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11 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Morrillgreen2 sentences1991There is even less merit in Roger’s belated effort to invoke a constitutional justification for his refusal to respond to a subpoena that was valid on its face. 5 Just as the privilege against self-incrimination does not provide an automatic defense to a grand jury summons; see State v. Morrill, 197 Conn. 507, 518 , 498 A.2d 76 (1985); so it does not provide an automatic defense to a subpoena. 1991There is even less merit in Roger’s belated effort to invoke a constitutional justification for his refusal to respond to a subpoena that was valid on its face. 5 Just as the privilege against self-incrimination does not provide an automatic defense to a grand jury summons; see State v. Morrill, 197 Conn. 507, 518 , 498 A.2d 76 (1985); so it does not provide an automatic defense to a subpoena. | 1 | 1 |
King v. Connecticut Co.green2 sentences1986See King v. Connecticut Co., 110 Conn. 615, 618 , 149 A. 219 (1930); Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 590 , 131 A. 432 (1925). 3 Thus, a person’s mental disability is not an automatic bar to that person’s liability. 1986See King v. Connecticut Co., 110 Conn. 615, 618 , 149 A. 219 (1930); Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 590 , 131 A. 432 (1925). 3 Thus, a person’s mental disability is not an automatic bar to that person’s liability. | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Caldwellgreen2 sentences1986See Turner v. Caldwell, 36 Conn. Sup. 350, 351 , 421 A.2d 876 (1980). 1986See Turner v. Caldwell, 36 Conn. Sup. 350, 351 , 421 A.2d 876 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Edmundson v. Riveragreen2 sentences1983See Edmundson v. Rivera, 169 Conn. 630, 635-36 , 363 A.2d 1031 (1975); Pizzola v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 167 Conn. 202, 209 , 355 A.2d 21 (1974); 16 Am. 1983See Edmundson v. Rivera, 169 Conn. 630, 635-36 , 363 A.2d 1031 (1975); Pizzola v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 167 Conn. 202, 209 , 355 A.2d 21 (1974); 16 Am. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
green
1 sentence2024Moreover, because state agencies often take corrective action within two years of learning of malfeasance, concluding that temporal proximity, without more, is probative of retaliatory intent would allow a self- reporting employee to automatically satisfy his or her burden under the first step of the burden shifting analysis recognized in McDonnell Douglas Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 6 ,0 0 Conn. 1 Dept. of Public Health v. Estrada Corp. v. Green ( 411 U.S. 792 ) without submitting evidence of retalia- tory animus. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. Cronic
green
2 sentences2018Id., at 662-66 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 . 2018Id., at 662-66 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Lostritto v. Community Action Agency of New Haven, Inc.
green
2 sentences2004The state and Shea, as well as the commissioner, claim that this court’s recent decision in Lostritto v. Community Action Agency of New Haven, Inc., 269 Conn. 10, 36-38 , 848 A.2d 418 (2004), is dispositive of the question of whether the trial court improperly granted Maresh’s motion for a declaratory ruling and a writ of mandamus, and improperly denied the state’s and Shea’s motions to dismiss. 2004The state and Shea, as well as the commissioner, claim that this court’s recent decision in Lostritto v. Community Action Agency of New Haven, Inc., 269 Conn. 10, 36-38 , 848 A.2d 418 (2004), is dispositive of the question of whether the trial court improperly granted Maresh’s motion for a declaratory ruling and a writ of mandamus, and improperly denied the state’s and Shea’s motions to dismiss. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Domian
green
1 sentence2000CT Page 5204 State v. Domian, 235 Conn. 679 (1996) is dispositive of the issue. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Caplan
green
2 sentences1997State v. Assuntino, 173 Conn. 104, 109-10 , 376 A.2d 1091 (1977); State v. Caplan, 85 Conn. 618, 622 , 84 A. 280 (1912); see also C. 1997State v. Assuntino, 173 Conn. 104, 109-10 , 376 A.2d 1091 (1977); State v. Caplan, 85 Conn. 618, 622 , 84 A. 280 (1912); see also C. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Ullmann v. State
green
2 sentences1997There is no indication, however, that the legislature contemplated that noncompliance with that filing period would serve as a complete and automatic bar to appellate review of the writ. 15 In contrast, it is clear that the writ of error, like the court’s “inherent . . . power to punish all contempts committed in its presence”; Ullmann v. State, 230 Conn. 698, 705 , 647 A.2d 324 (1994); is deeply rooted in our common law. 1997There is no indication, however, that the legislature contemplated that noncompliance with that filing period would serve as a complete and automatic bar to appellate review of the writ. 15 In contrast, it is clear that the writ of error, like the court’s “inherent . . . power to punish all contempts committed in its presence”; Ullmann v. State, 230 Conn. 698, 705 , 647 A.2d 324 (1994); is deeply rooted in our common law. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Assuntino
green
2 sentences1997State v. Assuntino, 173 Conn. 104, 109-10 , 376 A.2d 1091 (1977); State v. Caplan, 85 Conn. 618, 622 , 84 A. 280 (1912); see also C. 1997State v. Assuntino, 173 Conn. 104, 109-10 , 376 A.2d 1091 (1977); State v. Caplan, 85 Conn. 618, 622 , 84 A. 280 (1912); see also C. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Read v. Sacco
green
1 sentence1991United Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 172 F. Sup. 580 , 588 (D.Conn. 1959); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807 , 813 , 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Read v. CT Page 7815 Sacco, 49 App.Div.2d 471 , 473 , 375 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1975). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Saving Association
green
2 sentences1991United Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 172 F. Sup. 580 , 588 (D.Conn. 1959); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807 , 813 , 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Read v. CT Page 7815 Sacco, 49 App.Div.2d 471 , 473 , 375 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1975). 1991United Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 172 F. Sup. 580 , 588 (D.Conn. 1959); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807 , 813 , 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Read v. CT Page 7815 Sacco, 49 App.Div.2d 471 , 473 , 375 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1975). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Bushnell v. Bushnell
green
2 sentences1986See King v. Connecticut Co., 110 Conn. 615, 618 , 149 A. 219 (1930); Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 590 , 131 A. 432 (1925). 3 Thus, a person’s mental disability is not an automatic bar to that person’s liability. 1986See King v. Connecticut Co., 110 Conn. 615, 618 , 149 A. 219 (1930); Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 590 , 131 A. 432 (1925). 3 Thus, a person’s mental disability is not an automatic bar to that person’s liability. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
In Re Application of George B.
green
1 sentence1986Id., 429-31 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Pizzola v. Planning & Zoning Commission
green
2 sentences1983See Edmundson v. Rivera, 169 Conn. 630, 635-36 , 363 A.2d 1031 (1975); Pizzola v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 167 Conn. 202, 209 , 355 A.2d 21 (1974); 16 Am. 1983See Edmundson v. Rivera, 169 Conn. 630, 635-36 , 363 A.2d 1031 (1975); Pizzola v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 167 Conn. 202, 209 , 355 A.2d 21 (1974); 16 Am. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
State v. Turcio
green
2 sentences1980For this reason, there cannot be an automatic rule regarding the admissibility of such evidence. *59 When, in the exercise of judicial discretion, a trial court determines that the probative value of the fingerprint card outweighs its prejudicial effect, the evidence may be admitted; State v. DeFreitas, 179 Conn. 431 , 426 A.2d 799 ; State v. Turcio, 178 Conn. 116 , 422 A.2d 749 ; State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 597 , 325 A.2d 199 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 , 94 S. Ct. 291 , 38 L. 1980For this reason, there cannot be an automatic rule regarding the admissibility of such evidence. *59 When, in the exercise of judicial discretion, a trial court determines that the probative value of the fingerprint card outweighs its prejudicial effect, the evidence may be admitted; State v. DeFreitas, 179 Conn. 431 , 426 A.2d 799 ; State v. Turcio, 178 Conn. 116 , 422 A.2d 749 ; State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 597 , 325 A.2d 199 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 , 94 S. Ct. 291 , 38 L. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Moynahan
green
2 sentences1980For this reason, there cannot be an automatic rule regarding the admissibility of such evidence. *59 When, in the exercise of judicial discretion, a trial court determines that the probative value of the fingerprint card outweighs its prejudicial effect, the evidence may be admitted; State v. DeFreitas, 179 Conn. 431 , 426 A.2d 799 ; State v. Turcio, 178 Conn. 116 , 422 A.2d 749 ; State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 597 , 325 A.2d 199 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 , 94 S. Ct. 291 , 38 L. 1980For this reason, there cannot be an automatic rule regarding the admissibility of such evidence. *59 When, in the exercise of judicial discretion, a trial court determines that the probative value of the fingerprint card outweighs its prejudicial effect, the evidence may be admitted; State v. DeFreitas, 179 Conn. 431 , 426 A.2d 799 ; State v. Turcio, 178 Conn. 116 , 422 A.2d 749 ; State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 597 , 325 A.2d 199 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 , 94 S. Ct. 291 , 38 L. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Henrikson v. United States
green
2 sentences1980When, in the exercise of judicial discretion, a trial court determines that the probative value of the fingerprint card outweighs its prejudicial effect, the evidence may be admitted; State v. DeFreitas, 179 Conn. 431 , 426 A.2d 799 ; State v. Turcio, 178 Conn. 116 , 422 A.2d 749 ; State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 597 , 325 A.2d 199 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 , 94 S. Ct. 291 , 38 L. 1980For this reason, there cannot be an automatic rule regarding the admissibility of such evidence. *59 When, in the exercise of judicial discretion, a trial court determines that the probative value of the fingerprint card outweighs its prejudicial effect, the evidence may be admitted; State v. DeFreitas, 179 Conn. 431 , 426 A.2d 799 ; State v. Turcio, 178 Conn. 116 , 422 A.2d 749 ; State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 597 , 325 A.2d 199 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 , 94 S. Ct. 291 , 38 L. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Main Line Board of Realtors v. Collins
green
2 sentences1980When, in the exercise of judicial discretion, a trial court determines that the probative value of the fingerprint card outweighs its prejudicial effect, the evidence may be admitted; State v. DeFreitas, 179 Conn. 431 , 426 A.2d 799 ; State v. Turcio, 178 Conn. 116 , 422 A.2d 749 ; State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 597 , 325 A.2d 199 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 , 94 S. Ct. 291 , 38 L. 1980For this reason, there cannot be an automatic rule regarding the admissibility of such evidence. *59 When, in the exercise of judicial discretion, a trial court determines that the probative value of the fingerprint card outweighs its prejudicial effect, the evidence may be admitted; State v. DeFreitas, 179 Conn. 431 , 426 A.2d 799 ; State v. Turcio, 178 Conn. 116 , 422 A.2d 749 ; State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 597 , 325 A.2d 199 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 , 94 S. Ct. 291 , 38 L. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Textile Workers Union v. Kayser-Roth Corp.
green
2 sentences1980When, in the exercise of judicial discretion, a trial court determines that the probative value of the fingerprint card outweighs its prejudicial effect, the evidence may be admitted; State v. DeFreitas, 179 Conn. 431 , 426 A.2d 799 ; State v. Turcio, 178 Conn. 116 , 422 A.2d 749 ; State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 597 , 325 A.2d 199 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 , 94 S. Ct. 291 , 38 L. 1980For this reason, there cannot be an automatic rule regarding the admissibility of such evidence. *59 When, in the exercise of judicial discretion, a trial court determines that the probative value of the fingerprint card outweighs its prejudicial effect, the evidence may be admitted; State v. DeFreitas, 179 Conn. 431 , 426 A.2d 799 ; State v. Turcio, 178 Conn. 116 , 422 A.2d 749 ; State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 597 , 325 A.2d 199 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 , 94 S. Ct. 291 , 38 L. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. DeFreitas
green
2 sentences1980For this reason, there cannot be an automatic rule regarding the admissibility of such evidence. *59 When, in the exercise of judicial discretion, a trial court determines that the probative value of the fingerprint card outweighs its prejudicial effect, the evidence may be admitted; State v. DeFreitas, 179 Conn. 431 , 426 A.2d 799 ; State v. Turcio, 178 Conn. 116 , 422 A.2d 749 ; State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 597 , 325 A.2d 199 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 , 94 S. Ct. 291 , 38 L. 1980For this reason, there cannot be an automatic rule regarding the admissibility of such evidence. *59 When, in the exercise of judicial discretion, a trial court determines that the probative value of the fingerprint card outweighs its prejudicial effect, the evidence may be admitted; State v. DeFreitas, 179 Conn. 431 , 426 A.2d 799 ; State v. Turcio, 178 Conn. 116 , 422 A.2d 749 ; State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 597 , 325 A.2d 199 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 , 94 S. Ct. 291 , 38 L. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.