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12 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Miamisburg Train Derailment Litigationgreen2 sentences1994As this court acknowledged in In re Miamisburg, 68 Ohio St.3d at 262 , 626 N.E.2d at 91 , state tort claims can be within the preemptive reach of a federal statute in the appropriate situation, despite the presumption against preemption. {¶ 12} If a federal statute contains an express preemption clause, matters beyond the reach of the express clause are not preempted. 1994As this court acknowledged in In re Miamisburg, 68 Ohio St.3d at 262 , 626 N.E.2d at 91 , state tort claims can be within the preemptive reach of a federal statute in the appropriate situation, despite the presumption against preemption. {¶ 12} If a federal statute contains an express preemption clause, matters beyond the reach of the express clause are not preempted. | 2 | 3 |
Wilson v. Pleasantgreen2 sentences1997See Wilson, 660 N.E.2d at 334 ; Tebbetts, 140 N.H. at 207 , 665 A.2d at 348 ; Munroe, 938 P.2d at 1117 ; and Nelson v. Ford Motor Co. (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 158, 162 , 670 N.E.2d 307, 310 (“The express preemption clause, when read together with the savings clause, provides a ‘reliable indicium of congressional intent’ to preserve common-law 20 January Term, 1997 causes of action such as appellant’s.”). 1997See Wilson, 660 N.E.2d at 334 ; Tebbetts, 140 N.H. at 207 , 665 A.2d at 348 ; Munroe, 938 P.2d at 1117 ; and Nelson v. Ford Motor Co. (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 158, 162 , 670 N.E.2d 307, 310 (“The express preemption clause, when read together with the savings clause, provides a ‘reliable indicium of congressional intent’ to preserve common-law causes of action such as appellant’s.”). | 2 | 2 |
Nelson v. Ford Motor Co.green2 sentences1997See Wilson, 660 N.E.2d at 334 ; Tebbetts, 140 N.H. at 207 , 665 A.2d at 348 ; Munroe, 938 P.2d at 1117 ; and Nelson v. Ford Motor Co. (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 158, 162 , 670 N.E.2d 307, 310 (“The express preemption clause, when read together with the savings clause, provides a ‘reliable indicium of congressional intent’ to preserve common-law causes of action such as appellant’s.”). 1997See Wilson, 660 N.E.2d at 334 ; Tebbetts, 140 N.H. at 207 , 665 A.2d at 348 ; Munroe, 938 P.2d at 1117 ; and Nelson v. Ford Motor Co. (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 158, 162 , 670 N.E.2d 307, 310 (“The express preemption clause, when read together with the savings clause, provides a ‘reliable indicium of congressional intent’ to preserve common-law causes of action such as appellant’s.”). | 2 | 2 |
Jenkins v. James B. Day & Co.green2 sentences1997See, also, Jenkins, 69 Ohio St.3d at 545 , 634 N.E.2d at 1001 (“If a federal statute contains an express preemption clause, matters beyond the reach of the express clause are not preempted. * * * Since the FHSA [Federal Hazardous Substances Act, Section 1261 et seq., Title 15, U.S.Code] contains a preemption clause, we examine the text of that clause to determine if Congress intended for appellee’s claims to be preempted in the context of the FHSA.”). 1997See, also, Jenkins, 69 Ohio St.3d at 545 , 634 N.E.2d at 1001 (“If a federal statute contains an express preemption clause, matters beyond the reach of the express clause are not preempted. * * * Since the FHSA [Federal Hazardous Substances Act, Section 1261 et seq., Title 15, U.S.Code] contains a preemption clause, we examine the text of that clause to determine if Congress intended for appellee’s claims to be preempted in the context of the FHSA.”). | 2 | 2 |
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrickgreen2 sentences1997In Freightliner the court went to great lengths to dismiss as meritless the proposition that Cipollone obviates the need for implied conflict preemption analysis where an act includes an express preemption clause, stating that “[a]t best, Cipollone supports an inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied pre-emption; it does not establish a rule.” 514 U.S. at 289 , 115 S.Ct. at 1488 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 393 . 1997In Freightliner the court went to great lengths to dismiss as meritless the proposition that Cipollone obviates the need for implied conflict preemption analysis where an act includes an express preemption clause, stating that “[a]t best, Cipollone supports an inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied pre-emption; it does not establish a rule.” 514 U.S. at 289 , 115 S.Ct. at 1488 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 393 . | 1 | 2 |
Munroe v. Galatigreen2 sentences1997See Wilson, 660 N.E.2d at 334 ; Tebbetts, 140 N.H. at 207 , 665 A.2d at 348 ; Munroe, 938 P.2d at 1117 ; and Nelson v. Ford Motor Co. (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 158, 162 , 670 N.E.2d 307, 310 (“The express preemption clause, when read together with the savings clause, provides a ‘reliable indicium of congressional intent’ to preserve common-law 20 January Term, 1997 causes of action such as appellant’s.”). 1997See Wilson, 660 N.E.2d at 334 ; Tebbetts, 140 N.H. at 207 , 665 A.2d at 348 ; Munroe, 938 P.2d at 1117 ; and Nelson v. Ford Motor Co. (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 158, 162 , 670 N.E.2d 307, 310 (“The express preemption clause, when read together with the savings clause, provides a ‘reliable indicium of congressional intent’ to preserve common-law causes of action such as appellant’s.”). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Perrygreen2 sentences2002See State v. Perry , 83 Ohio St.3d at 44 , 697 N.E.2d 624 . 2002See State v. Perry , 83 Ohio St.3d at 44 , 697 N.E.2d 624 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997As the 1965 and 1969 provisions differ substantially, we consider each in turn.” Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 , 112 S.Ct. at 2618 , 120 L.Ed.2d at 423 . {¶ 32} Relying on Cipollone, we have concluded that if the federal legislation at issue contains an express preemption clause, there is no need to look beyond the text of that clause to determine the preemptive intent of Congress. 1997As the 1965 and 1969 provisions differ substantially, we consider each in turn.” Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 , 112 S.Ct. at 2618 , 120 L.Ed.2d at 423 . {¶ 32} Relying on Cipollone, we have concluded that if the federal legislation at issue contains an express preemption clause, there is no need to look beyond the text of that clause to determine the preemptive intent of Congress. | 5 | 1994–1997 |
Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co.
green
2 sentences1997See Wilson, 660 N.E.2d at 334 ; Tebbetts, 140 N.H. at 207 , 665 A.2d at 348 ; Munroe, 938 P.2d at 1117 ; and Nelson v. Ford Motor Co. (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 158, 162 , 670 N.E.2d 307, 310 (“The express preemption clause, when read together with the savings clause, provides a ‘reliable indicium of congressional intent’ to preserve common-law causes of action such as appellant’s.”). 1997See Wilson, 660 N.E.2d at 334 ; Tebbetts, 140 N.H. at 207 , 665 A.2d at 348 ; Munroe, 938 P.2d at 1117 ; and Nelson v. Ford Motor Co. (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 158, 162 , 670 N.E.2d 307, 310 (“The express preemption clause, when read together with the savings clause, provides a ‘reliable indicium of congressional intent’ to preserve common-law causes of action such as appellant’s.”). | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
green
2 sentences1997Finally, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996), 518 U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 2240 , 135 L.Ed.2d 700 , Justice Stevens, writing for a majority of the court, refused to go beyond the facts of that case and state that the express preemption clause under consideration foreclosed the possibility that any common-law actions would ever be preempted. 1997Finally, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996), 518 U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 2240 , 135 L.Ed.2d 700 , Justice Stevens, writing for a majority of the court, refused to go beyond the facts of that case and state that the express preemption clause under consideration foreclosed the possibility that any common-law actions would ever be preempted. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Cliff v. Payco General American Credits, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023Tipton v. Secretary of Education of the United States, 768 F.Supp. 540 (S.D.W.Va.1991), Keams v. Tempe Technical Institute, Inc., 39 F.3d 222 (9th Cir.1994), and Cliff v. Payco General American Credit, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir.2004), each predated the 2007 addition of the express preemption clause in subsection (o). 72 FR 62006 (Nov. 1, 2007) (adding subsection (o)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Grace Keams v. Tempe Technical Institute, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023Tipton v. Secretary of Education of the United States, 768 F.Supp. 540 (S.D.W.Va.1991), Keams v. Tempe Technical Institute, Inc., 39 F.3d 222 (9th Cir.1994), and Cliff v. Payco General American Credit, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir.2004), each predated the 2007 addition of the express preemption clause in subsection (o). 72 FR 62006 (Nov. 1, 2007) (adding subsection (o)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Tipton v. Secretary of Education of the United States
green
1 sentence2023Tipton v. Secretary of Education of the United States, 768 F.Supp. 540 (S.D.W.Va.1991), Keams v. Tempe Technical Institute, Inc., 39 F.3d 222 (9th Cir.1994), and Cliff v. Payco General American Credit, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir.2004), each predated the 2007 addition of the express preemption clause in subsection (o). 72 FR 62006 (Nov. 1, 2007) (adding subsection (o)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust
green
2 sentences2022Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 136 S.Ct. 1938 , 1946, 195 L.Ed.2d 298 (2016). 2022Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 136 S.Ct. 1938 , 1946, 195 L.Ed.2d 298 (2016). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Menorah Park Ctr. for Senior Living v. Rolston (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2021A “new motor vehicle engine” is defined similarly as “an engine in a new motor vehicle or a motor vehicle engine the equitable or legal title to which has never been transferred to the ultimate purchaser.” Id. {¶ 20} Congress has also helpfully defined the term “ultimate purchaser,” as it is used in 42 U.S.C. 7550(3), as “the first person who in good faith purchases such new motor vehicle or new engine for purposes other than resale.” 42 U.S.C. 7550(5). {¶ 21} Taken together, the plain text of the applicable statutes indicates that after a new motor vehicle or new motor-vehicle engine is first | 1 | 2021–2021 |
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance
green
2 sentences2014Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 , 115 S.Ct. 1671 , 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995). 2014Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 , 115 S.Ct. 1671 , 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good
green
2 sentences2011Even when there is an express preemption clause in a federal act, however, questions may still arise regarding “the substance and scope of Congress’ displacement of state law.” Id. 2011Second, Congress may impliedly preempt state law “if the scope of the [federal] statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy the legislative field, or if there is an actual conflict between state and federal law.” Id. {¶ 21} The Supreme Court of the United States has applied a presumption against preemption when the state legislation at issue relates to the “historic police powers of the States.” Altria Group, Inc. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that this presumption is applicable to “areas of law traditionally reserved to the states, like police powers and | 1 | 2011–2011 |
In the Matter Of: Thomas Cullen Davis Karen Joyce Davis, Debtors. Sandra Davis v. Thomas Cullen Davis
green
1 sentence2011Second, Congress may impliedly preempt state law “if the scope of the [federal] statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy the legislative field, or if there is an actual conflict between state and federal law.” Id. {¶ 21} The Supreme Court of the United States has applied a presumption against preemption when the state legislation at issue relates to the “historic police powers of the States.” Altria Group, Inc. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that this presumption is applicable to “areas of law traditionally reserved to the states, like police powers and | 1 | 2011–2011 |
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood
green
2 sentences1994“If the statute contains an express preemption clause, the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” Easterwood , 507 U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 1737 , 123 L.Ed.2d at 396 . 1994“If the statute contains an express preemption clause, the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” Easterwood , 507 U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 1737 , 123 L.Ed.2d at 396 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.