10 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1965–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentiregreen2 sentences1997With that guidance, we note that applying the New York State Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214) and its accompanying tolling provisions {see, CPLR 208) here would generate the sort of nonuniform procedural bar that we have disavowed. *646 The United States Supreme Court, moreover, has noted that although State courts are authorized to entertain maritime causes of action, "the extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called 'reverse- Erie’ doctrine which requires that the substantive remedies afforded by the States conform to governing federal 1994Under the "savings to suitors” clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789 ( 28 USC § 1333 [1], 1 US Stat 76), States are constrained by the " 'reverse Erie’ doctrine which requires that the substantive remedies afforded by States conform to governing federal maritime standards” (Offshore Logistics v Tallentire, 477 US 207, 223 [1986]). | 1 | 2 |
In re the Claim of Timmonsgreen1 sentence2022Co. , 191 AD2d 922, 923-924 [1993], lv dismissed 82 NY2d 706 [1993]). | 1 | 1 |
Rosalie Estates, Inc. v. Colonia Insurancegreen1 sentence2016Co., 227 AD2d 335, 336 [1996]). | 1 | 1 |
Metichecchia v. Palmerigreen2 sentences2016Erie’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied as premature. “[A] summary judgment motion is properly denied as premature when the nonmoving party has not been given reasonable time and opportunity to conduct disclosure relative to pertinent evidence that is within the exclusive knowledge of the movant or a codefendant” (Metichecchia v Palmeri, 23 AD3d 894, 895 [2005]; see Gitman v Martinez, 139 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2016]). 2016Under such circumstances, Erie’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied without prejudice as premature (see Greener v Town of Hurley, 140 AD3d 1285, 1286 [2016]; Gitman v Martinez, 139 AD3d at 1176 ; Metichecchia v Palmeri, 23 AD3d at 895 ; Rosalie Estates v Colonia Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Gitman v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2016Erie’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied as premature. “[A] summary judgment motion is properly denied as premature when the nonmoving party has not been given reasonable time and opportunity to conduct disclosure relative to pertinent evidence that is within the exclusive knowledge of the movant or a codefendant” (Metichecchia v Palmeri, 23 AD3d 894, 895 [2005]; see Gitman v Martinez, 139 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2016]). 2016Under such circumstances, Erie’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied without prejudice as premature (see Greener v Town of Hurley, 140 AD3d 1285, 1286 [2016]; Gitman v Martinez, 139 AD3d at 1176 ; Metichecchia v Palmeri, 23 AD3d at 895 ; Rosalie Estates v Colonia Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Greener v. Town of Hurleygreen1 sentence2016Under such circumstances, Erie’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied without prejudice as premature (see Greener v Town of Hurley, 140 AD3d 1285, 1286 [2016]; Gitman v Martinez, 139 AD3d at 1176 ; Metichecchia v Palmeri, 23 AD3d at 895 ; Rosalie Estates v Colonia Ins. | 1 | 1 |
East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.green1 sentence1997S. S. Corp. v Transamerica Delaval, 476 US 858, 864 ["(w)ith admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law”]; but see, Yamaha Motor Corp. v Calhoun, 516 US 199 , —, 116 S Ct 619, 623 [citations omitted] ["(t)he exercise of admiralty jurisdiction * * * 'does not result in automatic displacement of state law’ ”]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Yamaha Motor Corp., USA v. Calhoungreen2 sentences1997S. S. Corp. v Transamerica Delaval, 476 US 858, 864 ["(w)ith admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law”]; but see, Yamaha Motor Corp. v Calhoun, 516 US 199 , —, 116 S Ct 619, 623 [citations omitted] ["(t)he exercise of admiralty jurisdiction * * * 'does not result in automatic displacement of state law’ ”]). 1997S. S. Corp. v Transamerica Delaval, 476 US 858, 864 ["(w)ith admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law”]; but see, Yamaha Motor Corp. v Calhoun, 516 US 199 , —, 116 S Ct 619, 623 [citations omitted] ["(t)he exercise of admiralty jurisdiction * * * 'does not result in automatic displacement of state law’ ”]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Imrie v. Ratto
green
1 sentence2022As such, plaintiff's right to recover under the policy was "not affected by Erie's defense of alleged noncooperation by Ratto and/or the corporation" ( 187 AD3d at 1350 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Imrie v. Ratto
green
2 sentences2020Upon plaintiff's appeal, this Court reversed, finding that Erie's motion was premature because of the incomplete discovery ( 145 AD3d 1358 [2016]). 2020Upon plaintiff's appeal, this Court reversed, finding that Erie's motion was premature because of the incomplete discovery ( 145 AD3d 1358 [2016]). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Felder v. Casey
green
1 sentence2005In Felder v Casey ( 487 US 131 [1988]), the Supreme Court addressed the applicability of a Wisconsin notice of claim requirement to a federal civil rights action brought in state court pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Kingsbridge Heights Rehabilitation and Nursing Center, Inc. v. Daines
green
1 sentence1982A county may only be liable for injuries occurring on a town highway where it breaches its statutorily imposed duties under subdivisions 2 and 6 of section 102 of the Highway Law (Malcuria v Town of Seneca, 66 AD2d 421 ). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Kenford Co. v. County of Erie
green
1 sentence1978Even were we to agree that the motivation of an individual legislator for originally voting to authorize the contract in June, 1969 has been put in issue because of the County of Erie’s claim of reliance on the plaintiff’s alleged false representations; nonetheless, the conduct of such legislator in opposition to the project occurring subsequent to the authorization is irrelevant to the issue presented on this appeal (Kenford Co. v County of Erie, 41 AD2d 586, 587 ). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.
green
2 sentences1969The court held ( 388 U. S. 395 ) that Congress could and did eriact a law governing arbitration in the Federal courts, which included freeing the courts of any restrictions based on the Erie rule; However, the' broader rule which imposed ón the State courts the necessity of adhering to the Federal act in State court arbitrations was not adopted. 1969The court held ( 388 U. S. 395 ) that Congress could and did eriact a law governing arbitration in the Federal courts, which included freeing the courts of any restrictions based on the Erie rule; However, the' broader rule which imposed ón the State courts the necessity of adhering to the Federal act in State court arbitrations was not adopted. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Joe W. Collins, as Committee for Travious Riddle Collins, Incompetent v. American Automobile Insurance Company of St. Louis, Missouri
green
2 sentences1965Co., 230 F. 2d 416, 422 , supra; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 584), it is relevant that the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit which includes Puerto Bico has treated that Commonwealth’s direct action statute as substantive for purposes of the Erie doctrine (Erie R. 1965Co., 230 F. 2d 416, 422 , supra; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 584), it is relevant that the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit which includes Puerto Bico has treated that Commonwealth’s direct action statute as substantive for purposes of the Erie doctrine (Erie R. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
green
2 sentences1965Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 ), declaring that that statute “ relate [s] to the substance of the liability of the insurance company.” (Aponte v. American Sur. 1965Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 ), declaring that that statute “ relate [s] to the substance of the liability of the insurance company.” (Aponte v. American Sur. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.