9 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkeygreen2 sentences2025Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 4 No. 1-24-0530 569 U.S. 251, 260 (2013). ¶ 17 Illinois courts interpret the intended scope of a federal statute’s express preemption clause consistent with the general rules of statutory interpretation, meaning the court will “ ‘in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.’ ” Haage, 2021 IL 125918, ¶ 72 (quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)). 2025Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 260 (2013). ¶ 18 Illinois courts interpret the intended scope of a federal statute’s express preemption clause consistent with the general rules of statutory interpretation, meaning the court will “in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.” Haage, 2021 IL 125918, ¶ 72 (quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)). | 4 | 4 |
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwoodgreen2 sentences2025Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 4 No. 1-24-0530 569 U.S. 251, 260 (2013). ¶ 17 Illinois courts interpret the intended scope of a federal statute’s express preemption clause consistent with the general rules of statutory interpretation, meaning the court will “ ‘in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.’ ” Haage, 2021 IL 125918, ¶ 72 (quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)). 2025Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 260 (2013). ¶ 18 Illinois courts interpret the intended scope of a federal statute’s express preemption clause consistent with the general rules of statutory interpretation, meaning the court will “in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.” Haage, 2021 IL 125918, ¶ 72 (quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)). | 3 | 4 |
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trustgreen2 sentences2025Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 579 U.S. 115 , 125 (2016) (when a statute contains an express preemption clause, the court does “not invoke any presumption against preemption”). ¶ 22 Jamie also argues that the exercise of reasonable care should not be considered a “service,” and thus state negligence law, and its requirement that actors conduct themselves with reasonable care, is distinct from any “service” referenced in the preemption clause. 2025Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-free Trust, 579 U.S. 115, 125 (2016) (when a statute contains an express preemption clause, the court does “not invoke any presumption against preemption.”). ¶ 23 Jamie also argues that the exercise of reasonable care should not be considered a “service,” and thus state negligence law, and its requirement that actors conduct themselves with reasonable care, is distinct from any “service” referenced in the preemption clause. | 2 | 3 |
Haage v. Zavalagreen2 sentences2025Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 4 No. 1-24-0530 569 U.S. 251, 260 (2013). ¶ 17 Illinois courts interpret the intended scope of a federal statute’s express preemption clause consistent with the general rules of statutory interpretation, meaning the court will “ ‘in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.’ ” Haage, 2021 IL 125918, ¶ 72 (quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)). 2025Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 260 (2013). ¶ 18 Illinois courts interpret the intended scope of a federal statute’s express preemption clause consistent with the general rules of statutory interpretation, meaning the court will “in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.” Haage, 2021 IL 125918, ¶ 72 (quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)). | 2 | 2 |
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marinegreen2 sentences2009Where the federal statute at issue contains an express preemption clause, our task begins with a focus on the plain wording, as it “ ‘necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.’ ” Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 , 154 L. 2009Where the federal statute at issue contains an express preemption clause, our task begins with a focus on the plain wording, as it “ ‘necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.’ ” Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 , 154 L. | 1 | 3 |
Quimbey ex rel. Faure v. Community Health Systems Professional Services Corp.green1 sentence2018See Quimbey v. Community Health Systems Professional Services Corp. , 222 F.Supp.3d 1038 , 1043 (D.N.M. 2016) (finding that "the express language of the [the Patient Safety Act] demonstrates Congressional intent to preempt" any state laws providing for less protection of documents that constitute patient safety work product); Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. | 1 | 1 |
University of Kentucky v. Bunnellgreen1 sentence2018See Bunnell , 532 S.W.3d at 665 (stating that the Patient Safety Act uses "the language of federal preemption"). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Performance Marketing Association, Inc. v. Hamer
green
2 sentences2018The language used in the Food Security Act is identical to that of the Patient Safety Act. ¶ 66 Despite our finding that the Patient Safety Act contains an express preemption clause, our inquiry does not end, as such language informs "us that Congress intended to supersede or modify state law to some extent, but courts must still deal with the task of determining the substance and scope of Congress' displacement of state law." Performance Marketing , 2013 IL 114496 , ¶ 51, 375 Ill.Dec. 762 , 998 N.E.2d 54 . 2018The language used in the Food Security Act is identical to that of the Patient Safety Act. ¶ 66 Despite our finding that the Patient Safety Act contains an express preemption clause, our inquiry does not end, as such language informs "us that Congress intended to supersede or modify state law to some extent, but courts must still deal with the task of determining the substance and scope of Congress' displacement of state law." Performance Marketing , 2013 IL 114496 , ¶ 51, 375 Ill.Dec. 762 , 998 N.E.2d 54 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterprises
green
2 sentences2018Additionally, in State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterprises, Inc. , 2012 IL App (3d) 100495 , 357 Ill.Dec. 925 , 964 N.E.2d 604 , aff'd , 2013 IL 113836 , 368 Ill.Dec. 503 , 984 N.E.2d 449 , we found an express preemption clause with similar wording. 2018There, this court determined that the federal Food Security Act of 1985 ( 7 U.S.C. § 1631 (d) (2006) ) contained "a clear expression of an intent to preempt state law" when the federal law used the language: " 'Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section and notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law * * *.' " (Emphasis in original.) Cherry , 2012 IL App (3d) 100495 , ¶¶ 14-16, 357 Ill.Dec. 925 , 964 N.E.2d 604 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 1631 (d) (2006) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State Bank of Cherry v. CGB ENTERPRISES
green
2 sentences2018Additionally, in State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterprises, Inc. , 2012 IL App (3d) 100495 , 357 Ill.Dec. 925 , 964 N.E.2d 604 , aff'd , 2013 IL 113836 , 368 Ill.Dec. 503 , 984 N.E.2d 449 , we found an express preemption clause with similar wording. 2018Additionally, in State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterprises, Inc. , 2012 IL App (3d) 100495 , 357 Ill.Dec. 925 , 964 N.E.2d 604 , aff'd , 2013 IL 113836 , 368 Ill.Dec. 503 , 984 N.E.2d 449 , we found an express preemption clause with similar wording. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterprises, Inc.
green
1 sentence2018Additionally, in State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterprises, Inc. , 2012 IL App (3d) 100495 , 357 Ill.Dec. 925 , 964 N.E.2d 604 , aff'd , 2013 IL 113836 , 368 Ill.Dec. 503 , 984 N.E.2d 449 , we found an express preemption clause with similar wording. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine
green
1 sentence2009Ed. 2d 466, 477 , 123 S. Ct. 518, 526 (2002) (rev’g on other grounds 197 Ill. 2d 112 (2001)), quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 , 123 L. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.