mentioned rule in Alabama

2004The Court in Moyer observed that our Legislature has explicitly adopted the "before and after" rule used in the Uniform Eminent Domain Code, and it concluded that "in setting forth one standard and omitting the mention of the other standard in Alabama's codification of the eminent domain laws of Alabama, [the Legislature] intended that only the mentioned standard be used to determine the value of a partial taking." Id.

2001This court mentioned this privilege in Ex parte Life Insurance Co. of Georgia, 663 So.2d 929 (Ala.1995).

2001This court mentioned this privilege in Ex parte Life Insurance Co. of Georgia , 663 So.2d 929 (Ala. 1995).

1991The Court noted that "plaintiffs' second cause of action was based upon the theory that the lye constituted a dangerous instrumentality" and that "[t]he standard of care that the defendants owed with respect to storage of lye was to exercise care commensurate with the risk of injury," but that "[t]he storage of the container of lye within locked offices, presumably not accessible to children, [met] that standard." In Raney , this Court also mentioned the doctrine of "attractive nuisance" discussed by this Court in Tolbert v. Gulsby , and, quoting from Republic Steel Corp. v. Tillery , 261 Ala.

1991The Court noted that "plaintiffs' second cause of action was based upon the theory that the lye constituted a dangerous instrumentality" and that "[t]he standard of care that the defendants owed with respect to storage of lye was to exercise care commensurate with the risk of injury," but that "[t]he storage of the container of lye within locked offices, presumably not accessible to children, [met] that standard." In Raney , this Court also mentioned the doctrine of "attractive nuisance" discussed by this Court in Tolbert v. Gulsby , and, quoting from Republic Steel Corp. v. Tillery , 261 Ala.

1991The Court noted that "plaintiffs' second cause of action was based upon the theory that the lye constituted a dangerous instrumentality" and that "[t]he standard of care that the defendants owed with respect to storage of lye was to exercise care commensurate with the risk of injury," but that "[t]he storage of the container of lye within locked offices, presumably not accessible to children, [met] that standard." In Raney , this Court also mentioned the doctrine of "attractive nuisance" discussed by this Court in Tolbert v. Gulsby , and, quoting from Republic Steel Corp. v. Tillery , 261 Ala.

1974In DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1966) the court stated: "Failure, in an initial complaint, to set forth the claim by means of a short and plain statement, as required by Rule 8(a)(2), is not a ground for dismissal of an action with prejudice, since there are procedures available for correcting a vague or prolix complaint.

1974In DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1966) the court stated: “Failure, in an initial complaint, to set forth the claim by means of a short and plain statement, as required by Rule 8(a)(2), is not a ground for dismissal of an action with prejudice, since there are procedures available for correcting a vague or prolix complaint.

1944And see Cook et ux. v. State, 192 Wash. 602 , 74 P.2d 199 ; and State of Washington v. Burk, 114 Wash. 370 , 195 P. 16 , 21 A.L.R. 193 , with note *401 at end of report in 21 A.L.R.

1944And see Cook et ux. v. State, 192 Wash. 602 , 74 P.2d 199 ; and State of Washington v. Burk, 114 Wash. 370 , 195 P. 16 , 21 A.L.R. 193 , with note *401 at end of report in 21 A.L.R.

1944And see Cook et ux. v. State, 192 Wash. 602 , 74 P.2d 199 ; and State of Washington v. Burk, 114 Wash. 370 , 195 P. 16 , 21 A.L.R. 193 , with note *401 at end of report in 21 A.L.R.

1944And see Cook et ux. v. State, 192 Wash. 602 , 74 P.2d 199 ; and State of Washington v. Burk, 114 Wash. 370 , 195 P. 16 , 21 A.L.R. 193 , with note *401 at end of report in 21 A.L.R.

1918Co., 63 Minn. 255 , 65 N. W. 627 . [5] Aside from the legal results consequent upon the absolute duty stated, it may be added that the evidence is conclusive to these effects: That the carrier did not at the time undertake or intend the delivery of this cotton to the Compress Company as the agent of Jordan and Moss or of the appellees; and that at the time the carrier,, acting on the mentioned error in the “waybill” and not observing its duty under the bill of lading, only contemplated a delivery to the Jones Cotton Company, who had no right to the bill of lading or to the cotton.

1918Co., 63 Minn. 255 , 65 N. W. 627 . [5] Aside from the legal results consequent upon the absolute duty stated, it may be added that the evidence is conclusive to these effects: That the carrier did not at the time undertake or intend the delivery of this cotton to the Compress Company as the agent of Jordan and Moss or of the appellees; and that at the time the carrier,, acting on the mentioned error in the “waybill” and not observing its duty under the bill of lading, only contemplated a delivery to the Jones Cotton Company, who had no right to the bill of lading or to the cotton.

1857Section 3503 of the Oode expressly sanctions the manner of stating the act constituting-the offense, as set forth in that form; and it gives a like sanction to the other forms given in the Appendix, in all cases where 'they are applicable.’ The sufficiency of those forms,, in the cases for which they were designed, has been deliberately asserted by our predecessors, and is not now considered an'open question. — Noles v. The State, 24, Ala. 672; Elam v. The State, 25 Ala. 53 . : -'-'The plaintiff in error contends,' that the indictment • in this case is not in the form given in the Code for off

1855This reason, and the rule founded on it, cannot be applied as,between tenants in common of a slave: one of such tenants cannot maintain an action at law to try or establish his title, against his co-tenant, whilst the latter continues in the possession of the slave. — Parminter v. Kelly, 18 Ala. 716 ; Edwards v. Bennett, supra. If the above mentioned rule, as to tenants in common of land, were applied to tenants in common of slaves, there would be no remedy in any court for the latter class of tenants, whenever the tenant holding the actual possession denied the tenancy in common or the title