Morales factors in California

2024(See Sakhai, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 600 .) Midland’s proposal, however, requires us to both ignore the trial court’s express invocation of an erroneous basis for dismissal (the order denying Morales’s motion for reconsideration) and substitute an equally erroneous basis for the order dismissing the action with prejudice (a discretionary dismissal for delay in prosecution), and then to undertake the additional step of fixing the order (making it a dismissal without prejudice for delay in prosecution) to remedy this additional abuse of discretion Midland would have us impute to the trial c

2021(People v. Selivanov (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 726, 751 .) Following People v. Flores (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 174 (Flores), on which Morales relies, we agree that the court erred when it omitted the accomplice language from the jury instruction on the section 12022.53(d) enhancement for count 1.

2021Code, § 1259.) “ ‘Ascertaining whether claimed instructional error affected the substantial rights of the defendant necessarily requires an examination of the merits of the claim—at least to the extent of ascertaining whether the asserted error would result in prejudice if error it was.’ ” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1087 ; see also People v. Mitchell (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 442, 465 [“ ‘Substantial rights’ are equated with errors resulting in a miscarriage of justice under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [(Watson)].”].) Because Morales contends the jury instruction at i

2021As explained, post, Morales is not entitled to remand on the grounds he claims, so we will order correction of the unauthorized sentences. 27 Contrary to Morales’s claim, nothing in the record suggests that the trial court was unaware of its discretion under section 12022.53, subdivision (h). “[I]n light of the presumption on a silent record that the trial court is aware of the applicable law, including statutory discretion at sentencing, we cannot presume error where the record does not establish on its face that the trial court misunderstood the scope of that discretion.” (People v. Gutierre

2021(People v. Sotomayor (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 382, 391 ; People v. Furhman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 944 .) The trial court sentenced Morales one year and five months after Senate Bill No. 620 became effective.

2021(People v. Sotomayor (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 382, 391 ; People v. Furhman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 944 .) The trial court sentenced Morales one year and five months after Senate Bill No. 620 became effective.

2021(People v. Webb (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 83 , 94–95.) Morales admitted that he lashed out at McMillian with a seven-inch knife with sufficient force to penetrate five and a half inches into McMillian’s abdomen.

2021(People v. Selivanov (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 726, 751 .) Following People v. Flores (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 174 (Flores), on which Morales relies, we agree that the court erred when it omitted the accomplice language from the jury instruction on the section 12022.53(d) enhancement for count 1.

2021“We may review defendant’s claim of instructional error, even absent objection, to the extent [a defendant’s] substantial rights were affected.” (People v. Townsel (2016) 63 Cal.4th 25, 59-60 ; Pen.

2021We reject Morales’s claim of instructional error.7 A. Governing Legal Principles and Standard of Review “Section 1101(a) prohibits the admission of character evidence if offered to prove conduct in conformity with that character trait, sometimes described as a propensity to act in a certain way.” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 405-406 , fn. omitted (Bryant, Smith & Wheeler).) Although evidence of a defendant’s other criminal conduct is generally not admissible to prove a propensity to commit the charged crime (§ 1101, subd. (a)), “[i]n domestic violence cases, Evid

2020That is because “duress negates an element of the crime charged—the intent or capacity to commit the crime.”17 (People v. Heath (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 900 .) Evidence that Morales voluntarily acted as the getaway driver in the Granada Hills robbery for the same man who allegedly later threatened him in the Windsor robbery is relevant to assessing Morales’s claim of duress in the Windsor robbery.

2020That is because “duress negates an element of the crime charged—the intent or capacity to commit the crime.”17 (People v. Heath (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 900 .) Evidence that Morales voluntarily acted as the getaway driver in the Granada Hills robbery for the same man who allegedly later threatened him in the Windsor robbery is relevant to assessing Morales’s claim of duress in the Windsor robbery.

2018Section 1473.7 authorizes Morales's motion, as indicated by its plain terms and its legislative history. 3 The superior court's construction is incorrect and leads to an absurd result. *509 We review statutory interpretation issues de novo. ( *782 In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 627, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 , 399 P.3d 1 .) Our interpretation of a statute begins, but is not necessarily limited, to its words. ( Ibid . ) "Statutory interpretation is a question of law [citation] in which we ascertain the Legislature's intent ' "with a view to effectuating the purpose of the statute, and construe the

2018Section 1473.7 authorizes Morales's motion, as indicated by its plain terms and its legislative history. 3 The superior court's construction is incorrect and leads to an absurd result. *509 We review statutory interpretation issues de novo. ( *782 In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 627, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 , 399 P.3d 1 .) Our interpretation of a statute begins, but is not necessarily limited, to its words. ( Ibid . ) "Statutory interpretation is a question of law [citation] in which we ascertain the Legislature's intent ' "with a view to effectuating the purpose of the statute, and construe the

2018Section 1473.7 authorizes Morales's motion, as indicated by its plain terms and its legislative history. 3 The superior court's construction is incorrect and leads to an absurd result. *509 We review statutory interpretation issues de novo. ( *782 In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 627, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 , 399 P.3d 1 .) Our interpretation of a statute begins, but is not necessarily limited, to its words. ( Ibid . ) "Statutory interpretation is a question of law [citation] in which we ascertain the Legislature's intent ' "with a view to effectuating the purpose of the statute, and construe the

2018Section 1473.7 authorizes Morales's motion, as indicated by its plain terms and its legislative history. 3 The superior court's construction is incorrect and leads to an absurd result. *509 We review statutory interpretation issues de novo. ( *782 In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 627, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 , 399 P.3d 1 .) Our interpretation of a statute begins, but is not necessarily limited, to its words. ( Ibid . ) "Statutory interpretation is a question of law [citation] in which we ascertain the Legislature's intent ' "with a view to effectuating the purpose of the statute, and construe the

2018Section 1473.7 authorizes Morales's motion, as indicated by its plain terms and its legislative history. 3 The superior court's construction is incorrect and leads to an absurd result. *509 We review statutory interpretation issues de novo. ( *782 In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 627, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 , 399 P.3d 1 .) Our interpretation of a statute begins, but is not necessarily limited, to its words. ( Ibid . ) "Statutory interpretation is a question of law [citation] in which we ascertain the Legislature's intent ' "with a view to effectuating the purpose of the statute, and construe the

2018Section 1473.7 authorizes Morales's motion, as indicated by its plain terms and its legislative history. 3 The superior court's construction is incorrect and leads to an absurd result. *509 We review statutory interpretation issues de novo. ( *782 In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 627, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 , 399 P.3d 1 .) Our interpretation of a statute begins, but is not necessarily limited, to its words. ( Ibid . ) "Statutory interpretation is a question of law [citation] in which we ascertain the Legislature's intent ' "with a view to effectuating the purpose of the statute, and construe the

2018Section 1473.7 authorizes Morales's motion, as indicated by its plain terms and its legislative history. 3 The superior court's construction is incorrect and leads to an absurd result. *509 We review statutory interpretation issues de novo. ( *782 In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 627, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 , 399 P.3d 1 .) Our interpretation of a statute begins, but is not necessarily limited, to its words. ( Ibid . ) "Statutory interpretation is a question of law [citation] in which we ascertain the Legislature's intent ' "with a view to effectuating the purpose of the statute, and construe the

2018Section 1473.7 authorizes Morales's motion, as indicated by its plain terms and its legislative history. 3 The superior court's construction is incorrect and leads to an absurd result. *509 We review statutory interpretation issues de novo. ( *782 In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 627, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 , 399 P.3d 1 .) Our interpretation of a statute begins, but is not necessarily limited, to its words. ( Ibid . ) "Statutory interpretation is a question of law [citation] in which we ascertain the Legislature's intent ' "with a view to effectuating the purpose of the statute, and construe the

2018Section 1473.7 authorizes Morales's motion, as indicated by its plain terms and its legislative history. 3 The superior court's construction is incorrect and leads to an absurd result. *509 We review statutory interpretation issues de novo. ( *782 In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 627, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 , 399 P.3d 1 .) Our interpretation of a statute begins, but is not necessarily limited, to its words. ( Ibid . ) "Statutory interpretation is a question of law [citation] in which we ascertain the Legislature's intent ' "with a view to effectuating the purpose of the statute, and construe the

2018Section 1473.7 authorizes Morales's motion, as indicated by its plain terms and its legislative history. 3 The superior court's construction is incorrect and leads to an absurd result. *509 We review statutory interpretation issues de novo. ( *782 In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 627, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 , 399 P.3d 1 .) Our interpretation of a statute begins, but is not necessarily limited, to its words. ( Ibid . ) "Statutory interpretation is a question of law [citation] in which we ascertain the Legislature's intent ' "with a view to effectuating the purpose of the statute, and construe the

2017As explained herein, however, we conclude the Burns formulation of the force requirement encompasses the Morales test. 4 “To satisfy the asportation requirement for robbery, ‘no great movement is required, and it is not necessary that the property be taken out of the physical presence of the victim.’ [Citation.] ‘[S]light movement’ is enough to satisfy the asportation requirement.” (Hill, supra. 17 Cal.4th at p. 852 .) 5 Anderson does state in discussing the force element, “defendant drove Pamela’s car with more force than necessary to move it to a place of safety.” (Anderson, supra. 51 Cal.tt

2017As explained herein, however, we conclude the Burns formulation of the force requirement encompasses the Morales test. 4 “To satisfy the asportation requirement for robbery, ‘no great movement is required, and it is not necessary that the property be taken out of the physical presence of the victim.’ [Citation.] ‘[S]light movement’ is enough to satisfy the asportation requirement.” (Hill, supra. 17 Cal.4th at p. 852 .) 5 Anderson does state in discussing the force element, “defendant drove Pamela’s car with more force than necessary to move it to a place of safety.” (Anderson, supra. 51 Cal.tt

2016In the motion he argues that “had [he] been informed that he would be forced to leave the only home that he has known for over 20 years, and abandon his family, he would have obtained Counsel regarding his immigration consequences.” In opposition to the motion, the People produced a written waiver executed at the time of Morales’s plea pursuant to In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 , which contains the signatures of Morales and his counsel, Anna Armenta-Rigor.

2016In People v. Morales, supra, 63 Cal.4th 399 , the defendant successfully petitioned the superior court to reduce his conviction for possessing heroin from a felony to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. (§ 1170.18.) The superior court resentenced Morales to a jail sentence of time served and, over Morales’s objection, imposed a one-year period of parole. (§ 1170.18, subd. (d).) Morales appealed arguing, inter alia, that his excess credits for time in custody should be used to reduce his one-year parole period.

2006In this context, in Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pages 1148-1149, the Supreme Court indicated that it had frequently rejected similar claims and noted, “ ‘[Mjurder by means of lying in wait requires only a wanton and reckless intent to inflict injury likely to cause death. [Citations.]’ In contrast, the lying-in-wait special circumstance requires ‘an intentional murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting vi

2006In this context, in Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pages 1148-1149, the Supreme Court indicated that it had frequently rejected similar claims and noted, “ ‘[Mjurder by means of lying in wait requires only a wanton and reckless intent to inflict injury likely to cause death. [Citations.]’ In contrast, the lying-in-wait special circumstance requires ‘an intentional murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting vi

2006In this context, in Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pages 1148-1149, the Supreme Court indicated that it had frequently rejected similar claims and noted, “ ‘[Mjurder by means of lying in wait requires only a wanton and reckless intent to inflict injury likely to cause death. [Citations.]’ In contrast, the lying-in-wait special circumstance requires ‘an intentional murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting vi

2006In this context, in Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pages 1148-1149, the Supreme Court indicated that it had frequently rejected similar claims and noted, “ ‘[Mjurder by means of lying in wait requires only a wanton and reckless intent to inflict injury likely to cause death. [Citations.]’ In contrast, the lying-in-wait special circumstance requires ‘an intentional murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting vi