10 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Foster v. Devilbiss Co.green2 sentences2009See, e.g., Foster, 124 Ill.Dec. 600 , 529 N.E.2d at 584 (holding that the foreseeability of the removal of guards was a fact question). {25} NCR also argues that Ribble himself did not foresee the modifications that would allow a person closer access to the jaw *740 crusher or that would uncover the flywheel, but we do not view this as dispositive. 2009See, e.g., Foster, 124 Ill.Dec. 600 , 529 N.E.2d at 584 (holding that the foreseeability of the removal of guards was a fact question). {25} NCR also argues that Ribble himself did not foresee the modifications that would allow a person closer access to the jaw crusher or that would uncover the flywheel, but we do not view this as dispositive. | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2007See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (describing when prejudice is presumed in a conflict of interest case as opposed to the automatic presumption of prejudice that arises when a defendant is denied counsel or when the State frustrates a defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel). 2007See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (describing when prejudice is presumed in a conflict of interest case as opposed to the automatic presumption of prejudice that arises when a defendant is denied counsel or when the State frustrates a defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel). | 1 | 1 |
Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp.green2 sentences1992The reasonably-careful-invitee test of Davis has been abrogated by our supreme court in Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153, 157 , 824 P.2d 293, 297 (1992), holding that “in a place of public accommodation, an occupier of the premises owes a duty to safeguard each business visitor whom the occupier reasonably may foresee could be injured by a danger avoidable through reasonable precautions available to the occupier of the premises.” Under Klopp, neither the open and obvious nature of a defect nor the injured party’s own negligence constitutes an automatic bar to recovery. 1992The reasonably-careful-invitee test of Davis has been abrogated by our supreme court in Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153, 157 , 824 P.2d 293, 297 (1992), holding that “in a place of public accommodation, an occupier of the premises owes a duty to safeguard each business visitor whom the occupier reasonably may foresee could be injured by a danger avoidable through reasonable precautions available to the occupier of the premises.” Under Klopp, neither the open and obvious nature of a defect nor the injured party’s own negligence constitutes an automatic bar to recovery. | 1 | 1 |
McCoy v. New Mexico Real Estate Commissiongreen2 sentences1983In McCoy v. New Mexico Real Estate Commission, 94 N.M. 602, 603 , 614 P.2d 14, 15 (1980), which involved the commission of a crime (conspiracy to import marijuana) not directly related to the profession (real estate brokerage), we cited Bertrand, and stated that in order to prevent the conviction of a crime from operating as an automatic bar to employment, “the relevant state agency must state the reasons for the conclusion that the criminal offender cannot- maintain or pursue * * employment.” We find the language of Bertrand and McCoy persuasive and now determine that Subsection 28-2-4(B) req 1983In McCoy v. New Mexico Real Estate Commission, 94 N.M. 602, 603 , 614 P.2d 14, 15 (1980), which involved the commission of a crime (conspiracy to import marijuana) not directly related to the profession (real estate brokerage), we cited Bertrand, and stated that in order to prevent the conviction of a crime from operating as an automatic bar to employment, “the relevant state agency must state the reasons for the conclusion that the criminal offender cannot- maintain or pursue * * employment.” We find the language of Bertrand and McCoy persuasive and now determine that Subsection 28-2-4(B) req | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cordova v. Cline
green
2 sentences2023“The 4 Legislature knows how to include language in a statute if it so desires.” Cordova v. 5 Cline, 2021-NMCA-022, ¶ 9 , 489 P.3d 957 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and 6 citation omitted). 2023“The 4 Legislature knows how to include language in a statute if it so desires.” Cordova v. 5 Cline, 2021-NMCA-022, ¶ 9 , 489 P.3d 957 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and 6 citation omitted). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Johnson v. City of Las Cruces
green
2 sentences1994In Moore, 773 S.W.2d at 80 , the Arkansas Supreme Court, citing Johnson v. City of Las Cruces, 86 N.M. 196 , 521 P.2d 1037 (Ct.App.1974), characterized New Mexico as a state that follows the absolute bar approach. 1994In Moore, 773 S.W.2d at 80 , the Arkansas Supreme Court, citing Johnson v. City of Las Cruces, 86 N.M. 196 , 521 P.2d 1037 (Ct.App.1974), characterized New Mexico as a state that follows the absolute bar approach. | 2 | 1994–1994 |
Moore v. Missouri Pacific Railroad
green
2 sentences1994In Moore, 773 S.W.2d at 80 , the Arkansas Supreme Court, citing Johnson v. City of Las Cruces, 86 N.M. 196 , 521 P.2d 1037 (Ct.App. 1974), characterized New Mexico as a state that follows the absolute bar approach. 1994In Moore, 773 S.W.2d at 80 , the Arkansas Supreme Court, citing Johnson v. City of Las Cruces, 86 N.M. 196 , 521 P.2d 1037 (Ct.App.1974), characterized New Mexico as a state that follows the absolute bar approach. | 2 | 1994–1994 |
United States v. Olano
green
2 sentences2010The United States Supreme Court rejected the defendants’ claim that they were entitled to an automatic presumption of prejudice, explaining that the Court “generally [has] analyzed outside intrusions upon the jury for prejudicial impact.” Id. at 738 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 . 2010The United States Supreme Court rejected the defendants’ claim that they were entitled to an automatic presumption of prejudice, explaining that the Court “generally [has] analyzed outside intrusions upon the jury for prejudicial impact.” Id. at 738 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Davis v. Scherer
green
2 sentences2006Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194-95 , 104 S.Ct. 3012 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984). {28} Finally, we briefly respond to Plaintiffs’ argument that the following language from a footnote in Davis compels the conclusion that the violation of Section 27-2-16(B) constitutes an automatic violation of due process: “Neither federal nor state officials lose their immunity by violating the clear command of a statute or regulation — of federal or of state law — unless that statute or regulation provides the basis for the cause of action sued upon.” 468 U.S. at 194 n. 12, 104 S.Ct. 3012 (emphasis added). 2006Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194-95 , 104 S.Ct. 3012 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984). {28} Finally, we briefly respond to Plaintiffs’ argument that the following language from a footnote in Davis compels the conclusion that the violation of Section 27-2-16(B) constitutes an automatic violation of due process: “Neither federal nor state officials lose their immunity by violating the clear command of a statute or regulation — of federal or of state law — unless that statute or regulation provides the basis for the cause of action sued upon.” 468 U.S. at 194 n. 12, 104 S.Ct. 3012 (emphasis added). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.