archaic rule in New York

1939Interpretation should aid this purpose.” (Shientag, J., in Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 779 .) “ It would be a misfortune if a narrow or grudging process of construction were to exemplify and perpetuate the very evils to be remedied.” (Mr. Justice Cardozo in Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U. S. 342 .) A statute of this character is not “to be obeyed grudgingly, by construing it narrowly and treating it as though it did not exist for any purpose other than that embraced within the strict construction of its words.” It is “ not an alien intruder in the house of the common la

1937Interpretation should aid this purpose. “ It would be a misfortune if a narrow or grudging process of construction were to exemplify and perpetuate the very evils to be remedied.” (Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Company, 300 U. S. 342 ; 57 Sup. Ct. 452, 456, per Mr. Justice Cardozo.) A statute of this kind is not “ to be obeyed grudgingly, by construing it narrowly and treating it as though it did not exist for any purpose other than that embraced within the strict construction of its words.” It is “ not an alien intruder in the house of the common law, but a guest to be welcomed and made at home

1939Section 50 is penal, section 51 remedial. “ The statute is in part at least penal.” (People [Stern] v. McBride & Co., 159 Misc. 5, 10 ; Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 55 .) In a larger sense, however, “ the statute is remedial, having its root in dissatisfaction with what was felt to be an archaic rule of law.

1937Law Rev. 725, 731.) While “ in part at least penal ” (Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 55 ), in a larger sense the statute is remedial, having its root in dissatisfaction with what was felt to be an archaic rule of law.

1984As the Court of Appeals noted in 219 Broadway Corp. v Alexander’s, Inc. ( 46 NY2d 506, 511 ), the concept of delivery is not an archaic principle of property law, but rather is “fundamental to the conveyance of an interest in land.” Analyzing the practicalities of the situation, in language as equally applicable to transactions in real estate as to leasehold interests, the court noted (pp 511-512): “[Djelivery serves a very practical, end.

1978(Emphasis supplied.) There is no question that present day public policy has caused juridical law to step beyond the former archaic principle of caveat emptor regarding liquidated damages, of which the payment of attorneys was and still is a part (Wasserbauer v Marine Midland Bank — Rochester, 92 Misc 2d 388 ), and has refused to enforce a liquidated damage provision which fixed damages in an amount "grossly disproportionate to the harm actually, or likely to be sustained”, by the nonbreaching party (Equitable Lbr.

1939Section 50 is penal, section 51 remedial. “ The statute is in part at least penal.” (People [Stern] v. McBride & Co., 159 Misc. 5, 10 ; Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 55 .) In a larger sense, however, “ the statute is remedial, having its root in dissatisfaction with what was felt to be an archaic rule of law.

1939Interpretation should aid this purpose.” (Shientag, J., in Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 779 .) “ It would be a misfortune if a narrow or grudging process of construction were to exemplify and perpetuate the very evils to be remedied.” (Mr. Justice Cardozo in Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U. S. 342 .) A statute of this character is not “to be obeyed grudgingly, by construing it narrowly and treating it as though it did not exist for any purpose other than that embraced within the strict construction of its words.” It is “ not an alien intruder in the house of the common la

1931(Matter of Durbrow, 245 N. Y. 469, 477 ; Matter of Winburn, 139 Misc. 5, 8 ; Manley v. Fiske, 139 App. Div. 665, 667 ; affd., 201 N. Y. 546 .) In the last-cited case the following language, quoted in part with approval by the Court of Appeals in the Durbrow case (at p. 477), is found (at p. 667): “ It is true that there are no express words creating a trust, as there are no express words of gift; but it is quite plain that a trust was intended. Á trust is almost inseparably involved with a gift for charitable uses, and the statute provides for the case of a failure to select a trustee as well

1931(Matter of Durbrow, 245 N. Y. 469, 477 ; Matter of Winburn, 139 Misc. 5, 8 ; Manley v. Fiske, 139 App. Div. 665, 667 ; affd., 201 N. Y. 546 .) In the last-cited case the following language, quoted in part with approval by the Court of Appeals in the Durbrow case (at p. 477), is found (at p. 667): “ It is true that there are no express words creating a trust, as there are no express words of gift; but it is quite plain that a trust was intended. Á trust is almost inseparably involved with a gift for charitable uses, and the statute provides for the case of a failure to select a trustee as well

1931(Matter of Durbrow, 245 N. Y. 469, 477 ; Matter of Winburn, 139 Misc. 5, 8 ; Manley v. Fiske, 139 App. Div. 665, 667 ; affd., 201 N. Y. 546 .) In the last-cited case the following language, quoted in part with approval by the Court of Appeals in the Durbrow case (at p. 477), is found (at p. 667): “ It is true that there are no express words creating a trust, as there are no express words of gift; but it is quite plain that a trust was intended. Á trust is almost inseparably involved with a gift for charitable uses, and the statute provides for the case of a failure to select a trustee as well

1931(Matter of Durbrow, 245 N. Y. 469, 477 ; Matter of Winburn, 139 Misc. 5, 8 ; Manley v. Fiske, 139 App. Div. 665, 667 ; affd., 201 N. Y. 546 .) In the last-cited case the following language, quoted in part with approval by the Court of Appeals in the Durbrow case (at p. 477), is found (at p. 667): “ It is true that there are no express words creating a trust, as there are no express words of gift; but it is quite plain that a trust was intended. Á trust is almost inseparably involved with a gift for charitable uses, and the statute provides for the case of a failure to select a trustee as well

1916If an officer or an agent of a corporation is guilty of slander, he is personally liable, and no liability results to the corporation.” It would thus appear that the decision of this court in Eichner v. Bowery Bank (supra) was based upon the archaic doctrine that a corporation was an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in the contemplation of the law.