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19 California opinions name it 2 courts 1941–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Cochrangreen1 sentence2008As the court in Cochran notes, “as a factual matter, when the victim is as young as this victim and is molested by her father in the family home, in all but the rarest cases duress will be present.” (Cochran, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 16, fn. 6 .) Although in the instant case, defendant was Brianna’s stepfather, rather than her father, he held a similar position of authority in Brianna’s home, which would support a finding of duress, along with Brianna’s testimony she feared defendant. | 1 | 1 |
Ashe v. Swensongreen2 sentences1985Then, and not before, was it possible to put the accused in jeopardy for that offense.” (Id., at pp. 448-449 [ 56 L.Ed. at p. 503 ].) The Supreme Court in Brown and Jeffers also cited in support of the above mentioned exception the view expressed by Justice Brennan in footnote 7 of his concurring opinion in Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436, 453 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 481 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 ]: “For example, where a crime is not completed or not discovered, despite diligence on the part of the police, until after the commencement of a prosecution for other crimes arising from the same transaction, an 1985Then, and not before, was it possible to put the accused in jeopardy for that offense.” (Id., at pp. 448-449 [ 56 L.Ed. at p. 503 ].) The Supreme Court in Brown and Jeffers also cited in support of the above mentioned exception the view expressed by Justice Brennan in footnote 7 of his concurring opinion in Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436, 453 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 481 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 ]: “For example, where a crime is not completed or not discovered, despite diligence on the part of the police, until after the commencement of a prosecution for other crimes arising from the same transaction, an | 1 | 1 |
MacKie v. Ambassador Hotel & Investment Corp.green2 sentences1980(Mackie v. Ambassador Hotel etc. Corp. (1932) 123 Cal.App. 215, 222 [ 11 P.2d 3 ]; see 29 A.L.R.2d 825 .)” The above mentioned error in instructions was apparently the result of the trial court’s failure to distinguish the elements of the tort of false imprisonment from the elements of the tort of malicious prosecution. 1980(Mackie v. Ambassador Hotel etc. Corp. (1932) 123 Cal.App. 215, 222 [ 11 P.2d 3 ]; see 29 A.L.R.2d 825 .)” The above mentioned error in instructions was apparently the result of the trial court’s failure to distinguish the elements of the tort of false imprisonment from the elements of the tort of malicious prosecution. | 1 | 1 |
Leathers v. Leathersgreen2 sentences1973(In re Kyle (1947) 77 Cal.App.2d 634, 641 [ 176 P.2d 96 ].) 8 The above mentioned principle is sometimes traced to the equitable doctrine of unclean hands. 9 Leathers v. Leathers (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 768, 774 [ 328 P.2d 853 ], stated: “It is well settled that our courts will recognize and enforce custody decrees of a sister state without reexamina *835 tion of their merits regárdless of change of conditions when there is misconduct or malfeasance on the part of the parent seeking such reexamination, by invoking the doctrine of ‘clean hands.’ This misconduct generally consists of defiantly lea 1973(In re Kyle (1947) 77 Cal.App.2d 634, 641 [ 176 P.2d 96 ].) 8 The above mentioned principle is sometimes traced to the equitable doctrine of unclean hands. 9 Leathers v. Leathers (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 768, 774 [ 328 P.2d 853 ], stated: “It is well settled that our courts will recognize and enforce custody decrees of a sister state without reexamina *835 tion of their merits regárdless of change of conditions when there is misconduct or malfeasance on the part of the parent seeking such reexamination, by invoking the doctrine of ‘clean hands.’ This misconduct generally consists of defiantly lea | 1 | 1 |
In Re Kylegreen2 sentences1973(In re Kyle (1947) 77 Cal.App.2d 634, 641 [ 176 P.2d 96 ].) 8 The above mentioned principle is sometimes traced to the equitable doctrine of unclean hands. 9 Leathers v. Leathers (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 768, 774 [ 328 P.2d 853 ], stated: “It is well settled that our courts will recognize and enforce custody decrees of a sister state without reexamina *835 tion of their merits regárdless of change of conditions when there is misconduct or malfeasance on the part of the parent seeking such reexamination, by invoking the doctrine of ‘clean hands.’ This misconduct generally consists of defiantly lea 1973(In re Kyle (1947) 77 Cal.App.2d 634, 641 [ 176 P.2d 96 ].) 8 The above mentioned principle is sometimes traced to the equitable doctrine of unclean hands. 9 Leathers v. Leathers (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 768, 774 [ 328 P.2d 853 ], stated: “It is well settled that our courts will recognize and enforce custody decrees of a sister state without reexamina *835 tion of their merits regárdless of change of conditions when there is misconduct or malfeasance on the part of the parent seeking such reexamination, by invoking the doctrine of ‘clean hands.’ This misconduct generally consists of defiantly lea | 1 | 1 |
Woodard v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'ngreen2 sentences1963Dyas Co., supra, 4 Cal.2d 511 .) Defendants contend that “ [a]s a matter of law there was no evidence from which this jury could have found that this plaintiff’s injury resulted from the maintenance of a dangerous or defective condition for which these appellants would be liable.” This contention is based upon the claim that the faucet protruding 4 to 5 inches above the pavement was so obvious as to bring the case as a matter of law within the above mentioned rule that where the danger is obvious the occupier is not liable even though the condition is a dangerous or defective one. 11 It is ord 1963Dyas Co., supra, 4 Cal.2d 511 .) Defendants contend that “ [a]s a matter of law there was no evidence from which this jury could have found that this plaintiff’s injury resulted from the maintenance of a dangerous or defective condition for which these appellants would be liable.” This contention is based upon the claim that the faucet protruding 4 to 5 inches above the pavement was so obvious as to bring the case as a matter of law within the above mentioned rule that where the danger is obvious the occupier is not liable even though the condition is a dangerous or defective one. 11 It is ord | 1 | 1 |
People v. Guastigreen2 sentences1958However, in the following eases similar errors were held not to be prejudicial: People v. Chessman (1950), 38 Cal.2d 166, 183 [ 238 P.2d 1001 ], where on a charge of kidnaping the trial court additionally to specific instructions on intent gave the general instruction that to constitute criminal intent it is merely necessary that a person intend to do an act which, if committed, will constitute a crime; People v. Zerillo (1950), 36 Cal.2d 222 [ 223 P.2d 223 ], in a prosecution for offering a bribe, the trial court additionally gave the above mentioned instruction given in the Chessman case and 1958However, in the following eases similar errors were held not to be prejudicial: People v. Chessman (1950), 38 Cal.2d 166, 183 [ 238 P.2d 1001 ], where on a charge of kidnaping the trial court additionally to specific instructions on intent gave the general instruction that to constitute criminal intent it is merely necessary that a person intend to do an act which, if committed, will constitute a crime; People v. Zerillo (1950), 36 Cal.2d 222 [ 223 P.2d 223 ], in a prosecution for offering a bribe, the trial court additionally gave the above mentioned instruction given in the Chessman case and | 1 | 1 |
People v. Chessmangreen2 sentences1958However, in the following eases similar errors were held not to be prejudicial: People v. Chessman (1950), 38 Cal.2d 166, 183 [ 238 P.2d 1001 ], where on a charge of kidnaping the trial court additionally to specific instructions on intent gave the general instruction that to constitute criminal intent it is merely necessary that a person intend to do an act which, if committed, will constitute a crime; People v. Zerillo (1950), 36 Cal.2d 222 [ 223 P.2d 223 ], in a prosecution for offering a bribe, the trial court additionally gave the above mentioned instruction given in the Chessman case and 1958However, in the following eases similar errors were held not to be prejudicial: People v. Chessman (1950), 38 Cal.2d 166, 183 [ 238 P.2d 1001 ], where on a charge of kidnaping the trial court additionally to specific instructions on intent gave the general instruction that to constitute criminal intent it is merely necessary that a person intend to do an act which, if committed, will constitute a crime; People v. Zerillo (1950), 36 Cal.2d 222 [ 223 P.2d 223 ], in a prosecution for offering a bribe, the trial court additionally gave the above mentioned instruction given in the Chessman case and | 1 | 1 |
People v. Swensongreen2 sentences1958However, in the following eases similar errors were held not to be prejudicial: People v. Chessman (1950), 38 Cal.2d 166, 183 [ 238 P.2d 1001 ], where on a charge of kidnaping the trial court additionally to specific instructions on intent gave the general instruction that to constitute criminal intent it is merely necessary that a person intend to do an act which, if committed, will constitute a crime; People v. Zerillo (1950), 36 Cal.2d 222 [ 223 P.2d 223 ], in a prosecution for offering a bribe, the trial court additionally gave the above mentioned instruction given in the Chessman case and 1958However, in the following eases similar errors were held not to be prejudicial: People v. Chessman (1950), 38 Cal.2d 166, 183 [ 238 P.2d 1001 ], where on a charge of kidnaping the trial court additionally to specific instructions on intent gave the general instruction that to constitute criminal intent it is merely necessary that a person intend to do an act which, if committed, will constitute a crime; People v. Zerillo (1950), 36 Cal.2d 222 [ 223 P.2d 223 ], in a prosecution for offering a bribe, the trial court additionally gave the above mentioned instruction given in the Chessman case and | 1 | 1 |
Ray v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1956It says that on an appeal on the judgment roll alone, or on a partial or complete clerk’s transcript, the above mentioned presumption does not apply “unless the error claimed by appellant appears on the face of the record.” Appellant herein invokes the clause just quoted, upon the theory that the absence of an entry showing good cause for the continuance demonstrates the absence of good cause “upon the face of the record.” That is a non sequitur for two reasons: (1) this is not a judgment roll or any appeal from the judgment of conviction; and (2) the requirement that “the court shall enter in 1956It says that on an appeal on the judgment roll alone, or on a partial or complete clerk’s transcript, the above mentioned presumption does not apply “unless the error claimed by appellant appears on the face of the record.” Appellant herein invokes the clause just quoted, upon the theory that the absence of an entry showing good cause for the continuance demonstrates the absence of good cause “upon the face of the record.” That is a non sequitur for two reasons: (1) this is not a judgment roll or any appeal from the judgment of conviction; and (2) the requirement that “the court shall enter in | 1 | 1 |
Zamloch v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF CITY AND COUNTY OF SFgreen2 sentences1956It says that on an appeal on the judgment roll alone, or on a partial or complete clerk’s transcript, the above mentioned presumption does not apply “unless the error claimed by appellant appears on the face of the record.” Appellant herein invokes the clause just quoted, upon the theory that the absence of an entry showing good cause for the continuance demonstrates the absence of good cause “upon the face of the record.” That is a non sequitur for two reasons: (1) this is not a judgment roll or any appeal from the judgment of conviction; and (2) the requirement that “the court shall enter in 1956It says that on an appeal on the judgment roll alone, or on a partial or complete clerk’s transcript, the above mentioned presumption does not apply “unless the error claimed by appellant appears on the face of the record.” Appellant herein invokes the clause just quoted, upon the theory that the absence of an entry showing good cause for the continuance demonstrates the absence of good cause “upon the face of the record.” That is a non sequitur for two reasons: (1) this is not a judgment roll or any appeal from the judgment of conviction; and (2) the requirement that “the court shall enter in | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Estate of Cottrell
green
2 sentences1975The Controller’s argument is supported by the above mentioned presumption and certain dicta in Estate of Cottrell, 15 Cal.App.3d 88 , at page 93 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 923 ] (with reference to § 13310) that “Unquestionably the 1969 amendment nullifies Zook in cases to which it applies.” 6 The executor first argues that the statutory changes were not meant to affect testamentary devisees, as distinguished from intestate heirs. 1975The Controller’s argument is supported by the above mentioned presumption and certain dicta in Estate of Cottrell, 15 Cal.App.3d 88 , at page 93 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 923 ] (with reference to § 13310) that “Unquestionably the 1969 amendment nullifies Zook in cases to which it applies.” 6 The executor first argues that the statutory changes were not meant to affect testamentary devisees, as distinguished from intestate heirs. | 2 | 1975–1975 |
Mercury Insurance Group v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2023Instead, it concluded that plaintiff had not demonstrated substantial prejudice from the arbitrator’s ruling; 7 In judicial arbitrations—governed by section 1141.10 et seq., as implemented by rule 3.810 et seq. (see Mercury, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 343 )—the right to a court reporter is set forth in rule 3.824(b), which provides: “(b) Record of proceedings [¶] (1) Arbitrator’s record The arbitrator may, but is not required to, make a record of the proceedings. [¶] (2) Record not subject to discovery Any records of the proceedings made by or at the direction of the arbitrator are deemed the arb 2023Instead, it concluded that plaintiff had not demonstrated substantial prejudice from the arbitrator’s ruling; 7 In judicial arbitrations—governed by section 1141.10 et seq., as implemented by rule 3.810 et seq. (see Mercury, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 343 )—the right to a court reporter is set forth in rule 3.824(b), which provides: “(b) Record of proceedings [¶] (1) Arbitrator’s record The arbitrator may, but is not required to, make a record of the proceedings. [¶] (2) Record not subject to discovery Any records of the proceedings made by or at the direction of the arbitrator are deemed the arb | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase
green
1 sentence2023(Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 11 .) Moreover, although the trial court mentioned rule 3.824 in denying the petition on the court reporter issue, it did not base its decision on that rule. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Ricardo P. (In Re Ricardo P.)
green
1 sentence2021R.W. objected to the electronic search condition by citing to In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.), in which the court struck an electronics search condition on the ground it “was not reasonably related to the probationer’s future criminality” (id. at pp. 1114, 1128). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
C & L Enterprises Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma
green
1 sentence2016On the one hand, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that in an appropriate case it would “apply ‘the common-law rule of contract interpretation that a court should construe ambiguous language against the interest of the party that drafted it.’ ” (C&L, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 423 .) On the other hand, the court has held that a waiver must be “clear” and did not apply the above mentioned rule of construction in C&L because it found the contract unambiguous. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Goulart
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Goulart (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 71, 80 .) Defendant argues in his reply brief that the Harvey waiver did not apply because neither the prosecution nor the court mentioned the waiver at sentencing. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Diaz v. United States
green
1 sentence1985Then, and not before, was it possible to put the accused in jeopardy for that offense.” (Id., at pp. 448-449 [ 56 L.Ed. at p. 503 ].) The Supreme Court in Brown and Jeffers also cited in support of the above mentioned exception the view expressed by Justice Brennan in footnote 7 of his concurring opinion in Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436, 453 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 481 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 ]: “For example, where a crime is not completed or not discovered, despite diligence on the part of the police, until after the commencement of a prosecution for other crimes arising from the same transaction, an | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Blodgett v. B. H. Dyas Co.
green
1 sentence1963Dyas Co., supra, 4 Cal.2d 511 .) Defendants contend that “ [a]s a matter of law there was no evidence from which this jury could have found that this plaintiff’s injury resulted from the maintenance of a dangerous or defective condition for which these appellants would be liable.” This contention is based upon the claim that the faucet protruding 4 to 5 inches above the pavement was so obvious as to bring the case as a matter of law within the above mentioned rule that where the danger is obvious the occupier is not liable even though the condition is a dangerous or defective one. 11 It is ord | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Powell v. Vracin
green
1 sentence1963Dyas Co., supra, 4 Cal.2d 511 .) Defendants contend that “ [a]s a matter of law there was no evidence from which this jury could have found that this plaintiff’s injury resulted from the maintenance of a dangerous or defective condition for which these appellants would be liable.” This contention is based upon the claim that the faucet protruding 4 to 5 inches above the pavement was so obvious as to bring the case as a matter of law within the above mentioned rule that where the danger is obvious the occupier is not liable even though the condition is a dangerous or defective one. 11 It is ord | 1 | 1963–1963 |
People v. Zerillo
green
2 sentences1958However, in the following eases similar errors were held not to be prejudicial: People v. Chessman (1950), 38 Cal.2d 166, 183 [ 238 P.2d 1001 ], where on a charge of kidnaping the trial court additionally to specific instructions on intent gave the general instruction that to constitute criminal intent it is merely necessary that a person intend to do an act which, if committed, will constitute a crime; People v. Zerillo (1950), 36 Cal.2d 222 [ 223 P.2d 223 ], in a prosecution for offering a bribe, the trial court additionally gave the above mentioned instruction given in the Chessman case and 1958However, in the following eases similar errors were held not to be prejudicial: People v. Chessman (1950), 38 Cal.2d 166, 183 [ 238 P.2d 1001 ], where on a charge of kidnaping the trial court additionally to specific instructions on intent gave the general instruction that to constitute criminal intent it is merely necessary that a person intend to do an act which, if committed, will constitute a crime; People v. Zerillo (1950), 36 Cal.2d 222 [ 223 P.2d 223 ], in a prosecution for offering a bribe, the trial court additionally gave the above mentioned instruction given in the Chessman case and | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. City of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences1957Crescent Wharf etc. Co. v. Los Angeles, 207 Cal. 430 [ 278 P. 1028 ], fails to consider the above mentioned factors and should be overruled. 1957Crescent Wharf etc. Co. v. Los Angeles, 207 Cal. 430 [ 278 P. 1028 ], fails to consider the above mentioned factors and should be overruled. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Young v. County of Ventura
green
2 sentences1957The same applies to Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]. [11] On the second point it should be clear that the charter provisions do not apply to a conventional eminent domain proceeding. [12] "Our attention has not been directed to any authority requiring the filing of a claim against a city in an action in condemnation brought by it. 1957The same applies to Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]. [11] On the second point it should be clear that the charter provisions do not apply to a conventional eminent domain proceeding. [12] "Our attention has not been directed to any authority requiring the filing of a claim against a city in an action in condemnation brought by it. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
MacLean v. City & County of San Francisco
green
2 sentences1956(See MacLean v. City & County of San Francisco, 127 Cal.App.2d 263 [ 273 P.2d 698 ].) Logically there is no difference between a situation created by a subcontractor known to the general contractor and dangerous to third persons, which amounts to a public nuisance, and a similar situation which, while dangerous to third persons, does not amount to a public nuisance. 1956(See MacLean v. City & County of San Francisco, 127 Cal.App.2d 263 [ 273 P.2d 698 ].) Logically there is no difference between a situation created by a subcontractor known to the general contractor and dangerous to third persons, which amounts to a public nuisance, and a similar situation which, while dangerous to third persons, does not amount to a public nuisance. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
People v. Tenedor
green
1 sentence1956App.2d 581, 583 [ 237 P.2d 679 ]), so that the absence of such an entry would not necessarily show “no good cause” upon the face of the record. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Collazo v. Sancho Bonet
green
1 sentence1954In view of the nuisance feature of the evidence, cases on the doctrine of collateral nuisance such as Frassi v. McDonald, 122 Cal. 400 [ 55 P. 139, 772 ], Schmidlin v. Alta Plrnvng Mill Co., 170 Cal. 589 [ 150 P. 983 ], and the Restatement, Torts, section 426, on the same subject are not applicable. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Frassi v. McDonald
neutral
1 sentence1954In view of the nuisance feature of the evidence, cases on the doctrine of collateral nuisance such as Frassi v. McDonald, 122 Cal. 400 [ 55 P. 139, 772 ], Schmidlin v. Alta Plrnvng Mill Co., 170 Cal. 589 [ 150 P. 983 ], and the Restatement, Torts, section 426, on the same subject are not applicable. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Schmidlin v. Alta Planing Mill Co.
green
2 sentences1954In view of the nuisance feature of the evidence, cases on the doctrine of collateral nuisance such as Frassi v. McDonald, 122 Cal. 400 [ 55 P. 139, 772 ], Schmidlin v. Alta Plrnvng Mill Co., 170 Cal. 589 [ 150 P. 983 ], and the Restatement, Torts, section 426, on the same subject are not applicable. 1954In view of the nuisance feature of the evidence, cases on the doctrine of collateral nuisance such as Frassi v. McDonald, 122 Cal. 400 [ 55 P. 139, 772 ], Schmidlin v. Alta Plrnvng Mill Co., 170 Cal. 589 [ 150 P. 983 ], and the Restatement, Torts, section 426, on the same subject are not applicable. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Steinberger v. Steinberger
green
1 sentence1952In applying the above mentioned standard of what is necessary to make out a case of confidential relationship the court in the case of Steinberger v. Steinberger, 60 Cal.App.2d.116, 123 [ 140 P.2d 31 ], in which a hearing was denied by the Supreme Court, said: “In the instant case the trial court found that Earle and his uncle William stood in a confidential relationship to each other. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
People v. Dutton
green
1 sentence1941(People v. McCalla, 63 Cal. App. 783 [ 220 Pac. 436 ] ; People v. Dutton, 41 Cal. App. (2d) 866 [ 107 Pac (2d) 937 ].) In this connection, appellants complain that the above mentioned instruction as to certain documents being securities omitted “the element of selling or issuing as a necessary requisite to a criminal act.” The element of selling or issuing a security plays no part in the statutory definition of a security. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Speck v. Wylie green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| People v. McCalla green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Wedge v. Security-First National Bank green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.