10 New York opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrickgreen2 sentences2013While the existence of an express preemption clause in a statute supports a reasonable inference that the Legislature did not intend to preempt other matters, it does not, as respondents suggest, entirely foreclose any possibility of implied preemption (see Freightliner Corp. v Myrick, 514 US 280, 287-288 [1995]; Drattel v Toyota Motor Corp., 92 NY2d 35, 48-49 [1998]; Matter of Office of Attorney Gen. of State of N.Y., 269 AD2d 1, 7 [2000]). 2013While the existence of an express preemption clause in a statute supports a reasonable inference that the Legislature did not intend to preempt other matters, it does not, as respondents suggest, entirely foreclose any possibility of implied preemption (see Freightliner Corp. v Myrick, 514 US 280, 287-288 [1995]; Drattel v Toyota Motor Corp., 92 NY2d 35, 48-49 [1998]; Matter of Office of Attorney Gen. of State of N.Y., 269 AD2d 1, 7 [2000]). | 4 | 5 |
Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp.green2 sentences2013While the existence of an express preemption clause in a statute supports a reasonable inference that the Legislature did not intend to preempt other matters, it does not, as respondents suggest, entirely foreclose any possibility of implied preemption (see Freightliner Corp. v Myrick, 514 US 280, 287-288 [1995]; Drattel v Toyota Motor Corp., 92 NY2d 35, 48-49 [1998]; Matter of Office of Attorney Gen. of State of N.Y., 269 AD2d 1, 7 [2000]). 2013While the existence of an express preemption clause in a statute supports a reasonable inference that the Legislature did not intend to preempt other matters, it does not, as respondents suggest, entirely foreclose any possibility of implied preemption (see Freightliner Corp. v Myrick, 514 US 280, 287-288 [1995]; Drattel v Toyota Motor Corp., 92 NY2d 35, 48-49 [1998]; Matter of Office of Attorney Gen. of State of N.Y., 269 AD2d 1, 7 [2000]). | 4 | 4 |
Riley v. County of Broomegreen2 sentences2013The primary consideration in matters of statutory interpretation “is to ‘ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature’ ” (Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455, 463 [2000], quoting McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92 [a]; see Roberts v Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 13 NY3d 270, 286 [2009]). 2013The primary consideration in matters of statutory interpretation “is to ‘ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature’ ” (Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455, 463 [2000], quoting McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92 [a]; see Roberts v Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 13 NY3d 270, 286 [2009]). | 2 | 2 |
Frew Run Gravel Products, Inc. v. Town of Carrollgreen2 sentences2013Where, as here, a statute contains an express preemption clause, its effect “turns on the proper construction of [the] statutory provision” (Matter of Frew Run Gravel Prods. v Town of Carroll, 71 NY2d 126, 131 [1987]). 2013Where, as here, a statute contains an express preemption clause, its effect “turns on the proper construction of [the] statutory provision” (Matter of Frew Run Gravel Prods. v Town of Carroll, 71 NY2d 126, 131 [1987]). | 2 | 2 |
Detroit Diesel Corp. v. Attorney Generalgreen2 sentences2013While the existence of an express preemption clause in a statute supports a reasonable inference that the Legislature did not intend to preempt other matters, it does not, as respondents suggest, entirely foreclose any possibility of implied preemption (see Freightliner Corp. v Myrick, 514 US 280, 287-288 [1995]; Drattel v Toyota Motor Corp., 92 NY2d 35, 48-49 [1998]; Matter of Office of Attorney Gen. of State of N.Y., 269 AD2d 1, 7 [2000]). 2013While the existence of an express preemption clause in a statute supports a reasonable inference that the Legislature did not intend to preempt other matters, it does not, as respondents suggest, entirely foreclose any possibility of implied preemption (see Freightliner Corp. v Myrick, 514 US 280, 287-288 [1995]; Drattel v Toyota Motor Corp., 92 NY2d 35, 48-49 [1998]; Matter of Office of Attorney Gen. of State of N.Y., 269 AD2d 1, 7 [2000]). | 2 | 2 |
Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Properties, L.P.green2 sentences2013The primary consideration in matters of statutory interpretation “is to ‘ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature’ ” (Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455, 463 [2000], quoting McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92 [a]; see Roberts v Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 13 NY3d 270, 286 [2009]). 2013The primary consideration in matters of statutory interpretation “is to ‘ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature’ ” (Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455, 463 [2000], quoting McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92 [a]; see Roberts v Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 13 NY3d 270, 286 [2009]). | 2 | 2 |
Claim of Amoah v. Mallah Management, LLCgreen2 sentences2012Where, as here, a federal law contains an express preemption clause, “[the] ‘focus [is] on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent’ ” (Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v Whiting, 563 US —, —, 131 S Ct 1968, 1977 [2011], quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v Easterwood, 507 US 658, 664 [1993]; see Drattel v Toyota Motor Corp., 92 NY2d 35, 42 [1998]; Matter of Amoah v Mallah Mgt., LLC, 57 AD3d 29, 31 [2008]). 2012Where, as here, a federal law contains an express preemption clause, “[the] ‘focus [is] on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent’ ” (Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v Whiting, 563 US —, —, 131 S Ct 1968, 1977 [2011], quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v Easterwood, 507 US 658, 664 [1993]; see Drattel v Toyota Motor Corp., 92 NY2d 35, 42 [1998]; Matter of Amoah v Mallah Mgt., LLC, 57 AD3d 29, 31 [2008]). | 2 | 2 |
Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whitinggreen2 sentences2012Where, as here, a federal law contains an express preemption clause, “[the] ‘focus [is] on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent’ ” (Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v Whiting, 563 US —, —, 131 S Ct 1968, 1977 [2011], quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v Easterwood, 507 US 658, 664 [1993]; see Drattel v Toyota Motor Corp., 92 NY2d 35, 42 [1998]; Matter of Amoah v Mallah Mgt., LLC, 57 AD3d 29, 31 [2008]). 2012Where, as here, a federal law contains an express preemption clause, “[the] ‘focus [is] on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent’ ” (Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v Whiting, 563 US —, —, 131 S Ct 1968, 1977 [2011], quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v Easterwood, 507 US 658, 664 [1993]; see Drattel v Toyota Motor Corp., 92 NY2d 35, 42 [1998]; Matter of Amoah v Mallah Mgt., LLC, 57 AD3d 29, 31 [2008]). | 2 | 2 |
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwoodgreen2 sentences2012Where, as here, a federal law contains an express preemption clause, “[the] ‘focus [is] on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent’ ” (Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v Whiting, 563 US —, —, 131 S Ct 1968, 1977 [2011], quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v Easterwood, 507 US 658, 664 [1993]; see Drattel v Toyota Motor Corp., 92 NY2d 35, 42 [1998]; Matter of Amoah v Mallah Mgt., LLC, 57 AD3d 29, 31 [2008]). 2012Where, as here, a federal law contains an express preemption clause, “[the] ‘focus [is] on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent’ ” (Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v Whiting, 563 US —, —, 131 S Ct 1968, 1977 [2011], quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v Easterwood, 507 US 658, 664 [1993]; see Drattel v Toyota Motor Corp., 92 NY2d 35, 42 [1998]; Matter of Amoah v Mallah Mgt., LLC, 57 AD3d 29, 31 [2008]). | 2 | 2 |
California v. ARC America Corp.green1 sentence2026The Graves Amendment contains an express preemption clause but, as explained in more detail below, that clause addresses only vicarious liability and does not preempt any part of state insurance law.</p> <p>Finally, conflict preemption, which comes in the two flavors of "impossibility" or "obstacle" preemption, occurs where "compliance with both state and federal law is impossible" or where "the state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress' " (<i>Oneok, Inc. v Learjet, Inc.</i>, 575 US 373, 377 [2015], quoting <i>Californi | 1 | 1 |
Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.green1 sentence2026The Graves Amendment contains an express preemption clause but, as explained in more detail below, that clause addresses only vicarious liability and does not preempt any part of state insurance law.</p> <p>Finally, conflict preemption, which comes in the two flavors of "impossibility" or "obstacle" preemption, occurs where "compliance with both state and federal law is impossible" or where "the state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress' " (<i>Oneok, Inc. v Learjet, Inc.</i>, 575 US 373, 377 [2015], quoting <i>Californi | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. DeCuirgreen1 sentence2000Questions of preemption are to be determined on a case-by-case basis in order to ascertain “whether the dangers and hardships of diverse regulation justify foreclosing a State from the exercise of its traditional powers” (Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commn. v Continental Air Lines, 372 US 714, 719 ; see also, Hall v DeCuir, 95 US 485 ). | 1 | 1 |
Munroe v. Galatigreen2 sentences1998Although after My-rick an express preemption clause will not “entirely foreclose [ ] any possibility of implied pre-emption” (Freightliner Corp. v Myrick, supra, 514 US, at 288 ), Myrick still favors an inference that in applicable situations an express preemption clause may foreclose a claim of comprehensive implied preemption (see, Munroe v Galati, 189 Ariz 113, 117-118, 938 P2d 1114, 1118 [1997], supra). 1998Although after Myrick an express preemption clause will not "entirely foreclose[] any possibility of implied pre-emption" ( Freightliner Corp. v Myrick , supra , 514 US, at 288 ), Myrick still favors an inference that in applicable situations an express preemption clause may foreclose a claim of comprehensive implied preemption ( see , Munroe v Galati , 189 Ariz 113, 117-118, 938 P2d 1114, 1118 [1997], supra ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences1998Here, the Safety Act’s express preemption clause combined with the savings clause and over-all legislative history provide far more than a “ ‘reliable indicium of congressional intent’ ” to preserve common-law causes of action such as the plaintiffs’ action (Cipollone v Liggett Group, 505 US 504, 517 , supra, quoting Malone v White Motor Corp., 435 US 497, 505 ). 1998In the interest of such uniformity, the Act contains an express preemption clause at section 1334: “(a) Additional Statements “No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section [1333 of this title], shall be required on any cigarette package. “(b) State regulations “No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.” Matters outside the scope of an express preemption provis | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.
green
1 sentence2000Questions of preemption are to be determined on a case-by-case basis in order to ascertain “whether the dangers and hardships of diverse regulation justify foreclosing a State from the exercise of its traditional powers” (Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commn. v Continental Air Lines, 372 US 714, 719 ; see also, Hall v DeCuir, 95 US 485 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Sherman v. Claire Manufacturing Co.
neutral
1 sentence1999Co., 239 AD2d 487 , lv dismissed and denied 90 NY2d 933 ; Sirico v Beckerle Lbr. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Sherman v. Claire Manufacturing Co.
neutral
1 sentence1999Co., 239 AD2d 487 , lv dismissed and denied 90 NY2d 933 ; Sirico v Beckerle Lbr. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Patricia M. Wood v. General Motors Corporation
green
1 sentence1998We are unpersuaded by the view that the Safety Act does not provide a "reliable indicium of congressional intent" because Congress never anticipated the situation that now confronts us litigation of common-law claims ( see , Wood v General Motors Corp. , 865 F.2d 395, 402 , supra ). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Malone v. White Motor Corp.
green
2 sentences1998Here, the Safety Act’s express preemption clause combined with the savings clause and over-all legislative history provide far more than a “ ‘reliable indicium of congressional intent’ ” to preserve common-law causes of action such as the plaintiffs’ action (Cipollone v Liggett Group, 505 US 504, 517 , supra, quoting Malone v White Motor Corp., 435 US 497, 505 ). 1998Here, the Safety Act's express preemption clause combined with the savings clause and over-all legislative history provide far more than a "`reliable indicium of congressional intent'" to preserve common-law causes of action such as the plaintiffs' action ( Cipollone v Liggett Group , 505 US 504, 517 , supra, quoting Malone v White Motor Corp. , 435 US 497, 505 ). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.