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9 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 2013–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Browngreen1 sentence2025See State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-7701, ¶ 38-42 (7th Dist.) (where the State did not disclose a video to defense counsel until during the trial and the trial court granted the defendant’s request for a mistrial, the appellate -20- court found no Brady violation and the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2025“When a defendant refuses to leave his or her cell to attend a court proceeding, the defendant is considered voluntarily absent.” State v. Harris, 2023-Ohio-3271, ¶ 37 (2d Dist.), citing Grate at ¶ 85 (“Grate voluntarily made himself absent from the hearing by refusing to leave his cell and attend the video hearing.”); State v. Logan, 1988 Ohio 21 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS App. LEXIS 1533, *4 (10th Dist. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Grate (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2023See Grate, 164 Ohio St.3d 9 , 2020-Ohio-5584 , 172 N.E.3d 8, at ¶ 85 (“Grate voluntarily made himself absent from the hearing by refusing to leave his cell and attend the video hearing.”). {¶ 38} In general, defense counsel’s failure to object to a defendant’s absence results in a waiver of the Crim.R. 43 error, and we review the matter for plain error. 2023See Grate, 164 Ohio St.3d 9 , 2020-Ohio-5584 , 172 N.E.3d 8, at ¶ 85 (“Grate voluntarily made himself absent from the hearing by refusing to leave his cell and attend the video hearing.”). {¶ 38} In general, defense counsel’s failure to object to a defendant’s absence results in a waiver of the Crim.R. 43 error, and we review the matter for plain error. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Herrongreen1 sentence2020Montgomery No. 27910, 2019-Ohio-4180, ¶ 15 (any error in resentencing defendant on post-release control via a video hearing was harmless). {¶ 27} In this case, the resentencing hearing was conducted for the limited purposes of imposing post-release control, and the parties agreed that post-release control was not proper on the felonious assault and murder charges. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Terry v. Caputo
green
2 sentences2020Defense counsel stated that Grate could undergo an MRI at the Cleveland Clinic within 24 hours. {¶ 92} Before authorizing additional funding, the trial court ordered a video hearing “to determine whether the testing and analysis proposed by Mindset * * * meets the necessary reliability standards of Daubert and Evid.R. 702.” See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (under Fed.R.Evid. 702, “the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable”); 22 January Ter 2020Defense counsel stated that Grate could undergo an MRI at the Cleveland Clinic within 24 hours. {¶ 92} Before authorizing additional funding, the trial court ordered a video hearing “to determine whether the testing and analysis proposed by Mindset * * * meets the necessary reliability standards of Daubert and Evid.R. 702.” See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (under Fed.R.Evid. 702, “the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable”); 22 January Ter | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020Defense counsel stated that Grate could undergo an MRI at the Cleveland Clinic within 24 hours. {¶ 92} Before authorizing additional funding, the trial court ordered a video hearing “to determine whether the testing and analysis proposed by Mindset * * * meets the necessary reliability standards of Daubert and Evid.R. 702.” See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (under Fed.R.Evid. 702, “the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable”); 22 January Ter 2020Defense counsel stated that Grate could undergo an MRI at the Cleveland Clinic within 24 hours. {¶ 92} Before authorizing additional funding, the trial court ordered a video hearing “to determine whether the testing and analysis proposed by Mindset * * * meets the necessary reliability standards of Daubert and Evid.R. 702.” See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (under Fed.R.Evid. 702, “the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable”); 22 January Ter | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2018Rather, for the evidence to be sufficient to support aggravated murder, there has to be some evidence of premeditation or a plan ahead of time to purposely kill someone. {¶36} The Ohio Supreme Court has emphasized that there is “no bright-line test that emphatically distinguishes between the presence or absence of ‘prior calculation and design.’ Instead, each case turns on the particular facts and evidence presented at trial.” State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2014-Ohio-1019 , 9 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 148 ; State v. Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354 , 2003-Ohio-1325 , 785 N.E.2d 439, ¶ 61 ; State v. Taylor 2018Rather, for the evidence to be sufficient to support aggravated murder, there has to be some evidence of premeditation or a plan ahead of time to purposely kill someone. {¶36} The Ohio Supreme Court has emphasized that there is “no bright-line test that emphatically distinguishes between the presence or absence of ‘prior calculation and design.’ Instead, each case turns on the particular facts and evidence presented at trial.” State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2014-Ohio-1019 , 9 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 148 ; State v. Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354 , 2003-Ohio-1325 , 785 N.E.2d 439, ¶ 61 ; State v. Taylor | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Braden
green
2 sentences2018Rather, for the evidence to be sufficient to support aggravated murder, there has to be some evidence of premeditation or a plan ahead of time to purposely kill someone. {¶36} The Ohio Supreme Court has emphasized that there is “no bright-line test that emphatically distinguishes between the presence or absence of ‘prior calculation and design.’ Instead, each case turns on the particular facts and evidence presented at trial.” State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2014-Ohio-1019 , 9 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 148 ; State v. Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354 , 2003-Ohio-1325 , 785 N.E.2d 439, ¶ 61 ; State v. Taylor 2018Rather, for the evidence to be sufficient to support aggravated murder, there has to be some evidence of premeditation or a plan ahead of time to purposely kill someone. {¶36} The Ohio Supreme Court has emphasized that there is “no bright-line test that emphatically distinguishes between the presence or absence of ‘prior calculation and design.’ Instead, each case turns on the particular facts and evidence presented at trial.” State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2014-Ohio-1019 , 9 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 148 ; State v. Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354 , 2003-Ohio-1325 , 785 N.E.2d 439, ¶ 61 ; State v. Taylor | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Maxwell
green
2 sentences2018Rather, for the evidence to be sufficient to support aggravated murder, there has to be some evidence of premeditation or a plan ahead of time to purposely kill someone. {¶36} The Ohio Supreme Court has emphasized that there is “no bright-line test that emphatically distinguishes between the presence or absence of ‘prior calculation and design.’ Instead, each case turns on the particular facts and evidence presented at trial.” State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2014-Ohio-1019 , 9 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 148 ; State v. Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354 , 2003-Ohio-1325 , 785 N.E.2d 439, ¶ 61 ; State v. Taylor 2018Rather, for the evidence to be sufficient to support aggravated murder, there has to be some evidence of premeditation or a plan ahead of time to purposely kill someone. {¶36} The Ohio Supreme Court has emphasized that there is “no bright-line test that emphatically distinguishes between the presence or absence of ‘prior calculation and design.’ Instead, each case turns on the particular facts and evidence presented at trial.” State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2014-Ohio-1019 , 9 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 148 ; State v. Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354 , 2003-Ohio-1325 , 785 N.E.2d 439, ¶ 61 ; State v. Taylor | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Cole
neutral
1 sentence2018Montgomery No. 26576, 2015-Ohio-5295, ¶ 32 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Roughton
green
2 sentences2017The Sixth District aptly summed up this situation: "While we find the repeated failure to make full, timely disclosure of evidence deplorable, we cannot conclude that the purpose behind the behavior was a desire to force a mistrial." State v. Roughton , 132 Ohio App.3d 268 , 278, 724 N.E.2d 1193 (6th Dist.1999). {¶ 35} Because the evidence does not demonstrate that appellant was goaded into requesting a mistrial by an alleged "intentional act of deception" on the part of the state, appellant's re-trial is not barred on double jeopardy grounds. {¶ 36} Accordingly, appellant's second assignment 2017The Sixth District aptly summed up this situation: "While we find the repeated failure to make full, timely disclosure of evidence deplorable, we cannot conclude that the purpose behind the behavior was a desire to force a mistrial." State v. Roughton , 132 Ohio App.3d 268 , 278, 724 N.E.2d 1193 (6th Dist.1999). {¶ 35} Because the evidence does not demonstrate that appellant was goaded into requesting a mistrial by an alleged "intentional act of deception" on the part of the state, appellant's re-trial is not barred on double jeopardy grounds. {¶ 36} Accordingly, appellant's second assignment | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. LaMar
green
2 sentences2013The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." (Internal citations omitted.) State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128, ¶ 27 , quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-434 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 (1995). {¶ 41} After reviewing the record, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Vore's request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, or that the state did an 2013The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." (Internal citations omitted.) State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128, ¶ 27 , quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-434 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 (1995). {¶ 41} After reviewing the record, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Vore's request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, or that the state did an | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Kyles v. Whitley
green
2 sentences2013The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." (Internal citations omitted.) State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128, ¶ 27 , quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-434 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 (1995). {¶ 41} After reviewing the record, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Vore's request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, or that the state did an 2013The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." (Internal citations omitted.) State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128, ¶ 27 , quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-434 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 (1995). {¶ 41} After reviewing the record, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Vore's request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, or that the state did an | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.