automatic bar in Florida

2010On appeal, the Second District framed the issue as “whether a paternity action that states a proper claim on the date that it is filed and served may be barred if the mother subsequently marries a second man who files an acknowledgment of paternity,” and then held that “such defensive steps are not an automatic bar to the paternity action.” Id. at 639 .

2007We conclude that such defensive steps are not an automatic bar to the paternity action.” Id.

2014Liquors of Collier, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 556 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), which hold that a statute precluding licen-sure or certification for a particular occupation due to the conviction of a crime may not be interpreted as imposing an automatic bar against the licensure of those who have received a pardon or restoration of rights under the clemency power granted to the Governor in article IV, section 8(a) of the Florida Constitution.

2009Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 , 88 S.Ct. 1913 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968).

2009Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 , 88 S.Ct. 1913 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968).

2008It rejected, however, a per se rule of reversal: Satterwhite urges us to adopt an automatic rule of reversal for violation of the Sixth Amendment right recognized in Estelle v. Smith [ 451 U.S. 454, 471 , 101 S.Ct. 1866 , 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (holding that the death penalty was improperly imposed where the psychiatric examination on which the expert testified at the penalty phase proceeded in violation *577 of the right to counsel) ].

2008It rejected, however, a per se rule of reversal: Satterwhite urges us to adopt an automatic rule of reversal for violation of the Sixth Amendment right recognized in Estelle v. Smith [ 451 U.S. 454, 471 , 101 S.Ct. 1866 , 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (holding that the death penalty was improperly imposed where the psychiatric examination on which the expert testified at the penalty phase proceeded in violation *577 of the right to counsel) ].

2008He relies heavily upon the statement in Holloway [ v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) ] that "when a defendant is deprived of the presence and assistance of his attorney, either throughout the prosecution or during a critical stage in, at least, the prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is automatic.

2008He relies heavily upon the statement in Holloway [ v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) ] that "when a defendant is deprived of the presence and assistance of his attorney, either throughout the prosecution or during a critical stage in, at least, the prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is automatic.

2000"While in general relatives of homicide victims have the right to be present at trial, this right must yield to the defendant's right to a fair trial." 599 So.2d at 985-86 .

1994In Markham v. Neptune Hollywood Beach Club, 527 So.2d 814 (Fla. 1988), the supreme court held that the "plain meaning of subsection (6) requires that the sixty day requirement of subsection (2) be construed as a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim rather than a statute of limitations." Id. at 815 . [2] The difference between the two is that a statute of limitations bars untimely claims only when a party asserts the operation of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense; a statute of nonclaim operates as an automatic bar to untimely claims.

1994In Markham v. Neptune Hollywood Beach Club, 527 So.2d 814 (Fla. 1988), the supreme court held that the "plain meaning of subsection (6) requires that the sixty day requirement of subsection (2) be construed as a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim rather than a statute of limitations." Id. at 815 . [2] The difference between the two is that a statute of limitations bars untimely claims only when a party asserts the operation of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense; a statute of nonclaim operates as an automatic bar to untimely claims.

1991Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975).

1991Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975).

1990Therefore, although sale of a counterfeit substance is not a lesser included offense of the charge of sale of cocaine and thus prosecution on that charge is not an automatic violation of double jeopardy under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), clearly, under Grady, prosecution for sale of a counterfeit substance is barred on double jeopardy grounds under the unique circumstances of this case. [1] See also Scalf v. State, 15 F.L.W.

1990Therefore, although sale of a counterfeit substance is not a lesser included offense of the charge of sale of cocaine and thus prosecution on that charge is not an automatic violation of double jeopardy under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), clearly, under Grady, prosecution for sale of a counterfeit substance is barred on double jeopardy grounds under the unique circumstances of this case. [1] See also Scalf v. State, 15 F.L.W.

1988We addressed the automatic waiver rule with regard to death penalty cases in Muehleman v. State, 503 So.2d 310 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 39 , 98 L.Ed.2d 170 (1987).

1988We addressed the automatic waiver rule with regard to death penalty cases in Muehleman v. State, 503 So.2d 310 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 39 , 98 L.Ed.2d 170 (1987).

1988We addressed the automatic waiver rule with regard to death penalty cases in Muehleman v. State, 503 So.2d 310 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 39 , 98 L.Ed.2d 170 (1987).

1988We addressed the automatic waiver rule with regard to death penalty cases in Muehleman v. State, 503 So.2d 310 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 39 , 98 L.Ed.2d 170 (1987).

1988We addressed the automatic waiver rule with regard to death penalty cases in Muehleman v. State, 503 So.2d 310 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 39 , 98 L.Ed.2d 170 (1987).

1988We addressed the automatic waiver rule with regard to death penalty cases in Muehleman v. State, 503 So.2d 310 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 39 , 98 L.Ed.2d 170 (1987).

1986See Bell v. State, 93 So.2d 575 (Fla. 1957); Railway Express Agency v. Brabham, 62 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1952); see also, 24 Fla.Jur.2d Evidence and Witnesses § 442 (1981).