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10 Ohio opinions name it 1 courts 2003–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blakemore v. Blakemoregreen1 sentence2020Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). {¶25} Prior to trial, the trial court heard arguments on Sutton’s motion in limine requesting the exclusion of any evidence that he had consumed alcohol on the date of the incident. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Millergreen1 sentence2020Clermont No. CA2016-08-057, 2017-Ohio-2801, ¶ 20 (appellant's claims alleging his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered were barred by the doctrine of res judicata where appellant did not raise the issue in a direct appeal). {¶ 10} So, too, is Sutton's claim in his fourth assignment of error alleging he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. | 1 | 1 |
Lorain Natl. Bank v. Cornagreen1 sentence2018Lorain No. 13CA010472, 2015-Ohio-432, ¶ 7 (discussing the distinction between a common law motion to vacate a void judgment and a Civ.R. 60(B) motion.) Nevertheless, we need not address the issue of whether Ms. Sutton’s motion presented the trial court with proper grounds to consider vacating the default judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Unklesbay v. Fenwickgreen2 sentences2014Summit No. 23501, 2007-Ohio- 3245, this Court adopted the position that, since the purpose of Rule 37(E) is to endorse the self-regulating aspect of discovery and to require court intervention only as a last resort[,] * * * ‘once a trial court has gone to the trouble of conducting a hearing on a motion and issuing a decision resolving the parties’ dispute, * * * we see no useful purpose in invoking Civ.R. 37(E)—which is intended to benefit the trial court—to reverse its judgment and force the court to begin its work again * * *.’ Id. at ¶ 7, quoting Unklesbay v. Fenwick, 167 Ohio App.3d 408 , 2014Summit No. 23501, 2007-Ohio- 3245, this Court adopted the position that, since the purpose of Rule 37(E) is to endorse the self-regulating aspect of discovery and to require court intervention only as a last resort[,] * * * ‘once a trial court has gone to the trouble of conducting a hearing on a motion and issuing a decision resolving the parties’ dispute, * * * we see no useful purpose in invoking Civ.R. 37(E)—which is intended to benefit the trial court—to reverse its judgment and force the court to begin its work again * * *.’ Id. at ¶ 7, quoting Unklesbay v. Fenwick, 167 Ohio App.3d 408 , | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Sutton
green
1 sentence2024Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Porterfield
green
2 sentences2020CA2014-02- 002, CA2014-02-003, CA2014-03-006, and CA2014-03-007, 2015-Ohio-574 , ¶ 34, citing State v. Porterfield, 106 Ohio St.3d 5 , 2005-Ohio-3095 , ¶ 25. {¶ 16} The same is true as it relates to Sutton's claim raised in his third assignment of error alleging the trial court's decision to sentence him to the parties' agreed upon 59- month prison sentence was not supported by the record. 2020CA2014-02- 002, CA2014-02-003, CA2014-03-006, and CA2014-03-007, 2015-Ohio-574 , ¶ 34, citing State v. Porterfield, 106 Ohio St.3d 5 , 2005-Ohio-3095 , ¶ 25. {¶ 16} The same is true as it relates to Sutton's claim raised in his third assignment of error alleging the trial court's decision to sentence him to the parties' agreed upon 59- month prison sentence was not supported by the record. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Chuck Oeder Inc. v. Bower, Unpublished Decision (12-28-2007)
neutral
1 sentence2018“Rather, [s]he relied upon h[er] alleged meritorious defense [and the resulting consequences of the judgment] to assert that the grant of default judgment should be vacated in the interests of justice.” Chuck Oeder Inc, 2007-Ohio-7032, ¶ 11 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Russo v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
green
1 sentence2014Id. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Sutton v. Jondahl
green
1 sentence2011The first approach is the rule established in Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478 , 1975 OK.Civ.App. 2, commonly referred to as the “Sutton rule,” which holds that a lessor’s insurer is not entitled to seek subrogation against a lessee even when the lessee’s negligence has caused a fire that damages the lessor’s property, because the lessor and lessee are deemed to be “implied co-insureds” under the landlord’s fire-insurance policy. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Raimonde v. Van Vlerah
green
2 sentences2009As explained below in our resolution of the fourth assignment of error, we reject this argument with respect to Sheaffer’s claim. {¶ 43} Sutton’s motion for summary judgment on Hidy’s complaint argued that the noncompetition agreement was not enforceable based on the factors set forth in Raimonde v. Van Vlerah (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 21 , 71 O.O.2d 12 , 325 N.E.2d 544 . 2009As explained below in our resolution of the fourth assignment of error, we reject this argument with respect to Sheaffer’s claim. {¶ 43} Sutton’s motion for summary judgment on Hidy’s complaint argued that the noncompetition agreement was not enforceable based on the factors set forth in Raimonde v. Van Vlerah (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 21 , 71 O.O.2d 12 , 325 N.E.2d 544 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Sutton v. Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy
neutral
1 sentence2008Sutton v. Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy , 97 Ohio St.3d 1414 , 2002-Ohio-5601 . {¶ 8} In January of 2004, counsel for Sutton initiated contact with the Board regarding the licensure reinstatement process. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
In re Adoption of Ridenour
green
2 sentences2003However, the juvenile court’s order contains no such language. * * *” In re Adoption of Ridenour (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 319, 328-329 , 574 N.E.2d 1055 . {¶ 6} In this case, the basis for Sutton’s motion to intervene was the domestic relations court order that granted her visitation rights with Taylor. 2003However, the juvenile court’s order contains no such language. * * *” In re Adoption of Ridenour (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 319, 328-329 , 574 N.E.2d 1055 . {¶ 6} In this case, the basis for Sutton’s motion to intervene was the domestic relations court order that granted her visitation rights with Taylor. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Amato v. Mercury Casualty Co.
green
1 sentence2003Sutton's claim depends on the contract terms of the coverage provisions of the insurance policy, whereas Amato's claims is based on the application of the judicially expanded duty to defend. * * *" Id. at 839 . {¶ 61} Here, plaintiff's claims of bodily and personal injury arising from an accident involving a Westglen manufactured meat-grinder were not timely reported to Admiral as required by the unambiguous terms of the insurance policy. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.