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12 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Altman v. Allengreen2 sentences2013Certainly, “[tjhere is no basis for an automatic presumption of bias on the part of jurors towards a former physician.” Altman v. Allen, 850 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Ky.1992). 2004In Altman v. Allen, Ky., 850 S.W.2d 44 (1992), we concluded that there was “no basis for an automatic presumption of bias on the part of jurors toward a former physician.” Id. at 46 . | 1 | 2 |
Skilling v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2026Additionally, “[i]t is not the amount of publicity which determines that venue should be changed; it is whether public opinion is so aroused as to preclude a fair trial.” Kordenbrock v. Commonwealth, 700 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Ky. 1985); see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 385 (2010) (“Although publicity about a codefendant’s guilty plea calls for inquiry to guard against actual prejudice, it does not ordinarily . . . warrant an automatic presumption of prejudice.”). 33 Kentucky jurisprudence shows that the amount of pretrial publicity alone is not dispositive. | 1 | 1 |
Kordenbrock v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2026Additionally, “[i]t is not the amount of publicity which determines that venue should be changed; it is whether public opinion is so aroused as to preclude a fair trial.” Kordenbrock v. Commonwealth, 700 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Ky. 1985); see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 385 (2010) (“Although publicity about a codefendant’s guilty plea calls for inquiry to guard against actual prejudice, it does not ordinarily . . . warrant an automatic presumption of prejudice.”). 33 Kentucky jurisprudence shows that the amount of pretrial publicity alone is not dispositive. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Barrosogreen2 sentences2017Fifth, almost ten years after- we rendered Bond; our Supreme Court interpreted Bond narrowly as simply “holding in [a] child custody case that parents could not assert or waive [the] child’s privilege and speculating, but not holding, that [the] trial judge or guardian 'ad litem could do so on behalf of [the] child[.]” Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 565 (Ky. 2003) (emphasis added). 2017Sixth, when deciding Barroso , our Supreme Court said the psychiatrist-patient privilege “is not subject to avoidance because of a ‘need’ for the evidence.” Id. at 558 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Bond v. Bondgreen2 sentences2017See Harris.... ” Bond, 887 S.W.2d at 561 (emphasis added). 2017Id. (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Kentuckygreen1 sentence1994See Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 688 S.W.2d 338, 340 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842 , 106 S.Ct. 127 , 88 L.Ed.2d 104 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
McGiffen v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1994See Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 688 S.W.2d 338, 340 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842 , 106 S.Ct. 127 , 88 L.Ed.2d 104 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Englegreen1 sentence1994See Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 688 S.W.2d 338, 340 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842 , 106 S.Ct. 127 , 88 L.Ed.2d 104 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1994See Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 688 S.W.2d 338, 340 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842 , 106 S.Ct. 127 , 88 L.Ed.2d 104 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Sanborn v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1993We are no relation.” Mr. Dixon was called back, acknowledged “My wife is first cousins to Randy,” but when asked, “would that cause you any embarrassment or make you tend to lean toward Randy’s side any,” he responded “I don’t think it would.” First-cousin law is most recently examined in Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534, 546-47 (1988), reversing. 1993We are no relation." Mr. Dixon was called back, acknowledged "My wife is first cousins to Randy," but when asked, "would that cause you any embarrassment or make you tend to lean toward Randy's side any," he responded "I don't think it would." First-cousin law is most recently examined in Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534, 546-47 (1988), reversing. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Atwood v. Atwood
green
2 sentences2017We distilled the holding in Atwood to a simple short phrase and used analogy to address Harris’s claim to the privilege: “just' as mental health is immediately placed into issue in custody proceedings, thereby resulting in an automatic waiver of the psychiatrist-patient privilege [Atwood v. Atwood, — Ky. —, 550 S.W.2d 465 (1976)], it must be held that when ineffective assistance of counsel is raised via an 11.42, the statutory attorney-client privilege is lost.” Id. at 340 (brackets and bracketed citation in original;- emphasis added). 1984Additionally, just as mental health is immediately placed into issue in custody proceedings, thereby resulting in an automatic waiver of the psychiatrist-patient privilege [Atwood v. Atwood, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 465 (1976)], it must be held that when ineffective assistance of counsel is raised via an 11.42, the statutory attorney-client privilege is lost. | 2 | 1984–2017 |
Wyeth v. Levine
green
2 sentences2019Wyeth v. Levine , 555 U.S. 555 , 129 S.Ct. 1187 , 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009). 2019Wyeth v. Levine , 555 U.S. 555 , 129 S.Ct. 1187 , 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Locke
green
2 sentences2019This automatic presumption against preemption, however, does not apply in this case due to the unique nature of the VA because "an assumption of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence." U.S. v. Locke , 529 U.S. 89 , 108, 120 S.Ct. 1135 , 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000). 2019This automatic presumption against preemption, however, does not apply in this case due to the unique nature of the VA because "an assumption of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence." U.S. v. Locke , 529 U.S. 89 , 108, 120 S.Ct. 1135 , 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Courtney Dave Pennycooke Courtney Pennycooke
green
2 sentences2003United States v. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d 9 (3d Cir.1995) states that, “In such a case, it may be advisable that the trial court inquire discreetly into the disagreement and ensure that constitutional rights are not suppressed wrongly.” Id. at 13 . 2003United States v. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d 9 (3d Cir.1995) states that, “In such a case, it may be advisable that the trial court inquire discreetly into the disagreement and ensure that constitutional rights are not suppressed wrongly.” Id. at 13 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Knight v. Shell
neutral
1 sentence2001There are Kentucky cases, including Bob’s Ready to Wear, Inc. v. Weaver, 569 S.W.2d 715 (Ky.App.1978) holding that one isn’t required to show “absolute necessity” for access to their property, but that “all that is required is that the easement be reasonably necessary.” In that case the court stated that the fact that one of the parties had other access to their store “is not an automatic bar to their claim to an easement by implication to the parking lot.” Likewise, in Knight v. Shell, 313 Ky. 852 , 233 S.W.2d 973 (Ky.1950), the court quoted from Restatement, Property, Volume 5, Chapter 38, S | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Bob's Ready to Wear, Inc. v. Weaver
green
1 sentence2001There are Kentucky cases, including Bob’s Ready to Wear, Inc. v. Weaver, 569 S.W.2d 715 (Ky.App.1978) holding that one isn’t required to show “absolute necessity” for access to their property, but that “all that is required is that the easement be reasonably necessary.” In that case the court stated that the fact that one of the parties had other access to their store “is not an automatic bar to their claim to an easement by implication to the parking lot.” Likewise, in Knight v. Shell, 313 Ky. 852 , 233 S.W.2d 973 (Ky.1950), the court quoted from Restatement, Property, Volume 5, Chapter 38, S | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Knight v. Shell
green
1 sentence2001There are Kentucky cases, including Bob’s Ready to Wear, Inc. v. Weaver, 569 S.W.2d 715 (Ky.App.1978) holding that one isn’t required to show “absolute necessity” for access to their property, but that “all that is required is that the easement be reasonably necessary.” In that case the court stated that the fact that one of the parties had other access to their store “is not an automatic bar to their claim to an easement by implication to the parking lot.” Likewise, in Knight v. Shell, 313 Ky. 852 , 233 S.W.2d 973 (Ky.1950), the court quoted from Restatement, Property, Volume 5, Chapter 38, S | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Hicks v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1997Hicks v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 805 S.W.2d 144 (1990). 1997Hicks v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 805 S.W.2d 144 (1990). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Irvine v. McCreary
green
2 sentences1978Irvine v. McCreary, 108 Ky. 495 , 56 S.W. 966 (1900). 1978Irvine v. McCreary, 108 Ky. 495 , 56 S.W. 966 (1900). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.