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10 New Mexico opinions name it 1 courts 2005–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lavonegreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., State v. Lavone, 2011-NMCA-084, ¶¶ 1, 7, 10 , 150 N.M. 473 , 261 P.3d 1105 (upholding the district court’s designation of a homicide by vehicle conviction as a serious violent offense “based solely on [the defendant’s] failure to stop and help [the victim]”); Solano, 2009-NMCA-098, ¶¶ 17-18 (concluding that the district court’s finding that the defendant “recklessly veered across the center line and struck the victim with sufficient force to propel her into the bed of [the d]efendant’s truck . . . directly relate[d] to whether force was used in a violent manner,” thereby satisfying 2025See, e.g., State v. Lavone, 2011-NMCA-084, ¶¶ 1, 7, 10 , 150 N.M. 473 , 261 P.3d 1105 (upholding the district court’s designation of a homicide by vehicle conviction as a serious violent offense “based solely on [the defendant’s] failure to stop and help [the victim]”); Solano, 2009-NMCA-098, ¶¶ 17-18 (concluding that the district court’s finding that the defendant “recklessly veered across the center line and struck the victim with sufficient force to propel her into the bed of [the d]efendant’s truck . . . directly relate[d] to whether force was used in a violent manner,” thereby satisfying | 2 | 2 |
State v. Moralesgreen2 sentences2025While the district court’s findings as to the mental and emotional trauma Victim suffered as a result of Defendant’s long history of stalking and controlling behavior are sufficient to conclude that the crime was committed “either with an intent to do serious harm or with recklessness in the face of knowledge that one’s acts are reasonably likely to result in serious harm,” see Morales, 2002-NMCA-016, ¶ 16 , Defendant advocates for reversal based on the lack of a specific finding regarding the first part of the Morales standard—that the aggravated stalking was committed in a physically violent 2025While the district court’s findings as to the mental and emotional trauma Victim suffered as a result of Defendant’s long history of stalking and controlling behavior are sufficient to conclude that the crime was committed “either with an intent to do serious harm or with recklessness in the face of knowledge that one’s acts are reasonably likely to result in serious harm,” see Morales, 2002-NMCA-016, ¶ 16 , Defendant advocates for reversal based on the lack of a specific finding regarding the first part of the Morales standard—that the aggravated stalking was committed in a physically violent | 1 | 3 |
State v. Solanogreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., State v. Lavone, 2011-NMCA-084, ¶¶ 1, 7, 10 , 150 N.M. 473 , 261 P.3d 1105 (upholding the district court’s designation of a homicide by vehicle conviction as a serious violent offense “based solely on [the defendant’s] failure to stop and help [the victim]”); Solano, 2009-NMCA-098, ¶¶ 17-18 (concluding that the district court’s finding that the defendant “recklessly veered across the center line and struck the victim with sufficient force to propel her into the bed of [the d]efendant’s truck . . . directly relate[d] to whether force was used in a violent manner,” thereby satisfying 2025See, e.g., State v. Lavone, 2011-NMCA-084, ¶¶ 1, 7, 10 , 150 N.M. 473 , 261 P.3d 1105 (upholding the district court’s designation of a homicide by vehicle conviction as a serious violent offense “based solely on [the defendant’s] failure to stop and help [the victim]”); Solano, 2009-NMCA-098, ¶¶ 17-18 (concluding that the district court’s finding that the defendant “recklessly veered across the center line and struck the victim with sufficient force to propel her into the bed of [the d]efendant’s truck . . . directly relate[d] to whether force was used in a violent manner,” thereby satisfying | 1 | 2 |
State v. Montoyagreen2 sentences2025We disagree with the State’s second contention as the sentencing memorandum focuses on Defendant’s habitual offender status and does not address or establish whether the aggravated stalking conviction at issue here can be said to have been committed in a physically violent manner. {29} While this Court has said that “the trial court need not express its findings in the Morales language as long as the findings are consistent with the Morales standard,” State v. Montoya, 2005-NMCA-078, ¶ 8 , 137 N.M. 713 , 114 P.3d 393 , in this case the district court’s “findings on serious violent offense desi 2025We disagree with the State’s second contention as the sentencing memorandum focuses on Defendant’s habitual offender status and does not address or establish whether the aggravated stalking conviction at issue here can be said to have been committed in a physically violent manner. {29} While this Court has said that “the trial court need not express its findings in the Morales language as long as the findings are consistent with the Morales standard,” State v. Montoya, 2005-NMCA-078, ¶ 8 , 137 N.M. 713 , 114 P.3d 393 , in this case the district court’s “findings on serious violent offense desi | 1 | 2 |
State v. Lorettogreen2 sentences2007In this way, the district court ultimately determines under the Morales standard whether the crime was “committed in a physically violent manner either with an intent to do serious harm or with recklessness in the face of knowledge that one’s acts are reasonably likely to result in serious harm.” Loretto, 2006-NMCA-142, ¶ 14 , 140 N.M. 705 , 147 P.3d 1138 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2007In this way, the district court ultimately determines under the Morales standard whether the crime was “committed in a physically violent manner either with an intent to do serious harm or with recklessness in the face of knowledge that one’s acts are reasonably likely to result in serious harm.” Loretto, 2006-NMCA-142, ¶ 14 , 140 N.M. 705 , 147 P.3d 1138 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Scurrygreen2 sentences2012See 14 1 id. ¶¶ 19, 22 (reversing the designation of a CSCM conviction as a serious violent 2 offense where there was “nothing in the record showing what the court relied on that 3 would permit application of the Morales standard,” and remanding for reconsideration 4 and entry of appropriate factual findings); see also State v. Scurry, 2007-NMCA-064 , 5 ¶ 1, 141 N.M. 591 , 158 P.3d 1034 (reversing the discretionary designation of a crime 6 as a serious violent offense due to insufficient factual findings and remanding for the 7 district court “to ascertain if its determination can be supported 2012See 14 1 id. ¶¶ 19, 22 (reversing the designation of a CSCM conviction as a serious violent 2 offense where there was “nothing in the record showing what the court relied on that 3 would permit application of the Morales standard,” and remanding for reconsideration 4 and entry of appropriate factual findings); see also State v. Scurry, 2007-NMCA-064 , 5 ¶ 1, 141 N.M. 591 , 158 P.3d 1034 (reversing the discretionary designation of a crime 6 as a serious violent offense due to insufficient factual findings and remanding for the 7 district court “to ascertain if its determination can be supported | 1 | 2 |
State v. Worrickgreen2 sentences2009See State v. Worrick, 2006-NMCA-035, ¶ 9 , 139 N.M. 247 , 131 P.3d 97 (considering the defendant’s extremely high blood alcohol content at the time of the accident as well as that the defendant “habitually drank to the point of intoxication two times a week”); see also Montoya, 2005-NMCA-078, ¶¶ 9-10 , 137 N.M. 713 , 114 P.3d 393 (“The knowledge aspect is shown by the long, prior history of a drinking problem.”); State v. Wildgrube, 2003-NMCA-108, ¶ 37 , 134 N.M. 262 , 75 P.3d 862 (evaluating, for the purposes of the EMDA, the defendant’s previous four arrests for alcohol-related offenses and 2009See State v. Worrick, 2006-NMCA-035, ¶ 9 , 139 N.M. 247 , 131 P.3d 97 (considering the defendant’s extremely high blood alcohol content at the time of the accident as well as that the defendant “habitually drank to the point of intoxication two times a week”); see also Montoya, 2005-NMCA-078, ¶¶ 9-10 , 137 N.M. 713 , 114 P.3d 393 (“The knowledge aspect is shown by the long, prior history of a drinking problem.”); State v. Wildgrube, 2003-NMCA-108, ¶ 37 , 134 N.M. 262 , 75 P.3d 862 (evaluating, for the purposes of the EMDA, the defendant’s previous four arrests for alcohol-related offenses and | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Cooley
green
2 sentences2025This requirement, known as the Morales standard,4 does not “require specific language from the district court.” State v. Cooley, 2003-NMCA-149, ¶ 18 , 134 N.M. 717 , 82 P.3d 84 . 2025This requirement, known as the Morales standard,4 does not “require specific language from the district court.” State v. Cooley, 2003-NMCA-149, ¶ 18 , 134 N.M. 717 , 82 P.3d 84 . | 3 | 2005–2025 |
Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque
green
2 sentences2025Defendant, however, does so without discussing why this Court ought to disregard the vital principles of stare decisis, see Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 33-34 , 125 N.M. 721 , 965 P.2d 305 (discussing the importance of stare decisis and the “special justification” necessary to depart from prior precedent (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), or citing legal authority, see Casares, 2014-NMCA-024, ¶ 18 . 2025Defendant, however, does so without discussing why this Court ought to disregard the vital principles of stare decisis, see Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 33-34 , 125 N.M. 721 , 965 P.2d 305 (discussing the importance of stare decisis and the “special justification” necessary to depart from prior precedent (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), or citing legal authority, see Casares, 2014-NMCA-024, ¶ 18 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Branch
green
2 sentences2025“It is sufficient for the district court to make findings consistent with . . . [this] standard,” id., although a district court must make express findings to support its serious violent offense determinations, State v. Branch, 2018-NMCA-031 , ¶ 56, 417 P.3d 1141 . {6} Defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the district court’s serious violent offense designations, claiming that (A) the findings were nonspecific and boilerplate, and (B) the district court impermissibly relied on the elements of his homicide and great bodily injury by vehicle convictions and the physically violent nature 2025“It is sufficient for the district court to make findings consistent with . . . [this] standard,” id., although a district court must make express findings to support its serious violent offense determinations, State v. Branch, 2018-NMCA-031 , ¶ 56, 417 P.3d 1141 . {6} Defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the district court’s serious violent offense designations, claiming that (A) the findings were nonspecific and boilerplate, and (B) the district court impermissibly relied on the elements of his homicide and great bodily injury by vehicle convictions and the physically violent nature | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Casares
green
2 sentences2025Defendant, however, does so without discussing why this Court ought to disregard the vital principles of stare decisis, see Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 33-34 , 125 N.M. 721 , 965 P.2d 305 (discussing the importance of stare decisis and the “special justification” necessary to depart from prior precedent (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), or citing legal authority, see Casares, 2014-NMCA-024, ¶ 18 . 2025Defendant, however, does so without discussing why this Court ought to disregard the vital principles of stare decisis, see Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 33-34 , 125 N.M. 721 , 965 P.2d 305 (discussing the importance of stare decisis and the “special justification” necessary to depart from prior precedent (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), or citing legal authority, see Casares, 2014-NMCA-024, ¶ 18 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Romero
green
2 sentences2012To designate Defendant’s crime as a serious violent offense, the district 19 court must determine that the crime was “committed in a physically violent manner 2 1 either with an intent to do serious harm or with recklessness in the face of knowledge 2 that one’s acts are reasonably likely to result in serious harm.” State v. Morales, 3 2002-NMCA-106, ¶ 16 , 131 N.M. 530 , 39 P.3d 747 ; see State v. Lavone, 4 2011-NMCA-084, ¶ 4 , 150 N.M. 473 , 261 P.3d 1105 (quoting Solano as to the 5 findings required to be made by the district court); State v. Solano, 2009-NMCA-098 , 6 ¶ 10, 146 N.M. 831 , 2 2012To designate Defendant’s crime as a serious violent offense, the district 19 court must determine that the crime was “committed in a physically violent manner 2 1 either with an intent to do serious harm or with recklessness in the face of knowledge 2 that one’s acts are reasonably likely to result in serious harm.” State v. Morales, 3 2002-NMCA-106, ¶ 16 , 131 N.M. 530 , 39 P.3d 747 ; see State v. Lavone, 4 2011-NMCA-084, ¶ 4 , 150 N.M. 473 , 261 P.3d 1105 (quoting Solano as to the 5 findings required to be made by the district court); State v. Solano, 2009-NMCA-098 , 6 ¶ 10, 146 N.M. 831 , 2 | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Wilson
green
1 sentence2012Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Wildgrube
green
2 sentences2009See State v. Worrick, 2006-NMCA-035, ¶ 9 , 139 N.M. 247 , 131 P.3d 97 (considering the defendant’s extremely high blood alcohol content at the time of the accident as well as that the defendant “habitually drank to the point of intoxication two times a week”); see also Montoya, 2005-NMCA-078, ¶¶ 9-10 , 137 N.M. 713 , 114 P.3d 393 (“The knowledge aspect is shown by the long, prior history of a drinking problem.”); State v. Wildgrube, 2003-NMCA-108, ¶ 37 , 134 N.M. 262 , 75 P.3d 862 (evaluating, for the purposes of the EMDA, the defendant’s previous four arrests for alcohol-related offenses and 2009See State v. Worrick, 2006-NMCA-035, ¶ 9 , 139 N.M. 247 , 131 P.3d 97 (considering the defendant’s extremely high blood alcohol content at the time of the accident as well as that the defendant “habitually drank to the point of intoxication two times a week”); see also Montoya, 2005-NMCA-078, ¶¶ 9-10 , 137 N.M. 713 , 114 P.3d 393 (“The knowledge aspect is shown by the long, prior history of a drinking problem.”); State v. Wildgrube, 2003-NMCA-108, ¶ 37 , 134 N.M. 262 , 75 P.3d 862 (evaluating, for the purposes of the EMDA, the defendant’s previous four arrests for alcohol-related offenses and | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Lopez
green
2 sentences2006These processes comport with the Morales standard, which is simply a reasonableness standard imposed to focus the exercise of judicial discretion when the court is considering whether “the nature of the offense and the resulting harm are such that the court judges the crime to be a serious violent offense.” § 33-2-34(L)(4)(n); cf. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-036, ¶ 55 , 138 N.M. 521 , 123 P.3d 754 (discussing as a standard of reasonableness the statutory requirement that the court, in exercising its discretion under the statute permitting court aggravation of a basic sentence, write the reasons supportin 2006These processes comport with the Morales standard, which is simply a reasonableness standard imposed to focus the exercise of judicial discretion when the court is considering whether “the nature of the offense and the resulting harm are such that the court judges the crime to be a serious violent offense.” § 33-2-34(L)(4)(n); cf. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-036, ¶ 55 , 138 N.M. 521 , 123 P.3d 754 (discussing as a standard of reasonableness the statutory requirement that the court, in exercising its discretion under the statute permitting court aggravation of a basic sentence, write the reasons supportin | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.