expansion doctrine in California

2026Elements and Relief Available Today, a party relying on the defense of impracticability of performance must establish (1) the occurrence of an event that makes performance impossible or impracticable (Mineral Park, supra, 172 Cal. at p. 293 ), (2) the event occurred through no fault of the party seeking relief (Majestic Asset Management LLC v. The Colony at California Oaks Homeowners Assn. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 413 , 428), (3) the event was unexpected in the sense that its non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the agreement of the parties (Autry v. Republic Productions, Inc. (1947) 30 Cal.

2026Elements and Relief Available Today, a party relying on the defense of impracticability of performance must establish (1) the occurrence of an event that makes performance impossible or impracticable (Mineral Park, supra, 172 Cal. at p. 293 ), (2) the event occurred through no fault of the party seeking relief (Majestic Asset Management LLC v. The Colony at California Oaks Homeowners Assn. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 413 , 428), (3) the event was unexpected in the sense that its non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the agreement of the parties (Autry v. Republic Productions, Inc. (1947) 30 Cal.

2017Hence, the officers’ incentive to acquire evidence through illegal means is quite weak.” (James, supra, 493 U.S. at p. 318 .) However, the expansion of the exception would ‘“vastly increase the number of occasions on which such evidence could be used” and the ‘“prosecutor’s access to impeachment evidence . . . would also deter defendants from calling witnesses in the first place.” (Ibid.) Thus, ‘“obtaining evidence through illegal means stacks the deck heavily in the prosecution’s favor.” (Ibid.) The James court held that the impeachment exception would not be extended to third party witnesses

2017Though there is little, if any, concern that expert witnesses would commit perjury, 8 the admission of this evidence prevents the defendant from turning the exclusionary rule into a “ ‘a shield against contradiction of his untruths.’ ” (Harris, supra, 401 U.S. at p. 224 , quoting Walder, supra, 347 U.S. at p. 65 .) Nor would the admission of the suppressed statements have a chilling effect on a defendant’s ability to present a defense.

2017Though there is little, if any, concern that expert witnesses would commit perjury, 8 the admission of this evidence prevents the defendant from turning the exclusionary rule into a “ ‘a shield against contradiction of his untruths.’ ” (Harris, supra, 401 U.S. at p. 224 , quoting Walder, supra, 347 U.S. at p. 65 .) Nor would the admission of the suppressed statements have a chilling effect on a defendant’s ability to present a defense.

2016"A party's legitimate objectives in the litigation are limited to the remedies which can be awarded by courts.... [A] defendant's 'objects' are to resist a determination of liability and whatever assessment of damages, penalty or other order that the plaintiff seeks." ( Rothman v. Jackson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th 1134 , 1147-1148, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 284 .) Moreover, Stephens's communications to the general public through the Internet and the media are not protected by the litigation privilege. ( GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th 141 , 152, 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 831 .) An expansion

2016"A party's legitimate objectives in the litigation are limited to the remedies which can be awarded by courts.... [A] defendant's 'objects' are to resist a determination of liability and whatever assessment of damages, penalty or other order that the plaintiff seeks." ( Rothman v. Jackson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th 1134 , 1147-1148, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 284 .) Moreover, Stephens's communications to the general public through the Internet and the media are not protected by the litigation privilege. ( GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th 141 , 152, 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 831 .) An expansion

2016"A party's legitimate objectives in the litigation are limited to the remedies which can be awarded by courts.... [A] defendant's 'objects' are to resist a determination of liability and whatever assessment of damages, penalty or other order that the plaintiff seeks." ( Rothman v. Jackson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th 1134 , 1147-1148, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 284 .) Moreover, Stephens's communications to the general public through the Internet and the media are not protected by the litigation privilege. ( GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th 141 , 152, 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 831 .) An expansion

2016"A party's legitimate objectives in the litigation are limited to the remedies which can be awarded by courts.... [A] defendant's 'objects' are to resist a determination of liability and whatever assessment of damages, penalty or other order that the plaintiff seeks." ( Rothman v. Jackson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th 1134 , 1147-1148, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 284 .) Moreover, Stephens's communications to the general public through the Internet and the media are not protected by the litigation privilege. ( GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th 141 , 152, 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 831 .) An expansion

2008Jones, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 1578 ) that it was intended as an expansion of the immunity already granted to trustees in a different statute, section 2924f.

2004Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1268 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 , 906 P.2d 1112 .) Moreover, the cases predated the expansion of the privilege that began with Albertson v. Raboff, supra, 46 Cal.2d 375 , 295 P.2d 405 , and that led to the broad interpretation established in Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d 205 , 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 , 786 P.2d 365 , and other cases.

2004Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1268 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 , 906 P.2d 1112 .) Moreover, the cases predated the expansion of the privilege that began with Albertson v. Raboff, supra, 46 Cal.2d 375 , 295 P.2d 405 , and that led to the broad interpretation established in Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d 205 , 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 , 786 P.2d 365 , and other cases.

2004Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1268 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 , 906 P.2d 1112 .) Moreover, the cases predated the expansion of the privilege that began with Albertson v. Raboff, supra, 46 Cal.2d 375 , 295 P.2d 405 , and that led to the broad interpretation established in Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d 205 , 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 , 786 P.2d 365 , and other cases.

2004Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1268 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 , 906 P.2d 1112 .) Moreover, the cases predated the expansion of the privilege that began with Albertson v. Raboff, supra, 46 Cal.2d 375 , 295 P.2d 405 , and that led to the broad interpretation established in Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d 205 , 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 , 786 P.2d 365 , and other cases.

2003If that is the inevitable next step, it should be undertaken by the Legislature, not by the judiciary’s expansive reading of a statute that itself was limited in its origins.” (Drum, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1028 .) Similarly, adoption of Hartunian’s position would eliminate tort liability for false citizen’s arrest so long as the citizen promptly takes the arrested person before a magistrate or delivers him or her to the police, as Penal Code section 847, subdivision (a) requires.

1993(See, e.g., Ferrel v. Safway Steel Scaffolds (1962) 57 Cal.2d 651 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 575 , 371 P.2d 311 ]; Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, supra, 68 Cal.2d 245 ; Griesel v. Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 23 Cal.3d 578 ; Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., supra, 24 Cal.3d 502 .) Privette, the property owner sued here, recognizes this.

1993(See, e.g., Ferrel v. Safway Steel Scaffolds (1962) 57 Cal.2d 651 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 575 , 371 P.2d 311 ]; Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, supra, 68 Cal.2d 245 ; Griesel v. Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 23 Cal.3d 578 ; Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., supra, 24 Cal.3d 502 .) Privette, the property owner sued here, recognizes this.

1993(See, e.g., Ferrel v. Safway Steel Scaffolds (1962) 57 Cal.2d 651 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 575 , 371 P.2d 311 ]; Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, supra, 68 Cal.2d 245 ; Griesel v. Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 23 Cal.3d 578 ; Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., supra, 24 Cal.3d 502 .) Privette, the property owner sued here, recognizes this.

1993(See, e.g., Ferrel v. Safway Steel Scaffolds (1962) 57 Cal.2d 651 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 575 , 371 P.2d 311 ]; Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, supra, 68 Cal.2d 245 ; Griesel v. Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 23 Cal.3d 578 ; Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., supra, 24 Cal.3d 502 .) Privette, the property owner sued here, recognizes this.

1993(See, e.g., Ferrel v. Safway Steel Scaffolds (1962) 57 Cal.2d 651 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 575 , 371 P.2d 311 ]; Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, supra, 68 Cal.2d 245 ; Griesel v. Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 23 Cal.3d 578 ; Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., supra, 24 Cal.3d 502 .) Privette, the property owner sued here, recognizes this.

1986(Id., at p. 1026.) For example, Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 256 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 896 , 391 P.2d 168 ] extends strict liability to retailers since they are “engaged in the business of distributing goods to the public” and “are an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products. ” (At p. 262.) This rule is stated in section 402A of the Restatement Second of Torts: “(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subjec

1986(Id., at p. 1026.) For example, Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 256 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 896 , 391 P.2d 168 ] extends strict liability to retailers since they are “engaged in the business of distributing goods to the public” and “are an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products. ” (At p. 262.) This rule is stated in section 402A of the Restatement Second of Torts: “(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subjec

1986On appeal, the court first recalls the origin of the application of strict liability in California: Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) *500 59 Cal.2d 57 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897 ] held that “‘[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.’ (At p. 62.)” (Silverhart, supra, at p. 1025 .) The court then notes the expansion of the doctrine to impose strict liability on others in the chain of distribution, not merely manu

1986On appeal, the court first recalls the origin of the application of strict liability in California: Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) *500 59 Cal.2d 57 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897 ] held that “‘[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.’ (At p. 62.)” (Silverhart, supra, at p. 1025 .) The court then notes the expansion of the doctrine to impose strict liability on others in the chain of distribution, not merely manu

1978Dickey v. Retirement Board (1976) 16 Cal.3d 745 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 289 , 548 P.2d 689 ], reversing the trial court (substantial evidence test applied), and holding that the retirement board’s decision denying application for full salary disability benefits substantially affected a fundamental vested right requiring the trial court to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence.

1978Dickey v. Retirement Board (1976) 16 Cal.3d 745 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 289 , 548 P.2d 689 ], reversing the trial court (substantial evidence test applied), and holding that the retirement board’s decision denying application for full salary disability benefits substantially affected a fundamental vested right requiring the trial court to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence.