interstate commerce clause in Pennsylvania

2020It authorizes a WCJ to modify, reinstate, suspend or terminate compensation “at any time,” subject to the following provision: That, except in the case of eye injuries, no notice of compensation payable, agreement or award shall be reviewed, or modified, or reinstated, unless a petition is filed with the 11 In PPG Industries, Inc. v. Board of Finance and Revenue, 790 A.2d 261 (Pa. 2001), our Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise tax violated the interstate commerce clause because it gave preferential treatment to in-state companies.

2020The Supreme Court ordered retroactive relief to PPG and extended its ruling to “any pending appeals by any other taxpayers regarding this issue.” Id. at 269 n.12.

2019For example, in United States v. Shambry , 392 F.3d 631 (3rd Cir. 2004), the court opined, "To the extent that both parties and the District Court agree that we have never addressed the precise issue of whether proof that the firearm was manufactured in a state other than the state where possession occurred is sufficient to establish that the possession was 'in or affecting commerce' under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1), we conclude, like the overwhelming majority of our sister courts of appeals, that such proof meets the minimal nexus required to establish that the firearm affected interstate commerc

1999As the court noted in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 , 103 S.Ct. 2933 , 77 L.Ed.2d 545 (1983), the interstate commerce clause “has not in practice required much in addition to the requirement of fair apportionment.” Id. at 171 , 103 S.Ct. 2933 .

1999As the court noted in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 , 103 S.Ct. 2933 , 77 L.Ed.2d 545 (1983), the interstate commerce clause “has not in practice required much in addition to the requirement of fair apportionment.” Id. at 171 , 103 S.Ct. 2933 .

1973The requirement in section 303(a) of the LMRA (damage suits against unions) that the industry or activity “affect commerce” is a repetition of the general jurisdictional definition of “commerce” found in section 2(7) of the LMRA: “The term ‘affecting commerce’ means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce.” The Supreme Court of the United States has held that this language in the LMRA is sufficient to evoke the full power of the federal government under the interstate c

1973The requirement in section 303(a) of the LMRA (damage suits against unions) that the industry or activity “affect commerce” is a repetition of the general jurisdictional definition of “commerce” found in section 2(7) of the LMRA: “The term ‘affecting commerce’ means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce.” The Supreme Court of the United States has held that this language in the LMRA is sufficient to evoke the full power of the federal government under the interstate c

1973Once a prima facie case has been established, it is incumbent upon defendant to bring himself within one of the exemptions set forth in section 4 of the Securities Act: S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. S.E.C., 267 F. 2d 461 (2 cir., 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 896 ; S.E.C. v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F. 2d 137 (5 cir., 1972).

1973Once a prima facie case has been established, it is incumbent upon defendant to bring himself within one of the exemptions set forth in section 4 of the Securities Act: S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. S.E.C., 267 F. 2d 461 (2 cir., 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 896 ; S.E.C. v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F. 2d 137 (5 cir., 1972).

1973Once a prima facie case has been established, it is incumbent upon defendant to bring himself within one of the exemptions set forth in section 4 of the Securities Act: S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. S.E.C., 267 F. 2d 461 (2 cir., 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 896 ; S.E.C. v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F. 2d 137 (5 cir., 1972).

1973Once a prima facie case has been established, it is incumbent upon defendant to bring himself within one of the exemptions set forth in section 4 of the Securities Act: S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. S.E.C., 267 F. 2d 461 (2 cir., 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 896 ; S.E.C. v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F. 2d 137 (5 cir., 1972).

1973Even if all the phone calls took place within Pennsylvania, the interstate commerce requirement has been met, for it is the character of the instrument used, rather than the nature of the call which is determinative: Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (1964).

1964Relying principally on Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, supra, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the imposition of the corporation income tax on this taxpayer was not unconstitutional as a violation of the interstate commerce clause, and it was while pointing out the differences between the Corporate Net Income Tax Law and the Corporation Income Tax Law that the above-quoted statement was made.

1953Ingels v. Morf, 300 U. S. 290 , is so similar on its facts to the instant case, i.e., in its disposition of the tax receipts, that its language is equally applicable to and governs it.

1901The power of the state over the goods imported commences when the importer has so acted upon the importation that it has become incorporated and mixed with the mass of property in the state, which happens when the original package is no longer such in his hands: Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheaton, 419 ; Leisy v. Hardin, supra. The contracts into which the defendant entered did not necessarily involve interstate commerce.

1901The power of the state over the goods imported commences when the importer has so acted upon the importation that it has become incorporated and mixed with the mass of property in the state, which happens when the original package is no longer such in his hands: Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheaton, 419 ; Leisy v. Hardin, supra. The contracts into which the defendant entered did not necessarily involve interstate commerce.

1901It is not within the power of the state to impose a tax on the making of contracts within the state for the sale of goods to be delivered by a manufacturer in another state to a common carrier, consigned to the purchaser within the state where the contract is made: Brennan v. Titusville, supra. The goods imported from a foreign country or a sister state are within the protection of the interstate commerce clause of the constitution not only during the transportation, but must enter the interior of the state, and the importer is authorized to dispose of those articles introduced, so that they m