right to use and enjoy property held within the public trust.

2016There being no dispute that the LLCs' titles trace back to a provisional Mexican land grant, confirmed under the 1851 Act by the Supreme Court in Alviso, supra, 64 U.S. 318 , without any mention of a public trust easement, the court concluded that no "part of the Property is held subject to the public trust." The court opined that Article X, section 4 is simply "a restatement or codification of the preexisting public trust doctrine as it relates to the tidelands and what rights flow from the tidelands," and that under Summa , "the public trust doctrine as it is restated in the California Const

2016There being no dispute that the LLCs' titles trace back to a provisional Mexican land grant, confirmed under the 1851 Act by the Supreme Court in Alviso, supra, 64 U.S. 318 , without any mention of a public trust easement, the court concluded that no "part of the Property is held subject to the public trust." The court opined that Article X, section 4 is simply "a restatement or codification of the preexisting public trust doctrine as it relates to the tidelands and what rights flow from the tidelands," and that under Summa , "the public trust doctrine as it is restated in the California Const

2018For example, for farmers to flood their fields during winter solely for the purpose of drowning gophers and squirrels is not a reasonable beneficial use. ( Tulare , at p. 568, 45 P.2d 972 .) So, too, is it unreasonable for a riparian landowner to rely on a creek to deliver in suspension continuing supplies of rock, sand, and gravel, when water from that stream could instead be diverted for municipal use. ( Joslin , supra , 67 Cal.2d at pp. 134-135, 140-141, 60 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 429 P.2d 889 .) Another important limitation on water rights in California derives from the public trust doctrine, an a

2018For example, for farmers to flood their fields during winter solely for the purpose of drowning gophers and squirrels is not a reasonable beneficial use. ( Tulare , at p. 568, 45 P.2d 972 .) So, too, is it unreasonable for a riparian landowner to rely on a creek to deliver in suspension continuing supplies of rock, sand, and gravel, when water from that stream could instead be diverted for municipal use. ( Joslin , supra , 67 Cal.2d at pp. 134-135, 140-141, 60 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 429 P.2d 889 .) Another important limitation on water rights in California derives from the public trust doctrine, an a

2018The County cites Santa Teresa Citizen Action Group v. City of San Jose (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 689 , 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 868 for the bold assertion that the public trust doctrine does not apply to groundwater, ignoring, as we explained above, the crucial detail that the trial court did not find the public trust doctrine applies to groundwater.

2018The County cites Santa Teresa Citizen Action Group v. City of San Jose (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 689 , 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 868 for the bold assertion that the public trust doctrine does not apply to groundwater, ignoring, as we explained above, the crucial detail that the trial court did not find the public trust doctrine applies to groundwater.

2008Far from excluding wildlife from the scope of the public trust doctrine, the court acknowledged that “[t]he general right and ownership of wild animals, the most important constituent of which are fish, is in the people of the state.” (Id. at p. 1282, citing People v. Truckee Lumber Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 397 [ 48 P. 374 ], a case on which plaintiffs here heavily rely.) The court there distinguished between an action to enjoin a nuisance harming public fisheries, justified by the public trust doctrine, and an attempt to compel parties to maintain a reservoir so that others could fish from it, whi

1989The Water Board’s suggestion that section 5946 is a public trust rule rests principally upon People v. Truckee Lumber Co., supra, 116 Cal. 397 .