interstate commerce clause in Illinois

1986Textile Fabrics Corp. v. Roundtree (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 122 , 233 N.E.2d 376 .

1986Textile Fabrics Corp. v. Roundtree (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 122 , 233 N.E.2d 376 .

1972Bloom cites General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 , 12 L.Ed.2d 430 , 84 S.Ct. 1564 , to support the claim that multiple taxation violates the interstate commerce clause.

1972Bloom cites General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 , 12 L.Ed.2d 430 , 84 S.Ct. 1564 , to support the claim that multiple taxation violates the interstate commerce clause.

1960Norton Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 , 95 L. ed. 517; McLeod v. Dilworth Co. 322 U.S. 327 , 88 L. ed. 1304; Automatic Voting Maching Corp. v. Daley, 409 Ill. 438 ; Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Wright, 383 Ill. 363 .

1960Norton Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 , 95 L. ed. 517; McLeod v. Dilworth Co. 322 U.S. 327 , 88 L. ed. 1304; Automatic Voting Maching Corp. v. Daley, 409 Ill. 438 ; Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Wright, 383 Ill. 363 .

1960Norton Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 , 95 L. ed. 517; McLeod v. Dilworth Co. 322 U.S. 327 , 88 L. ed. 1304; Automatic Voting Maching Corp. v. Daley, 409 Ill. 438 ; Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Wright, 383 Ill. 363 .

1960Norton Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 , 95 L. ed. 517; McLeod v. Dilworth Co. 322 U.S. 327 , 88 L. ed. 1304; Automatic Voting Maching Corp. v. Daley, 409 Ill. 438 ; Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Wright, 383 Ill. 363 .

1957(See: Ozark Pipe Line Corporation v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555, at 567 , 69 L. ed. 439 at 444.) Inasmuch as the Federal decisions interpreting the interstate commerce clause necessarily control our decision, we must hold, in light of the principles reaffirmed in the Spcctor case, that, as applied to appellant, it was beyond the power of the State to levy the franchise tax in question.

1946In Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Finance, 383 Ill. 136 , section 2 of the Retailers’ Occupation Tax Act was construed.

1927As to the objection based upon the interstate commerce clause of the Federal constitution the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States is conclusive on us, and in Air-Way Flectric Appliance Corp. v. Day, 266 U. S. 71 , it was decided that a tax on a corporation organized in one State of the Union for the privilege of doing business in another State is an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce where less than the authorized amount of capital stock has been issued and the tax is measured by the proportion of the total authorized capital stock which its business done and propert

1927A statute of Massachusetts which imposed on foreign corporations doing business in that State an excise tax of one-fiftieth of one per cent of the par value of its authorized capital stock, but not exceeding $2000 in any year, and provided that where the stock of the corporation was issued without par value $100 should be considered par, was sustained in American Uniform Co. v. Commonwealth, 237 Mass. 42 , and held not to be discriminatory or to deny the equal protection of the laws or be regulation of interstate commerce.

1915The answer to this proposition is that in the case of People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146 , where the constitutionality of the Local Option Act was involved and attacked on the ground that this section of the act violates the interstate commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, the Supreme Court said: “The act does not purport to control in any manner the importation of liquor from other States.” There is no statute in this State prohibiting a recovery upon such a contract, and we are in accord with the views expressed by the court in the case of F. W.

1915Cook Brewing Co. v. Vaccaro, supra, that where intoxicating liquors are imported from another State into this State, as there is no statute prohibiting a recovery, therefore a recovery can be had for the sale thereof.