State relies principle in Oregon

2024The state also argues that trial courts have broad discretion to impose necessary security measures, and “[g]enerally, we do not second guess a trial court’s assessment of its security needs.” State v. Perez, 325 Or App 64, 69 , 528 P3d 318 (2023) (citing State v. Moore, 45 Or App 837, 840 , 609 P2d 866 (1980)).

2024The state also argues that trial courts have broad discretion to impose necessary security measures, and “[g]enerally, we do not second guess a trial court’s assessment of its security needs.” State v. Perez, 325 Or App 64, 69 , 528 P3d 318 (2023) (citing State v. Moore, 45 Or App 837, 840 , 609 P2d 866 (1980)).

2024The state also argues that trial courts have broad discretion to impose necessary security measures, and “[g]enerally, we do not second guess a trial court’s assessment of its security needs.” State v. Perez, 325 Or App 64, 69 , 528 P3d 318 (2023) (citing State v. Moore, 45 Or App 837, 840 , 609 P2d 866 (1980)).

2024The state also argues that trial courts have broad discretion to impose necessary security measures, and “[g]enerally, we do not second guess a trial court’s assessment of its security needs.” State v. Perez, 325 Or App 64, 69 , 528 P3d 318 (2023) (citing State v. Moore, 45 Or App 837, 840 , 609 P2d 866 (1980)).

2016The state nonetheless contends that defendant’s consent was broad solely because it was “unqualified.” The state relies on the principle that “[w]hen a request to search contains no limitations and a defendant places no limitation on the search, the scope of the allowable search may be fairly broad.” Allen, 112 Or App at 74 ; see also State v. Charlesworth/Parks, 151 Or App 100, 114-15 , 951 P2d 153 (1997), rev den, 327 Or 82 (1998) (same); State v. Allen, 104 Or App 519 , 802 P2d 91 (1990), rev den, 311 Or 261 (1991) (defendant’s grant of consent to search her purse allowed the officer to sea

2016The state nonetheless contends that defendant’s consent was broad solely because it was “unqualified.” The state relies on the principle that “[w]hen a request to search contains no limitations and a defendant places no limitation on the search, the scope of the allowable search may be fairly broad.” Allen, 112 Or App at 74 ; see also State v. Charlesworth/Parks, 151 Or App 100, 114-15 , 951 P2d 153 (1997), rev den, 327 Or 82 (1998) (same); State v. Allen, 104 Or App 519 , 802 P2d 91 (1990), rev den, 311 Or 261 (1991) (defendant’s grant of consent to search her purse allowed the officer to sea

2016The state nonetheless contends that defendant’s consent was broad solely because it was “unqualified.” The state relies on the principle that “[w]hen a request to search contains no limitations and a defendant places no limitation on the search, the scope of the allowable search may be fairly broad.” Allen, 112 Or App at 74 ; see also State v. Charlesworth/Parks, 151 Or App 100, 114-15 , 951 P2d 153 (1997), rev den, 327 Or 82 (1998) (same); State v. Allen, 104 Or App 519 , 802 P2d 91 (1990), rev den, 311 Or 261 (1991) (defendant’s grant of consent to search her purse allowed the officer to sea

2016But, as earlier noted, the scope of a consent is determined not just by the “specific words” of the request and the consent, but also the “overall character of the interchange between the officer and the defendant.” Lamoreux, 271 Or App at 761 .

2015The state relies on the principle that the analogous statute of limitations for an action at law may be used to establish a presumptively reasonable period in which the plaintiff must bring a claim, and that, when that period has expired, “there is a rebuttable presumption that the elements of laches have been sufficiently proven.” Fontana, 145 Or App at 232 ; see also Eichner v. Anderson, 229 Or App 495, 499 , 212 P3d 521 , rev den, 347 Or 258 (2009) (“When an action is commenced after the analogous statute of limitations period has run, the plaintiff bears the burden to prove the absence of

2014The state relies on the rule that a resident impliedly consents to members of the public going to his or her front door, so long as the resident has not “manifested an intent to forbid the intrusion of casual visitors onto the property.” State v. Cam, 255 Or App 1, 6 , 296 P3d 578 , modified on recons, 256 Or App 146 , 300 P3d 208 , rev den, 354 Or 148 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2014The state relies on the rule that a resident impliedly consents to members of the public going to his or her front door, so long as the resident has not “manifested an intent to forbid the intrusion of casual visitors onto the property.” State v. Cam, 255 Or App 1, 6 , 296 P3d 578 , modified on recons, 256 Or App 146 , 300 P3d 208 , rev den, 354 Or 148 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2014The state relies on the rule that a resident impliedly consents to members of the public going to his or her front door, so long as the resident has not “manifested an intent to forbid the intrusion of casual visitors onto the property.” State v. Cam, 255 Or App 1, 6 , 296 P3d 578 , modified on recons, 256 Or App 146 , 300 P3d 208 , rev den, 354 Or 148 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2014The state relies on the rule that a resident impliedly consents to members of the public going to his or her front door, so long as the resident has not “manifested an intent to forbid the intrusion of casual visitors onto the property.” State v. Cam, 255 Or App 1, 6 , 296 P3d 578 , modified on recons, 256 Or App 146 , 300 P3d 208 , rev den, 354 Or 148 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2014According to the state, “defendant’s unilateral, voluntary decision to lie about his identity attenuated the ‘discovery’ of the evidence from the prior illegality.” The state also argues, for the first time on appeal, that defendant’s statements are admissible because they are evidence of a “new independent crime — providing false information to a police officer.” As support for that argument, the state relies on an exception to the exclusionary rule that applies to evidence of “independent crimes directed at officers who illegally stop, frisk, arrest or search,” State v. Gaffney, 36 Or App 10

2014According to the state, “defendant’s unilateral, voluntary decision to lie about his identity attenuated the ‘discovery’ of the evidence from the prior illegality.” The state also argues, for the first time on appeal, that defendant’s statements are admissible because they are evidence of a “new independent crime — providing false information to a police officer.” As support for that argument, the state relies on an exception to the exclusionary rule that applies to evidence of “independent crimes directed at officers who illegally stop, frisk, arrest or search,” State v. Gaffney, 36 Or App 10

2013Specifically, the state relies on the analysis in State v. Pachmayr, 344 Or 482, 494-95 , 185 P3d 1103 (2008), to argue that defendant was not “deprived of a defense” when the defense is merely that the state failed to prove all of the allegations of the original indictment.

2013Specifically, the state relies on the analysis in State v. Pachmayr, 344 Or 482, 494-95 , 185 P3d 1103 (2008), to argue that defendant was not “deprived of a defense” when the defense is merely that the state failed to prove all of the allegations of the original indictment.

2008When the state relies on the exception to justify entry into a home, “the state must make a strong showing that exceptional emergency circumstances truly existed.” State v. Miller, 300 Or 203, 229 , 709 P2d 225 (1985), cert den, 475 US 1141 (1986).

2008When the state relies on the exception to justify entry into a home, “the state must make a strong showing that exceptional emergency circumstances truly existed.” State v. Miller, 300 Or 203, 229 , 709 P2d 225 (1985), cert den, 475 US 1141 (1986).

2008When the state relies on the exception to justify entry into a home, “the state must make a strong showing that exceptional emergency circumstances truly existed.” State v. Miller, 300 Or 203, 229 , 709 P2d 225 (1985), cert den, 475 US 1141 (1986).

2005In particular, the state relies on the rule in State v. Jury, 185 Or App 132 , 57 P3d 970 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 504 (2003), which held that a later decision by an appellate court can be the basis for determining that error apparent on the face of the record occurred in a trial court.

2005In particular, the state relies on the rule in State v. Jury, 185 Or App 132 , 57 P3d 970 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 504 (2003), which held that a later decision by an appellate court can be the basis for determining that error apparent on the face of the record occurred in a trial court.

1998The state relies on our analysis in Brown: “ ‘It is well established that when evidence is offered as a whole and an objection is made to the evidence as a whole and is overruled, the trial court will ordinarily not be reversed on appeal if any portion of the offered evidence was properly admissible, despite the fact that other portions would not have been admissible had proper objections been made to such portions of the offered evidence.’ Sproul v. Fossi, 274 Or 749, 755 , 548 P2d 970 (1976) (citations omitted).” 310 Or at 359. *414 David Wall’s testimony during the guilt phase of the trial—

1998The state relies on our analysis in Brown: “ ‘It is well established that when evidence is offered as a whole and an objection is made to the evidence as a whole and is overruled, the trial court will ordinarily not be reversed on appeal if any portion of the offered evidence was properly admissible, despite the fact that other portions would not have been admissible had proper objections been made to such portions of the offered evidence.’ Sproul v. Fossi, 274 Or 749, 755 , 548 P2d 970 (1976) (citations omitted).” 310 Or at 359. *414 David Wall’s testimony during the guilt phase of the trial—

1998In support of both propositions, the state relies on our analysis in State v. Pirouzkar, 98 Or App 741 , 780 P2d 802 , rev den 309 Or 333 (1989).

1998In support of both propositions, the state relies on our analysis in State v. Pirouzkar, 98 Or App 741 , 780 P2d 802 , rev den 309 Or 333 (1989).