future youth offender parole hearing in California

2026A Franklin hearing exists solely to preserve evidence for a future youth offender parole hearing. ( Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 451-455.) Arteaga, having committed his crime at age 18 and sentenced to LWOP, is unambiguously excluded from section 3051 relief and thus ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing. (§ 3051, subd. (h).) Indeed, in a motion for a Franklin hearing, an inmate is required to establish entitlement to a youthful parole hearing, however, Arteaga was unable to do so because he is ineligible as a matter of law.

2026(See People v. Stathum (May 29, 2025, B333909) [nonpub. opn.].) 2 In October 2022, Stathum filed a motion to initiate a proceeding under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) and In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook), seeking to make a record of information relevant to a future youth offender parole hearing.

2026Nearly three decades later, Stathum filed a request to initiate a proceeding under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 , seeking to make a record of information relevant to a future youth offender parole hearing.

2026(See People v. Stathum (May 29, 2025, B333909) [nonpub. opn.].) 2 In October 2022, Stathum filed a motion to initiate a proceeding under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) and In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook), seeking to make a record of information relevant to a future youth offender parole hearing.

2021(Cf. In re Cortez (1971) 6 Cal.3d 78, 87 [“an effective presentation of the merits of the petition [to strike a prior conviction] depends . . . upon his having the assistance of counsel to fashion facts and arguments into a persuasive appeal to the court”].) Merely allowing an incarcerated defendant to submit documentation he or she believes might be relevant at a future youth offender parole hearing is far short of the remedy contemplated under Franklin. 13 DISPOSITION The postjudgment order is reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court to conduct a Franklin proceeding as soon as pos

2021(Cf. In re Cortez (1971) 6 Cal.3d 78, 87 [“an effective presentation of the merits of the petition [to strike a prior conviction] depends . . . upon his having the assistance of counsel to fashion facts and arguments into a persuasive appeal to the court”].) Merely allowing an incarcerated defendant to submit documentation he or she believes might be relevant at a future youth offender parole hearing is far short of the remedy contemplated under Franklin. 13 DISPOSITION The postjudgment order is reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court to conduct a Franklin proceeding as soon as pos

2022(See People v. Woods (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1080, 1088-1089 [ “unlike the defendant in Franklin, defendant had both the opportunity and incentive to put information on the record related to a future youth offender parole hearing”].) And for this same reason, 49 Indeed, two days before sentencing, Roman’s counsel was present at a hearing where Ruslan’s counsel cited section 3051 to the trial court: “Based on the way the laws have been evolving regarding youthful offenders, and 3051 in particular allows for parole on youthful people that were sentenced before they were to turn 23 . . . .” 67 Roma

2021(Woods, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1088 ; In re Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 432.) “Thus unlike the defendant in Franklin, defendant had both the opportunity and incentive to put information on the 6 record related to a future youth offender parole hearing.” ( Woods, supra, at pp. 1088- 1089.) And, as the People note, an opinion in defendant’s first appeal was not issued until July 16, 2019.

2021“Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable basis for concluding, as defendant argues, that defendant was denied a sufficient opportunity to put on the record the kinds of information that . . . sections 3051 and 4801, subdivision (c) deem relevant at a youth offender parole hearing.” (People v. Woods, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1088-1089, italics added; accord, People v. Medrano (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 961 , 963; cf. People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123, 1131-1132 ; In re Loza (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 797, 807 ; People v. Jones (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 787, 819 .) Defendant says nothing

2020“Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable basis for concluding, as defendant argues, that defendant was denied a sufficient opportunity to put on the record the kinds of information that . . . sections 3051 and 4801, subdivision (c) deem relevant at a youth offender parole hearing.” (People v. Woods, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1088-1090, italics added; accord, People v. Medrano (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 961 , 963; cf. People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123, 1131-1132 ; In re Loza (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 797, 807 ; People v. Jones (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 787, 819 .) That we find no reason

2021(See In re Loza (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 797, 807 [remanding for a Franklin hearing where a defendant’s “sentencing took place well before” Franklin]; Lipptrapp, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 897 [ordering the trial court to conduct a Franklin proceeding where the defendant “ha[d] been incarcerated for over 20 years and he was eligible for the hearing several years before he filed the motion”].) Defendant was convicted in 1990 and was not eligible for a youthful offender parole hearing until 2016.

2021“Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable basis for concluding, as defendant argues, that defendant was denied a sufficient opportunity to put on the record the kinds of information that . . . sections 3051 and 4801, subdivision (c) deem relevant at a youth offender parole hearing.” (People v. Woods, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1088-1089, italics added; accord, People v. Medrano (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 961 , 963; cf. People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123, 1131-1132 ; In re Loza (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 797, 807 ; People v. Jones (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 787, 819 .) Defendant says nothing

2024(People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425 [“the full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior resentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant”] accord, People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“‘the full resentencing rule’”].) 33. street gang” and thus a “prerequisite to proving the gang crime and the gang enhancement.” (See § 186.22, subds. (a), (b)(1); People v. Rodriguez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 816 , 823.) “ ‘The offenses comprising a pattern of criminal gang activity are referred to as predicate offenses.’ ” (Rodriguez, supra, at p. 822.) At the time of defenda

2024(People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425 [“the full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior resentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant”] accord, People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“‘the full resentencing rule’”].) 33. street gang” and thus a “prerequisite to proving the gang crime and the gang enhancement.” (See § 186.22, subds. (a), (b)(1); People v. Rodriguez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 816 , 823.) “ ‘The offenses comprising a pattern of criminal gang activity are referred to as predicate offenses.’ ” (Rodriguez, supra, at p. 822.) At the time of defenda

2021Code, §§ 3051, 4801, subd (c); see People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 , 283–284). 8 We initially granted the People’s petitions for review in these cases and held them for People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1 (Perez), which concluded a defendant’s failure to object did not forfeit a Sanchez claim in a case predating that decision.

2019(People v. Jones (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 787, 819 [“Franklin made clear that the sentencing hearing has newfound import in providing the juvenile with an opportunity to place on the record the kinds of information that ‘will be relevant to the [parole board] as it fulfills its statutory obligations’”]; see People v. Tran (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 561, 570 .) We simply cannot assume defense counsel at a sentencing hearing that preceded Franklin anticipated the extent to which evidence of youth-related factors was a critical component of the hearing.