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12 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1928–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ropergreen1 sentence2018See MRE 401; MRE 402; MRE 403. -7- presumed to follow their instructions, and instructions are presumed to cure most errors.”); see also Roper, 286 Mich App at 106 (stating that a proper limiting instruction can safeguard a defendant’s rights). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Abrahamgreen2 sentences2018See People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 279 ; 662 NW2d 836 (2003) (“Jurors are 5 Although the trial court mentioned that defense counsel “opened the door” to further exploration of the unrelated shooting by questioning the prosecution’s firearms expert about the .30-caliber shell casings discussed in the expert’s report, it is evident that the trial court founded its decision to allow McDonald’s testimony on traditional principles of relevance and prejudice. 2018See People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 279 ; 662 NW2d 836 (2003) (“Jurors are 5 Although the trial court mentioned that defense counsel “opened the door” to further exploration of the unrelated shooting by questioning the prosecution’s firearms expert about the .30-caliber shell casings discussed in the expert’s report, it is evident that the trial court founded its decision to allow McDonald’s testimony on traditional principles of relevance and prejudice. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ross v. Consumers Power Co.
red
2 sentences2026As an initial matter, although the trial court mentioned the test for determining whether a governmental employee is immune from liability for intentional torts, as explained in Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459, 472-476 ; 760 NW2d 217 (2008), and Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 633-634 ; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), superseded by statute as stated in In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich 367 ; 835 NW2d 545 (2013), defendants did not assert they were entitled to such “good faith immunity” until moving for reconsideration. 2026As an initial matter, although the trial court mentioned the test for determining whether a governmental employee is immune from liability for intentional torts, as explained in Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459, 472-476 ; 760 NW2d 217 (2008), and Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 633-634 ; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), superseded by statute as stated in In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich 367 ; 835 NW2d 545 (2013), defendants did not assert they were entitled to such “good faith immunity” until moving for reconsideration. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Vushaj v. Farm Bureau General Insurance
green
2 sentences2026“Where an issue is first presented in a motion for reconsideration, it is not properly preserved.” Vushaj v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich, 284 Mich App 513, 519 ; 773 NW2d 758 (2009). 2026“Where an issue is first presented in a motion for reconsideration, it is not properly preserved.” Vushaj v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich, 284 Mich App 513, 519 ; 773 NW2d 758 (2009). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Odom v. Wayne County
green
2 sentences2026As an initial matter, although the trial court mentioned the test for determining whether a governmental employee is immune from liability for intentional torts, as explained in Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459, 472-476 ; 760 NW2d 217 (2008), and Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 633-634 ; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), superseded by statute as stated in In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich 367 ; 835 NW2d 545 (2013), defendants did not assert they were entitled to such “good faith immunity” until moving for reconsideration. 2026As an initial matter, although the trial court mentioned the test for determining whether a governmental employee is immune from liability for intentional torts, as explained in Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459, 472-476 ; 760 NW2d 217 (2008), and Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 633-634 ; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), superseded by statute as stated in In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich 367 ; 835 NW2d 545 (2013), defendants did not assert they were entitled to such “good faith immunity” until moving for reconsideration. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
in Re Bradley Estate
green
2 sentences2026As an initial matter, although the trial court mentioned the test for determining whether a governmental employee is immune from liability for intentional torts, as explained in Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459, 472-476 ; 760 NW2d 217 (2008), and Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 633-634 ; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), superseded by statute as stated in In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich 367 ; 835 NW2d 545 (2013), defendants did not assert they were entitled to such “good faith immunity” until moving for reconsideration. 2026As an initial matter, although the trial court mentioned the test for determining whether a governmental employee is immune from liability for intentional torts, as explained in Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459, 472-476 ; 760 NW2d 217 (2008), and Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 633-634 ; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), superseded by statute as stated in In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich 367 ; 835 NW2d 545 (2013), defendants did not assert they were entitled to such “good faith immunity” until moving for reconsideration. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Autio v. Proksch Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1999When a legislature, confronted constantly with unanimous interpretations ..., deliberately reenacts without change such an interpreted statutory proviso,... it seems to me that any judge who fails to apply the mentioned doctrine wittingly or unwittingly violates the law. [ Id., at 545-546 , 141 N.W.2d 81 (citation omitted).] Returning to the immediate case, the Legislature previously amended the statute in the wake of Moyses , [7] but chose not to expressly eliminate the distinction between intentional and nonintentional tortfeasors. 1999When a legislature, confronted constantly with unanimous interpretations ..., deliberately reenacts without change such an interpreted statutory proviso,... it seems to me that any judge who fails to apply the mentioned doctrine wittingly or unwittingly violates the law. [ Id., at 545-546 , 141 N.W.2d 81 (citation omitted).] Returning to the immediate case, the Legislature previously amended the statute in the wake of Moyses , [7] but chose not to expressly eliminate the distinction between intentional and nonintentional tortfeasors. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. McDaniels
green
2 sentences1979Cf., People v McDaniels, 38 Mich App 174, 177 ; 196 NW2d 25 (1972), lv den 387 Mich 787 *525 (1972). 1979Cf., People v McDaniels, 38 Mich App 174, 177 ; 196 NW2d 25 (1972), lv den 387 Mich 787 *525 (1972). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank
green
2 sentences1961In Acquilino and Durham the supreme court hints circumstantially that it may he ready to qualify the mentioned test of “choateness.” The hint, however, is neither loud nor clear; hence it is our plaih duty to follow the supreme rule Bond expounds from United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 US 47 ( 71 S Ct 111 , 95 L ed 53); United States v. New Britain, 347 US 81 ( 74 S Ct 367 , 98 L ed 520); United States v. Acri, 348 US 211 ( 75 S Ct 239 , 99 L ed 264); United States v. Liverpool & L. & G. 1961In Acquilino and Durham the supreme court hints circumstantially that it may he ready to qualify the mentioned test of “choateness.” The hint, however, is neither loud nor clear; hence it is our plaih duty to follow the supreme rule Bond expounds from United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 US 47 ( 71 S Ct 111 , 95 L ed 53); United States v. New Britain, 347 US 81 ( 74 S Ct 367 , 98 L ed 520); United States v. Acri, 348 US 211 ( 75 S Ct 239 , 99 L ed 264); United States v. Liverpool & L. & G. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
United States v. Acri
green
2 sentences1961In Acquilino and Durham the supreme court hints circumstantially that it may he ready to qualify the mentioned test of “choateness.” The hint, however, is neither loud nor clear; hence it is our plaih duty to follow the supreme rule Bond expounds from United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 US 47 ( 71 S Ct 111 , 95 L ed 53); United States v. New Britain, 347 US 81 ( 74 S Ct 367 , 98 L ed 520); United States v. Acri, 348 US 211 ( 75 S Ct 239 , 99 L ed 264); United States v. Liverpool & L. & G. 1961In Acquilino and Durham the supreme court hints circumstantially that it may he ready to qualify the mentioned test of “choateness.” The hint, however, is neither loud nor clear; hence it is our plaih duty to follow the supreme rule Bond expounds from United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 US 47 ( 71 S Ct 111 , 95 L ed 53); United States v. New Britain, 347 US 81 ( 74 S Ct 367 , 98 L ed 520); United States v. Acri, 348 US 211 ( 75 S Ct 239 , 99 L ed 264); United States v. Liverpool & L. & G. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
United States v. City of New Britain
green
2 sentences1961In Acquilino and Durham the supreme court hints circumstantially that it may he ready to qualify the mentioned test of “choateness.” The hint, however, is neither loud nor clear; hence it is our plaih duty to follow the supreme rule Bond expounds from United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 US 47 ( 71 S Ct 111 , 95 L ed 53); United States v. New Britain, 347 US 81 ( 74 S Ct 367 , 98 L ed 520); United States v. Acri, 348 US 211 ( 75 S Ct 239 , 99 L ed 264); United States v. Liverpool & L. & G. 1961In Acquilino and Durham the supreme court hints circumstantially that it may he ready to qualify the mentioned test of “choateness.” The hint, however, is neither loud nor clear; hence it is our plaih duty to follow the supreme rule Bond expounds from United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 US 47 ( 71 S Ct 111 , 95 L ed 53); United States v. New Britain, 347 US 81 ( 74 S Ct 367 , 98 L ed 520); United States v. Acri, 348 US 211 ( 75 S Ct 239 , 99 L ed 264); United States v. Liverpool & L. & G. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Keating v. Michigan Central Railroad
green
1 sentence1960Co., 94 Mich 219 , wherein the facts were as follows: ■ In 1876 plaintiff, then 7 years old, was injured. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Hamilton v. Hamilton
neutral
1 sentence1958(Citing authorities.)” “Upon the hearing of any motion or petition where any question of fact is involved, the court hearing such motion or petition, may in its discretion, if it deems it necessary in order to reach a just conclusion as to such facts, require the production of all, or any of the witnesses having knowledge of the matters of fact involved on such motion or petition for examination before him in open court.” (CL 1948, § 618.8 [Stat Ann § 27.988].) For genesis of the mentioned rule and statute, see Hamilton v.. Hamilton, 37 Mich 603, 606 , and notes appended under 1916 Circuit Cou | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Cebulak v. Lewis
green
1 sentence1956We should, then, write into the scroll plain declaration that the mentioned presumption of innocence, of an outside-the-family driver, equals in weight and dignity the statutory presumption of knowledge or consent, and that Hatter’s inference of rightful use and *527 control of a motor vehicle on a public way, arising from such presumption of innocence, casts on the defendant in a case of this nature “the burden of producing clear, positive and credible proof” (quotation from Cebulak v. Lewis, supra, p 724 of report) that express or implied knowledge or consent was absent. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
People v. Todaro
green
1 sentence1939BUSHNELL, SHARPE, CHANDLER, and NORTH, JJ., concurred with WIEST, J. * See People v. Todaro , 256 Mich. 427 , on rehearing. — REPORTER. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Cousins v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1933Cousins v. Railway Co., 96 Mich. 386 ( 4 Am. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Harris v. Harris
neutral
1 sentence1931In Harris v. Harris, 106 Mich. 246 , a daughter-in-law performed services in the home of her father-in-law and was denied recovery in the absence of an express contract. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Mutual Life Ins. v. Vaughan
red
2 sentences1928Co. of New York v. Vaughan, 125 Miss. 369 ( 88 South. 11 ); Basch v. Insurance Co., 35 N. J. 1928Co. of New York v. Vaughan, 125 Miss. 369 ( 88 South. 11 ); Basch v. Insurance Co., 35 N. J. | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.