Debt Limitation clause in New Jersey

2002Furthermore a county may not turn to the State for exoneration or reimbursement. [ Holster, supra, 59 N.J. at 73 , 279 A.2d 798 .] Approximately one year after the Court’s Holster decision, a sharply divided Court (4-3) sustained the constitutionality of the New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority Law, L. 1971, c. 137, against a Debt Limitation Clause challenge.

2002Furthermore a county may not turn to the State for exoneration or reimbursement. [ Holster, supra, 59 N.J. at 73 , 279 A.2d 798 .] Approximately one year after the Court’s Holster decision, a sharply divided Court (4-3) sustained the constitutionality of the New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority Law, L. 1971, c. 137, against a Debt Limitation Clause challenge.

1997It is to create an autonomous public corporate entity to undertake the task and to borrow money for the purpose on its own bonds.” (footnote omitted)); (2) the debt is dependent on a “special fund” or separate revenue source for its repayment, see, e.g., Clayton v. Kervick, 52 N.J. 138, 154 , 244 A.2d 281 (1968) (holding that the Educational Facilities Act did not violate the debt limitation clause because repayment of the debt was intended to come mainly from sources unrelated to legislative appropriations and that its operations, therefore, “may be compared favorably to the many self-liquida

1997It is to create an autonomous public corporate entity to undertake the task and to borrow money for the purpose on its own bonds.” (footnote omitted)); (2) the debt is dependent on a “special fund” or separate revenue source for its repayment, see, e.g., Clayton v. Kervick, 52 N.J. 138, 154 , 244 A.2d 281 (1968) (holding that the Educational Facilities Act did not violate the debt limitation clause because repayment of the debt was intended to come mainly from sources unrelated to legislative appropriations and that its operations, therefore, “may be compared favorably to the many self-liquida

2015Thus, contrary to the dissent’s assertion, the subject statute in City of Passaic did not survive Debt Limitation Clause analysis because the State’s required annual contribution was “an ‘ordinary government operating expense.’ ” See post at 231, 118 A.3d at 304 (quoting dissent *216 in Spadoro, supra, 150 N.J. at 11 , 695 A.2d 654 ). 9 Instead, as this Court has made clear in numerous cases interpreting and applying the City of Passaic holding, the statute at issue there was permissible under the Debt Limitation Clause because the payment it required was one that was subject to legislative ap

2015Thus, contrary to the dissent’s assertion, the subject statute in City of Passaic did not survive Debt Limitation Clause analysis because the State’s required annual contribution was “an ‘ordinary government operating expense.’ ” See post at 231, 118 A.3d at 304 (quoting dissent *216 in Spadoro, supra, 150 N.J. at 11 , 695 A.2d 654 ). 9 Instead, as this Court has made clear in numerous cases interpreting and applying the City of Passaic holding, the statute at issue there was permissible under the Debt Limitation Clause because the payment it required was one that was subject to legislative ap

2015See id. at 13-15, 819 A.2d 395 .

2015See id. at 13-15, 819 A.2d 395 .

2002See New Jersey Turnpike Auth., supra, 3 N.J. at 238 , 69 A.2d 875 (noting that amortization was to be payable solely from Turnpike tolls and revenues); Behnke, supra, 13 N.J. at 20, 29, 97 A.2d 647 (sustaining Guaranty Act, approved by voters, authorizing State to satisfy obligations arising from New Jersey Highway Authority bonds “in the event the revenue from tolls and otherwise shall be insufficient for the purpose” and noting that Highway Authority’s tolls and revenues are pledged to secure amortization of bonds); Clayton, supra, 52 N.J. at 154 , 244 A.2d 281 (noting that annual rental pay

2002See New Jersey Turnpike Auth., supra, 3 N.J. at 238 , 69 A.2d 875 (noting that amortization was to be payable solely from Turnpike tolls and revenues); Behnke, supra, 13 N.J. at 20, 29, 97 A.2d 647 (sustaining Guaranty Act, approved by voters, authorizing State to satisfy obligations arising from New Jersey Highway Authority bonds “in the event the revenue from tolls and otherwise shall be insufficient for the purpose” and noting that Highway Authority’s tolls and revenues are pledged to secure amortization of bonds); Clayton, supra, 52 N.J. at 154 , 244 A.2d 281 (noting that annual rental pay

2002See In re Passaic County Utilities Auth., 164 N.J. 270, 306-07 , 753 A. 2d 661 (2000) (invalidating utility authority's imposition of Environmental Impact Charge on non-users but deferring effective date of judgment for ninety days to provide opportunity for legislative action).

2002See In re Passaic County Utilities Auth., 164 N.J. 270, 306-07 , 753 A. 2d 661 (2000) (invalidating utility authority's imposition of Environmental Impact Charge on non-users but deferring effective date of judgment for ninety days to provide opportunity for legislative action).

1991For example, in City of Passaic v. Consolidated Police and Firemen’s Pension Fund Commission, 18 N.J. 137 , 113 A.2d 22 (1955), the Court examined a pension statute that provided: The State of New Jersey shall contribute annually, throughout a period of thirty years ... such amount as may be necessary to make up the balance of each annual payment____ All funds necessary to meet the State’s share of said annual payments shall be included in the annual State budget and appropriated by the Legislature. [Id. at 144, 113 A.2d 22 .] The Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that this provision v

1991For example, in City of Passaic v. Consolidated Police and Firemen’s Pension Fund Commission, 18 N.J. 137 , 113 A.2d 22 (1955), the Court examined a pension statute that provided: The State of New Jersey shall contribute annually, throughout a period of thirty years ... such amount as may be necessary to make up the balance of each annual payment____ All funds necessary to meet the State’s share of said annual payments shall be included in the annual State budget and appropriated by the Legislature. [Id. at 144, 113 A.2d 22 .] The Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that this provision v

1973The dissent quoted with approval from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337 , 190 A. 140, 147 (Sup. Ct. 1937), to the effect that “It is never an illegal evasion to accomplish a desired result, lawful in itself, by discovering a legal way to do it”. (13 N. J. at 76).

1973The dissent quoted with approval from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337 , 190 A. 140, 147 (Sup. Ct. 1937), to the effect that “It is never an illegal evasion to accomplish a desired result, lawful in itself, by discovering a legal way to do it”. (13 N. J. at 76).