investigatory inquiry in New York

2012The defendant’s first statement, denominated as Statement No. 1 by the Supreme Court, was made by the defendant in response to a police officer’s investigatory inquiry, and was not the result of custodial interrogation, since a reasonable person in the defendant’s position, innocent of any criminal wrongdoing, would not have believed that he or she was in police custody at the time he or she made the statement (see People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]).

2012The defendant’s first statement, denominated as Statement No. 1 by the Supreme Court, was made by the defendant in response to a police officer’s investigatory inquiry, and was not the result of custodial interrogation, since a reasonable person in the defendant’s position, innocent of any criminal wrongdoing, would not have believed that he or she was in police custody at the time he or she made the statement (see People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]).

2012The defendant’s first statement, denominated as Statement No. 1 by the Supreme Court, was made by the defendant in response to a police officer’s investigatory inquiry, and was not the result of custodial interrogation, since a reasonable person in the defendant’s position, innocent of any criminal wrongdoing, would not have believed that he or she was in police custody at the time he or she made the statement (see People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]).

2012The defendant’s first statement, denominated as Statement No. 1 by the Supreme Court, was made by the defendant in response to a police officer’s investigatory inquiry, and was not the result of custodial interrogation, since a reasonable person in the defendant’s position, innocent of any criminal wrongdoing, would not have believed that he or she was in police custody at the time he or she made the statement (see People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]).

1993In Elliot (supra), the Second Department cited People v Howard (supra) and People v Leung (supra) and stated that pursuit of an individual approached for an investigatory inquiry is justified only upon a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or will be committed.

1990The pursuit of a person who flees after first being approached by the police for purposes of an investigatory inquiry, as here, is justified only when reasonable suspicion exists that the person has committed or was about to commit a crime (People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 592 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ; see also, People v Leung, 68 NY2d 734, 736 ; People v Terracciano, 135 AD2d 849 ).

2024While it is true that in Burns v. Reed, 500 US 478 (1991) and Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 US 259 (1993), the United States Supreme Court recognized that prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity when performing investigatory functions or providing legal advice during the pre- prosecution phase, Plaintiffs allegations here do not demonstrate that the ADA Defendants were acting in an investigatory capacity.

2024While it is true that in Burns v. Reed, 500 US 478 (1991) and Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 US 259 (1993), the United States Supreme Court recognized that prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity when performing investigatory functions or providing legal advice during the pre- prosecution phase, Plaintiffs allegations here do not demonstrate that the ADA Defendants were acting in an investigatory capacity.

2014Contrary to the People’s contention, the defendant’s challenge to the County Court’s Sandoval ruling (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974]) is preserved for appellate review, as “[t]he law does not require litigants to make repeated pointless protests after the court has made its position clear” (People v Mezon, 80 NY2d 155, 161 [1992]).

2010(People v Jenkins, 208 AD2d 459 , 460 [1st Dept 1994].) After the arrest, a police officer must administer the Miranda warnings prior to interrogating defendant.

2010(People v Williams, 287 AD2d 396 [1st Dept 2001]; People v Duncan, 234 AD2d 8, 9 [1st Dept 1996].) During a frisk, an officer may make an investigatory inquiry without administering Miranda warnings, when the purpose of such questioning is not to elicit incriminating statements but to ensure the officer’s safety.

2003Appellant was never restrained and was allowed to return to his classes following the investigatory inquiry (see Doe v Bagan, 41 F3d 571 , 574 n 3 [principal’s office interview not custodial]).

2003The principal’s office setting was not an additional restraint beyond the ordinary condition of a high school student, who is not literally “free to leave” without permission during school hours (cf. People v Alls, 83 NY2d 94 , cert denied 511 US 1090 ).

2003The principal’s office setting was not an additional restraint beyond the ordinary condition of a high school student, who is not literally “free to leave” without permission during school hours (cf. People v Alls, 83 NY2d 94 , cert denied 511 US 1090 ).

2001She was not, as a matter of law, in custody at the time and therefore Miranda warnings were not required (People v Bennett, 70 NY2d 891 ).

1993In Elliot (supra), the Second Department cited People v Howard (supra) and People v Leung (supra) and stated that pursuit of an individual approached for an investigatory inquiry is justified only upon a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or will be committed.

1992In finding that defendant was "in custody”, County Court seemingly placed great reliance upon People v Tanner ( 31 AD2d 148 ).

1990The pursuit of a person who flees after first being approached by the police for purposes of an investigatory inquiry, as here, is justified only when reasonable suspicion exists that the person has committed or was about to commit a crime (People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 592 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ; see also, People v Leung, 68 NY2d 734, 736 ; People v Terracciano, 135 AD2d 849 ).

1990The pursuit of a person who flees after first being approached by the police for purposes of an investigatory inquiry, as here, is justified only when reasonable suspicion exists that the person has committed or was about to commit a crime (People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 592 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ; see also, People v Leung, 68 NY2d 734, 736 ; People v Terracciano, 135 AD2d 849 ).