10 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1943–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Schaeffler v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2016We conclude that the policy reasons for keeping a litigation limitation on the common interest doctrine outweigh 5 Although the Second and Ninth Circuits have made clear that actual or ongoing litigation is not required, they do not appear to have expressly decided whether there must be a threat of litigation in order to invoke the exception (see Schaeffler v United States, -- F3d --, 2015 WL 6874979 at *4-5 [2d Cir 2015], citing United States v Schwimmer, 892 F2d 237 [2d Cir 1989]; United States v Zolin, 809 F2d 1411, 1417 [9th Cir 1987], affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 491 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ambac Assurance Corporation v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021The Court reasoned that it did not "perceive a need to extend the common interest doctrine to communications made in the absence of pending or anticipated litigation, and any benefits that may attend such an expansion of the doctrine are outweighed by the substantial loss of relevant evidence, as well as the potential for abuse" ( id. at 629 ). 2021The Court concluded that "the policy reasons for keeping a litigation limitation on the common interest doctrine outweigh any purported justification for doing away with it, and therefore maintained the narrow construction that New York courts have traditionally applied" ( id. at 632 ). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
United States v. Zolin
green
1 sentence2016We conclude that the policy reasons for keeping a litigation limitation on the common interest doctrine outweigh 5 Although the Second and Ninth Circuits have made clear that actual or ongoing litigation is not required, they do not appear to have expressly decided whether there must be a threat of litigation in order to invoke the exception (see Schaeffler v United States, -- F3d --, 2015 WL 6874979 at *4-5 [2d Cir 2015], citing United States v Schwimmer, 892 F2d 237 [2d Cir 1989]; United States v Zolin, 809 F2d 1411, 1417 [9th Cir 1987], affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 491 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In re the Estate of Agliata
neutral
1 sentence2014He relies upon an unreported decision of the Supreme Court, Nassau County in AC v DR (NYLJ 1202618541795 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2013], citing Peterson and Matter of Agliata, 222 AD2d 1025 [4th Dept 1995]) to support his contention that this action did not abate. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd.
green
1 sentence2010The court observed that “[w]hen ‘violation of swelled to ‘covered by,’ the specific became general.” ( 728 F Supp 2d at 364 .) The result was a significant expansion of the rule of the state courts “which had only dismissed claims relying solely on real estate regulations promulgated by the Attorney General under the Martin Act and had never preempted any causes of action that existed independent of the Martin Act” (id.). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Brock v. Bua
green
1 sentence1990We decline to do so here.” With the obligation to stare decisis clearly in focus, this court in an effort to hármonize the facially conflicting precedents noted above interprets the ruling in Brock (supra) as an expansion of the rule enunciated in Shaw v Cock (supra), so as to permit the maintenance of an action against a defendant belatedly served after expiration of the limitations period, who, though united in interest with a timely served codefendant, was not identified as a party within the action’s caption. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Shaw v. . Cock
neutral
1 sentence1990We decline to do so here.” With the obligation to stare decisis clearly in focus, this court in an effort to hármonize the facially conflicting precedents noted above interprets the ruling in Brock (supra) as an expansion of the rule enunciated in Shaw v Cock (supra), so as to permit the maintenance of an action against a defendant belatedly served after expiration of the limitations period, who, though united in interest with a timely served codefendant, was not identified as a party within the action’s caption. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Levy
green
1 sentence1984People v Levy ( 15 NY2d 159 , supra) marked an expansion of the principle and established the present kidnap merger doctrine. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Barrow v. New York City Housing Authority
neutral
1 sentence1978Corp., 38 NY2d 662 ; Matter of Barrow v New York City Housing Auth., 59 AD2d 780 ), in our view plaintiff’s reliance upon unsubstantiated, and apparently unauthorized, oral representations by municipal officials falls far short of the showing necessary to invoke this doctrine (Seif v City of Long Beach, 286 NY 382 ; 21 NY Jur, Estoppel, § 81). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Seif v. City of Long Beach
green
1 sentence1978Corp., 38 NY2d 662 ; Matter of Barrow v New York City Housing Auth., 59 AD2d 780 ), in our view plaintiff’s reliance upon unsubstantiated, and apparently unauthorized, oral representations by municipal officials falls far short of the showing necessary to invoke this doctrine (Seif v City of Long Beach, 286 NY 382 ; 21 NY Jur, Estoppel, § 81). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Pine Top Associates v. Hirsch & Sons Deli World, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence1978Moreover, viewing the landlord and tenant relationships in our present day enlightened concepts and within the declared legislative policy on "Leases — Defense of Unconscionability” as expressed in the message submitted by Governor Carey for the enactment of section 235-c of the Real Property Law (NY Legis Ann, 1976, p 406) and the authorities construing said section, this court favors the expansion of the doctrine of unconscionability to include "judicial policing against unconscionable results without strained construction of legal principles.” (Pine Top Assoc. v Hirsch & Sons Deli World, 92 | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Bender v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.
green
1 sentence1978Corp., 38 NY2d 662 ; Matter of Barrow v New York City Housing Auth., 59 AD2d 780 ), in our view plaintiff’s reliance upon unsubstantiated, and apparently unauthorized, oral representations by municipal officials falls far short of the showing necessary to invoke this doctrine (Seif v City of Long Beach, 286 NY 382 ; 21 NY Jur, Estoppel, § 81). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Douglaston Civic Ass'n v. Galvin
green
1 sentence1975(See L 1975, ch 827, § 1; Matter of Douglaston Civic Assn. v Galvin, 36 NY2d 1 .) The Court of Appeals recognizes the concept that our courts should be open to those persons who can bring a full and vigorous presentation of the issues (Matter of Burke v Sugarman, 35 NY2d 39 ), so that there will not be an impenetrable barrier to judicial scrutiny of allegedly unconstitutional acts performed by governmental officers. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Burke v. Sugarman
green
1 sentence1975(See L 1975, ch 827, § 1; Matter of Douglaston Civic Assn. v Galvin, 36 NY2d 1 .) The Court of Appeals recognizes the concept that our courts should be open to those persons who can bring a full and vigorous presentation of the issues (Matter of Burke v Sugarman, 35 NY2d 39 ), so that there will not be an impenetrable barrier to judicial scrutiny of allegedly unconstitutional acts performed by governmental officers. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Boryszewski v. Brydges
green
1 sentence1975We recognize the undeniable trend in New York law toward the liberal expansion of the doctrine of standing (Boryszewski v Brydges, 37 NY2d 361 ). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Lawrence v. . Fox
green
1 sentence1943With all the expansion in the doctrine announced in Lawrence v. Fox ( 20 N. Y. 268 ), so far as my researches have gone it has never extended the benefits of a manufacturer’s warranty beyond the person to whom it was made to the ultimate consumer or succeeding purchasers. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.