public trust doctrine in Texas

2005According to the supreme court, the “rule has long been established” in this State that “the State is the owner of the soil underlying the navigable waters, such as navigable streams, as defined by statute, lakes, bays, inlets, and other areas within the tide water limits within its borders.” City of Galveston v. Mann, 135 Tex. 319 , 143 S.W.2d 1028, 1033 (1940).

2005According to the supreme court, the “rule has long been established” in this State that “the State is the owner of the soil underlying the navigable waters, such as navigable streams, as defined by statute, lakes, bays, inlets, and other areas within the tide water limits within its borders.” City of Galveston v. Mann, 135 Tex. 319 , 143 S.W.2d 1028, 1033 (1940).

2019Under the public trust doctrine an animal must be “legally removed” from the wild before property rights can arise in it.10 See Bartee, 894 S.W.2d at 41 (“A wrongful reducing to possession of creature ferae naturæ cannot form the basis of ownership.” (quoting 3A C.J.S.

2019The state’s authority over such animals is “not based on ownership, but upon the state’s police power to preserve and regulate an important resource.” State v. Bartee, 894 S.W.2d 34, 47 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no pet.) (Rickhoff, J., concurring). 23 industry urge that the public trust doctrine is vital to the continuing health of the hunting and deer breeding industries.14 We do not address these arguments because “[t]he wisdom or expediency of the law is the Legislature’s prerogative, not ours.” City of Laredo v. Laredo Merchants Ass’n, 550 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Smith v. D

2012See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296 , 294 A.2d 47, 49 (1972) (“[T]he public trust doctrine dictates that the beach and the ocean waters must be open to all on equal terms and without preference.... ”); see also Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 95 N.J. 306 , 471 A.2d 355, 365 (1984).

2012See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296 , 294 A.2d 47, 49 (1972) (“[T]he public trust doctrine dictates that the beach and the ocean waters must be open to all on equal terms and without preference.... ”); see also Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 95 N.J. 306 , 471 A.2d 355, 365 (1984).

2012See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296 , 294 A.2d 47, 49 (1972) (“[T]he public trust doctrine dictates that the beach and the ocean waters must be open to all on equal terms and without preference.... ”); see also Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 95 N.J. 306 , 471 A.2d 355, 365 (1984).

2012See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296 , 294 A.2d 47, 49 (1972) (“[T]he public trust doctrine dictates that the beach and the ocean waters must be open to all on equal terms and without preference.... ”); see also Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 95 N.J. 306 , 471 A.2d 355, 365 (1984).

2005Davis does not support the claim that an owner of non- littoral land adjacent to a water district is entitled to construct a boat dock in violation of a water district’s regulations, which protect the public’s interest in safe drinking water. (2) Littoral boundaries and the public trust doctrine The District also established that, regardless of the littoral rights issue, it properly denied the Cumminses’ application for a boat dock license on the basis that the Cumminses have no rights in the submerged lands of Lake Travis: the Cumminses’ boundary line is the water’s edge; the State holds titl

2005Davis does not support the claim that an owner of non- littoral land adjacent to a water district is entitled to construct a boat dock in violation of a water district’s regulations, which protect the public’s interest in safe drinking water. (2) Littoral boundaries and the public trust doctrine The District also established that, regardless of the littoral rights issue, it properly denied the Cumminses’ application for a boat dock license on the basis that the Cumminses have no rights in the submerged lands of Lake Travis: the Cumminses’ boundary line is the water’s edge; the State holds titl

2025The people of Texas, speaking through their duly-elected representatives in the Legislature, have decided the only way white-tailed deer can be legally removed from the wild and held captive is to obtain a permit to either breed or manage the deer.24 The State’s authority to regulate wildlife as part of its police power to protect this natural resource is beyond question.25 21 Id. at 693. 22 See Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc. v. State, 529 P.3d 1160, 1187 (Alaska 2023) (“The public trust doctrine provides that the State holds certain resources (such as wildlife, minerals, and water rights) in

2025PARKS & WILDLIFE CODE §§ 43.351–.369, 43.601–.607; see Baily, 581 S.W.3d at 391 (“legally removed”); Bartee, 894 S.W.2d at 41 (“legally removed”); see also Jones v. State, 45 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Crim.

2020It has long been the law in Texas that navigable waters and their beds—both above and below the tide—are “reserved to the State for the use of the public generally.” Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co., 175 12 See Luttes, 324 S.W.2d at 192 (civil-law tide line applies to civil-law grants and common-law tide line applies to common-law grants);.Manry, 56 S.W.2d at 449 (abandoned riverbeds); Motl, 286 S.W. at 468 (public rights of navigation over floodwaters). 21 S.W.2d 410 , 414 (Tex. 1943) (below tide); Bradford, 50 S.W.2d at 1075 (above tide). 13 Private parties may not have the exclusive right to

2020It has long been the law in Texas that navigable waters and their beds—both above and below the tide—are “reserved to the State for the use of the public generally.” Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co., 175 12 See Luttes, 324 S.W.2d at 192 (civil-law tide line applies to civil-law grants and common-law tide line applies to common-law grants);.Manry, 56 S.W.2d at 449 (abandoned riverbeds); Motl, 286 S.W. at 468 (public rights of navigation over floodwaters). 21 S.W.2d 410 , 414 (Tex. 1943) (below tide); Bradford, 50 S.W.2d at 1075 (above tide). 13 Private parties may not have the exclusive right to

2020See id. at 1075–76, 1079.

2020It has long been the law in Texas that navigable waters and their beds—both above and below the tide—are “reserved to the State for the use of the public generally.” Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co., 175 12 See Luttes, 324 S.W.2d at 192 (civil-law tide line applies to civil-law grants and common-law tide line applies to common-law grants);.Manry, 56 S.W.2d at 449 (abandoned riverbeds); Motl, 286 S.W. at 468 (public rights of navigation over floodwaters). 21 S.W.2d 410 , 414 (Tex. 1943) (below tide); Bradford, 50 S.W.2d at 1075 (above tide). 13 Private parties may not have the exclusive right to

2020They advance several arguments in an effort to support this position, including the Commissioner’s contention that the public trust doctrine applies with “heightened standards” to See also In re Adjudication of Water Rights of Upper Guadalupe Segment of Guadalupe River Basin, 642 13 S.W.2d 438, 444 (Tex. 1982) (“Texas holds the title to the waters in a navigable stream in trust for the public.”). 14 As these authorities show, the dissent is incorrect that only portions of navigable stream beds below the tide require express legislative relinquishment of state ownership.

2020It has long been the law in Texas that navigable waters and their beds—both above and below the tide—are “reserved to the State for the use of the public generally.” Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co., 175 12 See Luttes, 324 S.W.2d at 192 (civil-law tide line applies to civil-law grants and common-law tide line applies to common-law grants);.Manry, 56 S.W.2d at 449 (abandoned riverbeds); Motl, 286 S.W. at 468 (public rights of navigation over floodwaters). 21 S.W.2d 410 , 414 (Tex. 1943) (below tide); Bradford, 50 S.W.2d at 1075 (above tide). 13 Private parties may not have the exclusive right to

2019See PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576 , 603–04 (2012) (remarking “the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law” and is not defined by the Constitution).

2019See PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576 , 603–04 (2012) (remarking “the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law” and is not defined by the Constitution).

2019The state’s authority over such animals is “not based on ownership, but upon the state’s police power to preserve and regulate an important resource.” State v. Bartee, 894 S.W.2d 34, 47 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no pet.) (Rickhoff, J., concurring). 23 industry urge that the public trust doctrine is vital to the continuing health of the hunting and deer breeding industries.14 We do not address these arguments because “[t]he wisdom or expediency of the law is the Legislature’s prerogative, not ours.” City of Laredo v. Laredo Merchants Ass’n, 550 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Smith v. D

2019See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335–36.

2019See, e.g., State v. Marshall, 13 Tex. 55, 57 (1854) (applying rule that wild animals are generally not “the subject of property”); Ex parte Blardone, 115 S.W. 838, 840 (Tex. Crim.

2019See, e.g., State v. Marshall, 13 Tex. 55, 57 (1854) (applying rule that wild animals are generally not “the subject of property”); Ex parte Blardone, 115 S.W. 838, 840 (Tex. Crim.

2019The state’s authority over such animals is “not based on ownership, but upon the state’s police power to preserve and regulate an important resource.” State v. Bartee, 894 S.W.2d 34, 47 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no pet.) (Rickhoff, J., concurring). 23 industry urge that the public trust doctrine is vital to the continuing health of the hunting and deer breeding industries.14 We do not address these arguments because “[t]he wisdom or expediency of the law is the Legislature’s prerogative, not ours.” City of Laredo v. Laredo Merchants Ass’n, 550 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Smith v. D

2004See City of Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d at 410, 411 (noting in "Syllabus by the Court” that appellant’s challenge to which public-trust doctrine applied was raised "apart from any issue [of] sovereign immunity” and treating the two holdings separately in opinion). .

2004See City of Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d at 410, 411 (noting in "Syllabus by the Court" that appellant's challenge to which public-trust doctrine applied was raised "apart from any issue [of] sovereign immunity" and treating the two holdings separately in opinion). [6] Justice Keyes's dissenting opinion asserts that our holding "contravenes the plain language of the applicable statute, the TTCA...." The TTCA waives sovereign immunity from suit, but does not confer it.