Erie doctrine in California

2021However the extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called reverse-Erie doctrine which requires that substantive remedies afforded by the states conform to governing federal maritime standards. [Citation.]” (Price v. Connolly-Pacific Co., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1214, fn. 1 .) “But even when an action is founded on federal law, when brought in state court ‘the law of the state controls in matters of practice and procedure unless the federal statute provides otherwise. [Citation.]’” (Simmons v. Ware (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1047 , quotin

2013State remedies under the savings to suitors clause may be pursued in state court or, if there is a basis for federal jurisdiction, in federal court. [Citation.] A maritime claim brought in the common law state courts is governed by federal maritime law, however.’ [Citation.] This is sometimes referred to as the revers e-Erie doctrine.” (Price v. Connolly-Pacific Co. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1213-1214 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 872 ], fn. omitted & italics added (Price).) “The Erie doctrine (Erie R.

2021However the extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called reverse-Erie doctrine which requires that substantive remedies afforded by the states conform to governing federal maritime standards. [Citation.]” (Price v. Connolly-Pacific Co., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1214, fn. 1 .) “But even when an action is founded on federal law, when brought in state court ‘the law of the state controls in matters of practice and procedure unless the federal statute provides otherwise. [Citation.]’” (Simmons v. Ware (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1047 , quotin

2013However, the extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called revers e-Erie doctrine which requires that substantive remedies afforded by the states conform to governing federal maritime standards. [Citation.]” (Price, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1214, fn. 1 .) But even when an action is founded on federal law, when brought in state court “the law of the state controls in matters of practice and procedure unless the federal statute provides otherwise. [Citation.]” (Scruton v. Korean Air Lines Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1603 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d

2025At the time of the 1984 amendments, the high court had already made clear that although the term “maritime” appears in both the LHWCA and in the codification of federal court admiralty jurisdiction, they do not carry identical meanings: “these are two different statutes ‘each with different legislative histories and jurisprudential interpretations over the course of decades.’ ” (Perini, supra, 459 U.S. at p. 320, fn. 29 .) Accordingly, the exclusion of club workers from the ambit of the LHWCA did not clearly signal these workers fell outside the broad parameters of admiralty jurisdiction and t

2021Co. v. Jensen (1917) 244 U.S. 205, 216 [ 37 S.Ct. 524 , 61 L.Ed. 1086 ].) We review de novo a trial court’s decision regarding choice- of-law and federal preemption of state law.

2021Co. v. Jensen (1917) 244 U.S. 205, 216 [ 37 S.Ct. 524 , 61 L.Ed. 1086 ].) We review de novo a trial court’s decision regarding choice- of-law and federal preemption of state law.

2021However the extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called reverse-Erie doctrine which requires that substantive remedies afforded by the states conform to governing federal maritime standards. [Citation.]” (Price v. Connolly-Pacific Co., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1214, fn. 1 .) “But even when an action is founded on federal law, when brought in state court ‘the law of the state controls in matters of practice and procedure unless the federal statute provides otherwise. [Citation.]’” (Simmons v. Ware (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1047 , quotin

2021However the extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called reverse-Erie doctrine which requires that substantive remedies afforded by the states conform to governing federal maritime standards. [Citation.]” (Price v. Connolly-Pacific Co., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1214, fn. 1 .) “But even when an action is founded on federal law, when brought in state court ‘the law of the state controls in matters of practice and procedure unless the federal statute provides otherwise. [Citation.]’” (Simmons v. Ware (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1047 , quotin

2015Cal. 2004) 356 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1099 (New.Net)], applying it to federal claims arguably would permit state law to affect and alter the substance of federal claims in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.” (Bulletion Displays, supra, 448 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1181–1182.) This dicta is not persuasive because New.Net was an Erie doctrine case, and it therefore does not support a finding that the anti-SLAPP statute is substantive under a preemption analysis.

2015Cal. 2004) 356 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1099 (New.Net)], applying it to federal claims arguably would permit state law to affect and alter the substance of federal claims in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.” (Bulletion Displays, supra, 448 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1181–1182.) This dicta is not persuasive because New.Net was an Erie doctrine case, and it therefore does not support a finding that the anti-SLAPP statute is substantive under a preemption analysis.

2015Cal. 2006) 448 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1182 (Bulletin Displays) [same];17 Restaino v. Bah (In re Bah) (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2005) 321 B.R. 41, 46 [impliedly holding that the Bankruptcy Code preempts the application of the anti-SLAPP statute to federal claims in bankruptcy court]; Riese v. County of Del Norte (case No. 12 CV-03723-WHO, N.D.

2015Cal. 2006) 448 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1182 (Bulletin Displays) [same];17 Restaino v. Bah (In re Bah) (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2005) 321 B.R. 41, 46 [impliedly holding that the Bankruptcy Code preempts the application of the anti-SLAPP statute to federal claims in bankruptcy court]; Riese v. County of Del Norte (case No. 12 CV-03723-WHO, N.D.

2015Cal. 2006) 448 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1182 (Bulletin Displays) [same];17 Restaino v. Bah (In re Bah) (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2005) 321 B.R. 41, 46 [impliedly holding that the Bankruptcy Code preempts the application of the anti-SLAPP statute to federal claims in bankruptcy court]; Riese v. County of Del Norte (case No. 12 CV-03723-WHO, N.D.

2015Cal. 2006) 448 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1182 (Bulletin Displays) [same];17 Restaino v. Bah (In re Bah) (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2005) 321 B.R. 41, 46 [impliedly holding that the Bankruptcy Code preempts the application of the anti-SLAPP statute to federal claims in bankruptcy court]; Riese v. County of Del Norte (case No. 12 CV-03723-WHO, N.D.

2013The majority identified two critical errors in the Court of Appeal decisions that it was convinced the California Supreme Court would not make: (1) giving insufficient weight to Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 , 126 S.Ct. 1297 , 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006) . . . and (2) misinterpreting Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 , 108 S.Ct. 2667 , 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988). ―The dissent argued (1) we were bound by the Erie doctrine to follow the California Court of Appeal decisions; (2) the California Supreme Court would no

2013The majority identified two critical errors in the Court of Appeal decisions that it was convinced the California Supreme Court would not make: (1) giving insufficient weight to Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 , 126 S.Ct. 1297 , 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006) . . . and (2) misinterpreting Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 , 108 S.Ct. 2667 , 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988). ―The dissent argued (1) we were bound by the Erie doctrine to follow the California Court of Appeal decisions; (2) the California Supreme Court would no

2013The majority identified two critical errors in the Court of Appeal decisions that it was convinced the California Supreme Court would not make: (1) giving insufficient weight to Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 , 126 S.Ct. 1297 , 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006) . . . and (2) misinterpreting Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 , 108 S.Ct. 2667 , 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988). ―The dissent argued (1) we were bound by the Erie doctrine to follow the California Court of Appeal decisions; (2) the California Supreme Court would no

2013The majority identified two critical errors in the Court of Appeal decisions that it was convinced the California Supreme Court would not make: (1) giving insufficient weight to Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 , 126 S.Ct. 1297 , 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006) . . . and (2) misinterpreting Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 , 108 S.Ct. 2667 , 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988). ―The dissent argued (1) we were bound by the Erie doctrine to follow the California Court of Appeal decisions; (2) the California Supreme Court would no

2008(Hutchins v. Juneau Tanker Corp. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 493, 499 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 542 ].) 2 To be “ ‘in the service of the ship’ ” or vessel, a seaman “must be generally answerable to its call to duty rather than actually in performance of routine tasks or specific orders.” (Farrell v. United States (1949) 336 U.S. 511, 516 [ 93 L.Ed. 850 , 69 S.Ct. 707 ].) 3 We are quick to note that Price has not been deprived of relief for his medical condition since the Operating Engineers Health and Welfare Trust Fund (the fund which pays for each Local 12 member dispatched to its jobs under the collective

2008(Hutchins v. Juneau Tanker Corp. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 493, 499 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 542 ].) 2 To be “ ‘in the service of the ship’ ” or vessel, a seaman “must be generally answerable to its call to duty rather than actually in performance of routine tasks or specific orders.” (Farrell v. United States (1949) 336 U.S. 511, 516 [ 93 L.Ed. 850 , 69 S.Ct. 707 ].) 3 We are quick to note that Price has not been deprived of relief for his medical condition since the Operating Engineers Health and Welfare Trust Fund (the fund which pays for each Local 12 member dispatched to its jobs under the collective

2008(Hutchins v. Juneau Tanker Corp. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 493, 499 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 542 ].) 2 To be “ ‘in the service of the ship’ ” or vessel, a seaman “must be generally answerable to its call to duty rather than actually in performance of routine tasks or specific orders.” (Farrell v. United States (1949) 336 U.S. 511, 516 [ 93 L.Ed. 850 , 69 S.Ct. 707 ].) 3 We are quick to note that Price has not been deprived of relief for his medical condition since the Operating Engineers Health and Welfare Trust Fund (the fund which pays for each Local 12 member dispatched to its jobs under the collective

2008(Hutchins v. Juneau Tanker Corp. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 493, 499 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 542 ].) 2 To be “ ‘in the service of the ship’ ” or vessel, a seaman “must be generally answerable to its call to duty rather than actually in performance of routine tasks or specific orders.” (Farrell v. United States (1949) 336 U.S. 511, 516 [ 93 L.Ed. 850 , 69 S.Ct. 707 ].) 3 We are quick to note that Price has not been deprived of relief for his medical condition since the Operating Engineers Health and Welfare Trust Fund (the fund which pays for each Local 12 member dispatched to its jobs under the collective

2000(Gramm v. Lincoln, supra, 257 F.2d at p. 255, fn. 6 .) The Eighth Circuit, also with cursory analysis, bases its rule on the combined effect of the Erie doctrine and the full faith and credit clause, as supplemented by 28 United States Code section 1738 . 12 {Austin v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., supra, 31 F.2d at pp. 617-618.) Our Supreme Court, in Levy, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pages 172-73, and Martin, supra, 2 Cal.3d at page 761 , did not give any indication that the rule it was announcing—the preclusive effect of a prior judgment of a federal court is determined by federal law—would differ depend

2000(Gramm v. Lincoln, supra, 257 F.2d at p. 255, fn. 6 .) The Eighth Circuit, also with cursory analysis, bases its rule on the combined effect of the Erie doctrine and the full faith and credit clause, as supplemented by 28 United States Code section 1738 . 12 {Austin v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., supra, 31 F.2d at pp. 617-618.) Our Supreme Court, in Levy, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pages 172-73, and Martin, supra, 2 Cal.3d at page 761 , did not give any indication that the rule it was announcing—the preclusive effect of a prior judgment of a federal court is determined by federal law—would differ depend