Debt Limitation clause in California

2009The appropriation of such moneys and the issuance of warrants in anticipation of the receipt of revenues in effect operates in the nature of a cash payment and, therefore, does not create an indebtedness or liability within the meaning of the debt limitation clause.” (Ibid.) In Riley v. Johnson (1936) 6 Cal.2d 529 [ 58 P.2d 631 ], the court extended this principle to situations where the warrants were not likely to be paid until sometime during the succeeding fiscal period. {Id. at p. 532.) The fundamental principle underlying each of these exceptions is that the constitutional debt limit does

2009The appropriation of such moneys and the issuance of warrants in anticipation of the receipt of revenues in effect operates in the nature of a cash payment and, therefore, does not create an indebtedness or liability within the meaning of the debt limitation clause.” (Ibid.) In Riley v. Johnson (1936) 6 Cal.2d 529 [ 58 P.2d 631 ], the court extended this principle to situations where the warrants were not likely to be paid until sometime during the succeeding fiscal period. {Id. at p. 532.) The fundamental principle underlying each of these exceptions is that the constitutional debt limit does

1971The appropriation of such moneys and the issuance of warrants in anticipation of the receipt of revenues in effect operates in the nature of a cash payment and, therefore, does not create an indebtedness or liability within the meaning of the debt limitation clause. [Citations.]” (Riley v. Johnson, supra, 219 Cal. 513, 520-521 ; Riley v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.2d 529, 531-532 .) We perceive no constitutionally relevant distinctions between chapter 605 upheld in the Riley cases and chapter 223.

1971Such appropriation and issuance “operates in the nature of a cash payment and, therefore, does not create an indebtedness or liability within the meaning of the debt limitation clause.” (Riley v. Johnson, supra, 219 Cal. 513, 520-521 ; Riley v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.2d 529, 531-532 .) Respondent contends, however, that chapter 223 violátes article XIII, section 21, of the Constitution on the ground that, it authorizes money to be drawn from the treasury without a warrant “duly drawn thereon by the Controller.” 2 The obvious purpose of this requirement is to insure the Controller’s concurrence

1936On this phase of the ease the Supreme Court of Iowa, in an exhaustive discussion and study of the question, reaches the same conclusion, and adds: “Nor do we find the weight of authority otherwise.” (Rowley v. Clarke, 162 Iowa, 732 [ 144 N. W. 908 ].) We are of the view that the decision in Riley v. Johnson, supra, sufficiently and definitely settles the foregoing two propositions advanced by the respondent Treasurer and other questions which might arise in considering this case.

1933(State v. McCauley, supra; People v. Pacheco, 27 Cal. 175 ; Bickerdike v. State, 144 Cal. 681 [ 78 Pac. 270 ].) Respondent also suggests that subsequent legislatures may repeal the statute or appropriate for other purposes the unapplied money in the general fund, and thus exhaust the general fund, and thus create an indebtedness or liability in violation of the clause in question.

1933(State v. McCauley, supra; People v. Pacheco, 27 Cal. 175 ; Bickerdike v. State, 144 Cal. 681 [ 78 Pac. 270 ].) Respondent also suggests that subsequent legislatures may repeal the statute or appropriate for other purposes the unapplied money in the general fund, and thus exhaust the general fund, and thus create an indebtedness or liability in violation of the clause in question.

1933(State v. McCauley, supra; People v. Pacheco, 27 Cal. 175 ; Bickerdike v. State, 144 Cal. 681 [ 78 Pac. 270 ].) Respondent also suggests that subsequent legislatures may repeal the statute or appropriate for other purposes the unapplied money in the general fund, and thus exhaust the general fund, and thus create an indebtedness or liability in violation of the clause in question.