10 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1922–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fulchergreen2 sentences2008Pursuant to the above mentioned principle of statutory construction, we construe the word "restrain," as used in G.S. 14-39, to connote a restraint separate and apart from that which is inherent in the commission of the other felony. 294 N.C. 503, 523 , 243 S.E.2d 338, 351 (1978). 2008Pursuant to the above mentioned principle of statutory construction, we construe the word "restrain," as used in G.S. 14-39, to connote a restraint separate and apart from that which is inherent in the commission of the other felony. 294 N.C. 503, 523 , 243 S.E.2d 338, 351 (1978). | 3 | 6 |
State v. Pigottgreen2 sentences2008In applying the test laid out in Fulcher, the Supreme Court further clarified, The key question here is whether the kidnapping charge is supported by evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that the necessary restraint for kidnapping "exposed [the victim] to greater danger than that inherent in the armed robbery itself, . . . [or] is . . . subjected to the kind of danger and abuse the kidnapping statute was designed to prevent." State v. Pigott, 331 N.C. 199, 210 , 415 S.E.2d 555, 561 (1992) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 103 , 282 S.E.2d 439, 446 (1981)). 2008In applying the test laid out in Fulcher, the Supreme Court further clarified, The key question here is whether the kidnapping charge is supported by evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that the necessary restraint for kidnapping "exposed [the victim] to greater danger than that inherent in the armed robbery itself, . . . [or] is . . . subjected to the kind of danger and abuse the kidnapping statute was designed to prevent." State v. Pigott, 331 N.C. 199, 210 , 415 S.E.2d 555, 561 (1992) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 103 , 282 S.E.2d 439, 446 (1981)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Irwingreen2 sentences2008In applying the test laid out in Fulcher, the Supreme Court further clarified, The key question here is whether the kidnapping charge is supported by evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that the necessary restraint for kidnapping "exposed [the victim] to greater danger than that inherent in the armed robbery itself, . . . [or] is . . . subjected to the kind of danger and abuse the kidnapping statute was designed to prevent." State v. Pigott, 331 N.C. 199, 210 , 415 S.E.2d 555, 561 (1992) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 103 , 282 S.E.2d 439, 446 (1981)). 2008In applying the test laid out in Fulcher, the Supreme Court further clarified, The key question here is whether the kidnapping charge is supported by evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that the necessary restraint for kidnapping "exposed [the victim] to greater danger than that inherent in the armed robbery itself, . . . [or] is . . . subjected to the kind of danger and abuse the kidnapping statute was designed to prevent." State v. Pigott, 331 N.C. 199, 210 , 415 S.E.2d 555, 561 (1992) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 103 , 282 S.E.2d 439, 446 (1981)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Weavergreen1 sentence2007State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503, 523 , 243 S.E.2d 338, 351 (1978); see also State v. Weaver, 123 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Evansgreen2 sentences1977(Citations omitted.) If, considered in accordance with the above mentioned rule, the evidence is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to whether the offense charged was committed, the motion for nonsuit should be allowed even though the suspicion so aroused by the evidence is strong.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Evans and State v. Britton and State v. Hairston, 279 N.C. 447, 453 , 183 S.E. 2d 540, 544 (1971). 1977(Citations omitted.) If, considered in accordance with the above mentioned rule, the evidence is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to whether the offense charged was committed, the motion for nonsuit should be allowed even though the suspicion so aroused by the evidence is strong.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Evans and State v. Britton and State v. Hairston, 279 N.C. 447, 453 , 183 S.E. 2d 540, 544 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fulcher
green
1 sentence1978In Fulcher , the Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected the decision of this Court ( 34 N.C. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Shaffer
green
2 sentences1978We think that the decision of this case is controlled by the principle announced by this Court in Insurance Co. v. Shaffer, 250 N.C. 45 , 108 S.E. 2d 49 (1959). 1978We think that the decision of this case is controlled by the principle announced by this Court in Insurance Co. v. Shaffer, 250 N.C. 45 , 108 S.E. 2d 49 (1959). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State v. . Harvey
green
2 sentences1971State v. Clybum, supra; State v. Cutler, supra; State v. Harvey, 228 N.C. 62 , 44 S.E. 2d 472 . 1971State v. Clybum, supra; State v. Cutler, supra; State v. Harvey, 228 N.C. 62 , 44 S.E. 2d 472 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Evans v. Gore
green
1 sentence1922J. , and Pearson and Battle , judges ( 48 N.C. 544 ), and that of Attorney-General Gilmer, 131 N.C. 692 , approved by the Court as denying the power of the Legislature to tax the salaries of the judges, which would plainly be a diminution of them, forbidden by the Constitution." Finally, in the case of Evans v. Gore , 253 U.S. 245 , the United (109) States Supreme Court (opinion filed 1 June, 1920) has set the matter at rest by holding that, under the above mentioned clause in the Federal Constitution, Congress was without authority to subject the salaries of the Federal judges to an income ta | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Foster v. Bloom
neutral
1 sentence1922Hepburn v. Mann (Pa.), 5 Watts S., 403; New Orleans v. Lea , 14 La. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
In the Matter of the Txn. of the Salaries of Judges
neutral
1 sentence1922J. , and Pearson and Battle , judges ( 48 N.C. 544 ), and that of Attorney-General Gilmer, 131 N.C. 692 , approved by the Court as denying the power of the Legislature to tax the salaries of the judges, which would plainly be a diminution of them, forbidden by the Constitution." Finally, in the case of Evans v. Gore , 253 U.S. 245 , the United (109) States Supreme Court (opinion filed 1 June, 1920) has set the matter at rest by holding that, under the above mentioned clause in the Federal Constitution, Congress was without authority to subject the salaries of the Federal judges to an income ta | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.