Erie motion in Pennsylvania

2025Hosp., 190 A.3d 631, 640 (Pa.Super. 2019) (stating: “[W]here a defendant presents evidence following the denial of a motion for nonsuit, the correctness of the trial court’s denial is rendered a moot issue and unappealable”). 2 In Windows, the claims raised in the summary judgment motion concerning whether Erie’s insurance policy excluded the homeowners’ losses were not resolved at trial because the trial court denied Erie’s motion in limine seeking to present evidence of its coverage defense at trial. -2- J-E03001-24 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal denied, 633 Pa. 757 , 125 A.3d 778 (2015);3 Hempt B

2025Thus, this Court proceeded to review Erie’s claim in the context of the trial court’s denial of its motion for JNOV.7 Given the inconsistency in our caselaw, it would be unfair to the instant parties to decline to consider the appeal from the denial of summary judgment in this case given that the trial court denied Domino’s motion for summary judgment on May 26, 2020, well before this Court issued its decision in Turnpaugh.8 Thus, Domino’s could not have intuited that it needed to seek permission to file an interlocutory appeal under Section 702(b) to preserve its challenge to the court’s deni

2025Thus, this Court proceeded to review Erie’s claim in the context of the trial court’s denial of its motion for JNOV.7 Given the inconsistency in our caselaw, it would be unfair to the instant parties to decline to consider the appeal from the denial of summary judgment in this case given that the trial court denied Domino’s motion for summary judgment on May 26, 2020, well before this Court issued its decision in Turnpaugh.8 Thus, Domino’s could not have intuited that it needed to seek permission to file an interlocutory appeal under Section 702(b) to preserve its challenge to the court’s deni

2025Thus, this Court proceeded to review Erie’s claim in the context of the trial court’s denial of its motion for JNOV.7 Given the inconsistency in our caselaw, it would be unfair to the instant parties to decline to consider the appeal from the denial of summary judgment in this case given that the trial court denied Domino’s motion for summary judgment on May 26, 2020, well before this Court issued its decision in Turnpaugh.8 Thus, Domino’s could not have intuited that it needed to seek permission to file an interlocutory appeal under Section 702(b) to preserve its challenge to the court’s deni

2025Thus, this Court proceeded to review Erie’s claim in the context of the trial court’s denial of its motion for JNOV.7 Given the inconsistency in our caselaw, it would be unfair to the instant parties to decline to consider the appeal from the denial of summary judgment in this case given that the trial court denied Domino’s motion for summary judgment on May 26, 2020, well before this Court issued its decision in Turnpaugh.8 Thus, Domino’s could not have intuited that it needed to seek permission to file an interlocutory appeal under Section 702(b) to preserve its challenge to the court’s deni

2024Fedn. of Pa., 970 A.2d at 1114 ; see also generally Rush II. ____________________________________________ 8 The parties did not have the benefit of Rush II when they filed their briefs in this Court in 2022.

2022They argued: (1) Eric was entitled to UIM benefits because ____________________________________________ 4“UM” refers to “uninsured motorist.” “UM coverage applies when an insured suffers injury or damage caused by a third-party tortfeasor who is uninsured[.]” Gallagher, 201 A.3d at 132 n.1. -6- J-A08037-22 he was injured by an underinsured motorist and stacked UIM benefits were purchased under the Erie Policy for Lloyd and Janet as well as their resident relatives, including Eric; (2) Erie’s attempt to denying Eric’s claim, which was based upon his rejection of UIM benefits under a separate po

2022Id.

2022Exch., 54 A.3d 371 (Pa. Super. 2012),5 “is controlling on this Court …, dictating affirmance of the trial court[.]” Appellee’s Brief at 28.

2022Exch., 54 A.3d 371 (Pa. Super. 2012),5 “is controlling on this Court …, dictating affirmance of the trial court[.]” Appellee’s Brief at 28.

2014Id. at 1236 .

2009Did the lower court err in fading to follow Blood v. Old Guard Insurance Company, 594 Pa. [151] 156, 934 A.2d 1218 (2007) and Salazar v. Allstate Insurance Company, 549 Pa. 658 , 702 A.2d 1038 (1997), by fashioning a remedy reforming the UM Bodily Injury Coverage and UIM Bodily Injury Coverage Limits of Protection under Erie Insurance Exchange Policy No. Q04-2407916 such that they were deemed to be equal to the Bodily Injury Liability Coverage Limits, for what the Court found to be Erie’s violation of Section 1734 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, when no such rem

2009Did the lower court err in fading to follow Blood v. Old Guard Insurance Company, 594 Pa. [151] 156, 934 A.2d 1218 (2007) and Salazar v. Allstate Insurance Company, 549 Pa. 658 , 702 A.2d 1038 (1997), by fashioning a remedy reforming the UM Bodily Injury Coverage and UIM Bodily Injury Coverage Limits of Protection under Erie Insurance Exchange Policy No. Q04-2407916 such that they were deemed to be equal to the Bodily Injury Liability Coverage Limits, for what the Court found to be Erie’s violation of Section 1734 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, when no such rem

2009Did the lower court err in fading to follow Blood v. Old Guard Insurance Company, 594 Pa. [151] 156, 934 A.2d 1218 (2007) and Salazar v. Allstate Insurance Company, 549 Pa. 658 , 702 A.2d 1038 (1997), by fashioning a remedy reforming the UM Bodily Injury Coverage and UIM Bodily Injury Coverage Limits of Protection under Erie Insurance Exchange Policy No. Q04-2407916 such that they were deemed to be equal to the Bodily Injury Liability Coverage Limits, for what the Court found to be Erie’s violation of Section 1734 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, when no such rem

2008Indeed, Erie’s motion in limine, as well as the argument it offered at trial, asserted that the expert’s opinion was deficient because in certain passages, his report expressed more than one possible cause for the collapse beneath the Betzes’ house and did not consistently state his conclusions “to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.” Id.

2007These exclusions have been applied by our appellate courts to deny coverage where an insured “desired to cause the consequences of his act or if he acted knowingly that such consequences were substantially certain to result.” United Services Automobile Association v. Elitzky, 358 Pa. Super. 362, 375 , 517 A.2d 982, 989 (1986); Donegal Mutual Insurance Company v. Ferrara, 380 Pa. Super. 588 , 552 A.2d 699 (1989); Baumhammers, supra at 822 ; and Germantown Insurance Company v. Martin, 407 Pa. Super. 326 , 595 A.2d 1172 (1991).

2007These exclusions have been applied by our appellate courts to deny coverage where an insured “desired to cause the consequences of his act or if he acted knowingly that such consequences were substantially certain to result.” United Services Automobile Association v. Elitzky, 358 Pa. Super. 362, 375 , 517 A.2d 982, 989 (1986); Donegal Mutual Insurance Company v. Ferrara, 380 Pa. Super. 588 , 552 A.2d 699 (1989); Baumhammers, supra at 822 ; and Germantown Insurance Company v. Martin, 407 Pa. Super. 326 , 595 A.2d 1172 (1991).

2007These exclusions have been applied by our appellate courts to deny coverage where an insured “desired to cause the consequences of his act or if he acted knowingly that such consequences were substantially certain to result.” United Services Automobile Association v. Elitzky, 358 Pa. Super. 362, 375 , 517 A.2d 982, 989 (1986); Donegal Mutual Insurance Company v. Ferrara, 380 Pa. Super. 588 , 552 A.2d 699 (1989); Baumhammers, supra at 822 ; and Germantown Insurance Company v. Martin, 407 Pa. Super. 326 , 595 A.2d 1172 (1991).

2007These exclusions have been applied by our appellate courts to deny coverage where an insured “desired to cause the consequences of his act or if he acted knowingly that such consequences were substantially certain to result.” United Services Automobile Association v. Elitzky, 358 Pa. Super. 362, 375 , 517 A.2d 982, 989 (1986); Donegal Mutual Insurance Company v. Ferrara, 380 Pa. Super. 588 , 552 A.2d 699 (1989); Baumhammers, supra at 822 ; and Germantown Insurance Company v. Martin, 407 Pa. Super. 326 , 595 A.2d 1172 (1991).

2007These exclusions have been applied by our appellate courts to deny coverage where an insured “desired to cause the consequences of his act or if he acted knowingly that such consequences were substantially certain to result.” United Services Automobile Association v. Elitzky, 358 Pa. Super. 362, 375 , 517 A.2d 982, 989 (1986); Donegal Mutual Insurance Company v. Ferrara, 380 Pa. Super. 588 , 552 A.2d 699 (1989); Baumhammers, supra at 822 ; and Germantown Insurance Company v. Martin, 407 Pa. Super. 326 , 595 A.2d 1172 (1991).

2005See Schriro, — U.S. -, -, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2523 , 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) (death *859 penalty factors to jury); Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 , 116 S.Ct. 2211 , 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996) (Erie doctrine); Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280-281 , 114 S.Ct. 1483 , 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (anti-retroactivity presumption); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-294 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (Ex Post Facto Clause).

2005See Schriro, — U.S. -, -, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2523 , 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) (death *859 penalty factors to jury); Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 , 116 S.Ct. 2211 , 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996) (Erie doctrine); Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280-281 , 114 S.Ct. 1483 , 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (anti-retroactivity presumption); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-294 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (Ex Post Facto Clause).

2005See Schriro, — U.S. -, -, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2523 , 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) (death *859 penalty factors to jury); Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 , 116 S.Ct. 2211 , 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996) (Erie doctrine); Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280-281 , 114 S.Ct. 1483 , 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (anti-retroactivity presumption); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-294 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (Ex Post Facto Clause).

2005See Schriro, — U.S. -, -, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2523 , 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) (death *859 penalty factors to jury); Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 , 116 S.Ct. 2211 , 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996) (Erie doctrine); Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280-281 , 114 S.Ct. 1483 , 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (anti-retroactivity presumption); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-294 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (Ex Post Facto Clause).

2005See Schriro, — U.S. -, -, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2523 , 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) (death *859 penalty factors to jury); Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 , 116 S.Ct. 2211 , 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996) (Erie doctrine); Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280-281 , 114 S.Ct. 1483 , 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (anti-retroactivity presumption); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-294 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (Ex Post Facto Clause).

2005See Schriro, — U.S. -, -, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2523 , 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) (death *859 penalty factors to jury); Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 , 116 S.Ct. 2211 , 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996) (Erie doctrine); Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280-281 , 114 S.Ct. 1483 , 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (anti-retroactivity presumption); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-294 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (Ex Post Facto Clause).