interstate commerce clause in California

1992(Id. at pp. 444-445 [60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 345-346].) The latter test upholds a state tax against an interstate commerce clause challenge if the tax “ ‘[i] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [ii] is fairly apportioned, [iii] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [iv] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.’ ” (441 U.S. at pp. 444-445, 449, 454 [60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 345-346, 348, 351-352], quoting Complete Auto Transit, supra, 430 U.S. at p. 279 [ 51 L.Ed.2d at p. 331 ].) Our concern is with the discrimination component of this t

1992(Id. at pp. 444-445 [60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 345-346].) The latter test upholds a state tax against an interstate commerce clause challenge if the tax “ ‘[i] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [ii] is fairly apportioned, [iii] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [iv] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.’ ” (441 U.S. at pp. 444-445, 449, 454 [60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 345-346, 348, 351-352], quoting Complete Auto Transit, supra, 430 U.S. at p. 279 [ 51 L.Ed.2d at p. 331 ].) Our concern is with the discrimination component of this t

1981“In the modern world it cannot be denied that the activities of lawyers play an important part in commercial intercourse, and that anticompetitive activities by lawyers may exert a restraint on commerce.” (Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar (1975) 421 U.S. 773, 788 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 572, 585 , 95 S.Ct. 2004, 2014 ].) Although “there may be legal services that have no nexus with interstate commerce and thus are beyond the reach of the Sherman Act” (id., at pp. 785-786 [ 44 L.Ed.2d at p. 584 ]), we proceed here on the assumption the fees incurred in probate proceedings, indispensable to the transfer of r

1981“In the modern world it cannot be denied that the activities of lawyers play an important part in commercial intercourse, and that anticompetitive activities by lawyers may exert a restraint on commerce.” (Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar (1975) 421 U.S. 773, 788 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 572, 585 , 95 S.Ct. 2004, 2014 ].) Although “there may be legal services that have no nexus with interstate commerce and thus are beyond the reach of the Sherman Act” (id., at pp. 785-786 [ 44 L.Ed.2d at p. 584 ]), we proceed here on the assumption the fees incurred in probate proceedings, indispensable to the transfer of r

2001Division Three noted that, although the reach of the Indian and interstate commerce clauses are not identical, it found applicable to the Indian commerce clause the recent instruction of United States v. Lopez (1995) 514 U.S. 549 , 115 S.Ct. 1624 which had found the Gun Free School Zone Act (18 U.S.C. ง 922(q)(l)(A)) to have been beyond Congressional power to enact under the interstate commerce clause, because the statute did not regulate activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. ( Bridget R., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1511 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 .) Since jurisdiction over fami

2001Division Three noted that, although the reach of the Indian and interstate commerce clauses are not identical, it found applicable to the Indian commerce clause the recent instruction of United States v. Lopez (1995) 514 U.S. 549 , 115 S.Ct. 1624 which had found the Gun Free School Zone Act (18 U.S.C. ง 922(q)(l)(A)) to have been beyond Congressional power to enact under the interstate commerce clause, because the statute did not regulate activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. ( Bridget R., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1511 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 .) Since jurisdiction over fami

2001Division Three noted that, although the reach of the Indian and interstate commerce clauses are not identical, it found applicable to the Indian commerce clause the recent instruction of United States v. Lopez (1995) 514 U.S. 549 , 115 S.Ct. 1624 which had found the Gun Free School Zone Act (18 U.S.C. ง 922(q)(l)(A)) to have been beyond Congressional power to enact under the interstate commerce clause, because the statute did not regulate activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. ( Bridget R., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1511 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 .) Since jurisdiction over fami

2001Division Three noted that, although the reach of the Indian and interstate commerce clauses are not identical, it found applicable to the Indian commerce clause the recent instruction of United States v. Lopez (1995) 514 U.S. 549 , 115 S.Ct. 1624 which had found the Gun Free School Zone Act (18 U.S.C. ง 922(q)(l)(A)) to have been beyond Congressional power to enact under the interstate commerce clause, because the statute did not regulate activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. ( Bridget R., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1511 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 .) Since jurisdiction over fami

2001Division Three noted that, although the reach of the Indian and interstate commerce clauses are not identical, it found applicable to the Indian commerce clause the recent instruction of United States v. Lopez (1995) 514 U.S. 549 , 115 S.Ct. 1624 which had found the Gun Free School Zone Act (18 U.S.C. ง 922(q)(l)(A)) to have been beyond Congressional power to enact under the interstate commerce clause, because the statute did not regulate activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. ( Bridget R., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1511 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 .) Since jurisdiction over fami

2001Division Three noted that, although the reach of the Indian and interstate commerce clauses are not identical, it found applicable to the Indian commerce clause the recent instruction of United States v. Lopez (1995) 514 U.S. 549 , 115 S.Ct. 1624 which had found the Gun Free School Zone Act (18 U.S.C. ง 922(q)(l)(A)) to have been beyond Congressional power to enact under the interstate commerce clause, because the statute did not regulate activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. ( Bridget R., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1511 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 .) Since jurisdiction over fami

1997The Interstate Commerce Clause “[S]ection 6396 is designed to accommodate federal constitutional restrictions on state taxation of sales in interstate commerce.” (Engs Motor Truck Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1458, 1467-1468 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 117 ].) This is necessary because the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, article I, section 8, restricts the taxation of sales of goods in interstate commerce, and permits a state to require a local seller to collect and remit a tax on receipts from sales made to out-of-state customers only if the

1997The Interstate Commerce Clause “[S]ection 6396 is designed to accommodate federal constitutional restrictions on state taxation of sales in interstate commerce.” (Engs Motor Truck Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1458, 1467-1468 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 117 ].) This is necessary because the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, article I, section 8, restricts the taxation of sales of goods in interstate commerce, and permits a state to require a local seller to collect and remit a tax on receipts from sales made to out-of-state customers only if the

1997Essentially, the court, perhaps not realizing it, borrowed the rationale of Wickard v. Filburn (1942) 317 U.S. 111, 125 [ 63 S.Ct. 82, 89 , 87 L.Ed. 122 ], in which it was held that a small farmer’s individual wheat sales might not affect interstate commerce themselves, but the sales of many other similarly situated farmers would, and therefore the individual farmer’s sales could be regulated under the interstate commerce clause.

1997Essentially, the court, perhaps not realizing it, borrowed the rationale of Wickard v. Filburn (1942) 317 U.S. 111, 125 [ 63 S.Ct. 82, 89 , 87 L.Ed. 122 ], in which it was held that a small farmer’s individual wheat sales might not affect interstate commerce themselves, but the sales of many other similarly situated farmers would, and therefore the individual farmer’s sales could be regulated under the interstate commerce clause.

1995In rejecting inter alia the state’s argument that the license fee was not a tax on the corporation’s capital stock but was “simply measured by” that standard (id. at p. 679), we quoted with approval the foregoing refutation of a similar claim in Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra, 268 U.S. 473, 494-495 [ 69 L.Ed. 1058, 1064 ], including the explanation that “ ‘It would open the way for easily doing indirectly what is forbidden to be done directly, and would render important constitutional limitations of no avail.’ ” ( 200 Cal. at p. 679 .) In other decisions this court has invoked the same reasoning

1995In rejecting inter alia the state’s argument that the license fee was not a tax on the corporation’s capital stock but was “simply measured by” that standard (id. at p. 679), we quoted with approval the foregoing refutation of a similar claim in Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra, 268 U.S. 473, 494-495 [ 69 L.Ed. 1058, 1064 ], including the explanation that “ ‘It would open the way for easily doing indirectly what is forbidden to be done directly, and would render important constitutional limitations of no avail.’ ” ( 200 Cal. at p. 679 .) In other decisions this court has invoked the same reasoning

1992(See also Container, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 170 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 556-557].) Under that component, a state may not impose a tax which discriminates against foreign commerce either by providing a “direct commercial advantage” to domestic commerce or by subjecting foreign commerce to multiple taxation. 2 (Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota (1959) 358 U.S. 450, 458 [ 3 L.Ed.2d 421, 427 , 79 S.Ct. 357 ]; Maryland, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 754 [68 L.Ed.2d at pp. 600-601]; Boston Stock.

1992(See also Container, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 170 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 556-557].) Under that component, a state may not impose a tax which discriminates against foreign commerce either by providing a “direct commercial advantage” to domestic commerce or by subjecting foreign commerce to multiple taxation. 2 (Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota (1959) 358 U.S. 450, 458 [ 3 L.Ed.2d 421, 427 , 79 S.Ct. 357 ]; Maryland, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 754 [68 L.Ed.2d at pp. 600-601]; Boston Stock.

1992(Japan Line, supra, 441 U.S. at pp. 444-445, 451 [60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 345-346, 349-350].) Under the four-part interstate test, a state tax will survive an interstate commerce clause challenge if the tax “ ‘[i] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [ii] is fairly apportioned, [iii] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [iv] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.’ ” (Japan Line, supra, 441 U.S. at pp. 444-445, 449, 454 [60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 345, 348, 352], quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady (1977) 430 U.S. 274, 279 [ 51

1992(Japan Line, supra, 441 U.S. at pp. 444-445, 451 [60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 345-346, 349-350].) Under the four-part interstate test, a state tax will survive an interstate commerce clause challenge if the tax “ ‘[i] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [ii] is fairly apportioned, [iii] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [iv] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.’ ” (Japan Line, supra, 441 U.S. at pp. 444-445, 449, 454 [60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 345, 348, 352], quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady (1977) 430 U.S. 274, 279 [ 51

1992(Japan Line, supra, 441 U.S. at pp. 444-445, 451 [60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 345-346, 349-350].) Under the four-part interstate test, a state tax will survive an interstate commerce clause challenge if the tax “ ‘[i] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [ii] is fairly apportioned, [iii] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [iv] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.’ ” (Japan Line, supra, 441 U.S. at pp. 444-445, 449, 454 [60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 345, 348, 352], quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady (1977) 430 U.S. 274, 279 [ 51

1992(Japan Line, supra, 441 U.S. at pp. 444-445, 451 [60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 345-346, 349-350].) Under the four-part interstate test, a state tax will survive an interstate commerce clause challenge if the tax “ ‘[i] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [ii] is fairly apportioned, [iii] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [iv] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.’ ” (Japan Line, supra, 441 U.S. at pp. 444-445, 449, 454 [60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 345, 348, 352], quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady (1977) 430 U.S. 274, 279 [ 51

1992(Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe (1982) 455 U.S. 130, 154-155 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 21, 40-41 , 102 S.Ct. 894 ]; Wardair, supra, All U.S. at pp. 7-8, 18 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 9-10, 16].) In such “dormant” foreign commerce clause situations, the judiciary must determine whether a particular state action unduly threatens the purpose of the clause: to ensure a unified national voice in foreign commerce matters raising inherently national concerns and to ensure that individual states do not work to the detriment of the whole nation.

1992(Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe (1982) 455 U.S. 130, 154-155 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 21, 40-41 , 102 S.Ct. 894 ]; Wardair, supra, All U.S. at pp. 7-8, 18 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 9-10, 16].) In such “dormant” foreign commerce clause situations, the judiciary must determine whether a particular state action unduly threatens the purpose of the clause: to ensure a unified national voice in foreign commerce matters raising inherently national concerns and to ensure that individual states do not work to the detriment of the whole nation.

1992(See also Container, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 170 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 556-557].) Under that component, a state may not impose a tax which discriminates against foreign commerce either by providing a “direct commercial advantage” to domestic commerce or by subjecting foreign commerce to multiple taxation. 2 (Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota (1959) 358 U.S. 450, 458 [ 3 L.Ed.2d 421, 427 , 79 S.Ct. 357 ]; Maryland, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 754 [68 L.Ed.2d at pp. 600-601]; Boston Stock.

1992(See also Container, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 170 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 556-557].) Under that component, a state may not impose a tax which discriminates against foreign commerce either by providing a “direct commercial advantage” to domestic commerce or by subjecting foreign commerce to multiple taxation. 2 (Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota (1959) 358 U.S. 450, 458 [ 3 L.Ed.2d 421, 427 , 79 S.Ct. 357 ]; Maryland, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 754 [68 L.Ed.2d at pp. 600-601]; Boston Stock.

1987Delivery within the taxing state can establish such a nexus.’ [Citation.] If delivery occurs in California the transaction constitutionally may be taxed, regardless of any intent to subsequently ship the goods out of state. [Citations.]” (Satco, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 12,16 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 449 ]; Dept, of Treasury v. Wood Corp. (1941) 313 U.S. 62, 68 [ 85 L.Ed. 1188, 1193 , 61 S.Ct. 885 ].) Thus, California must exempt those sales which, though in other respects transacted in California, are consummated by delivery to the buyer outside the state.

1987Delivery within the taxing state can establish such a nexus.’ [Citation.] If delivery occurs in California the transaction constitutionally may be taxed, regardless of any intent to subsequently ship the goods out of state. [Citations.]” (Satco, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 12,16 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 449 ]; Dept, of Treasury v. Wood Corp. (1941) 313 U.S. 62, 68 [ 85 L.Ed. 1188, 1193 , 61 S.Ct. 885 ].) Thus, California must exempt those sales which, though in other respects transacted in California, are consummated by delivery to the buyer outside the state.

1987Delivery within the taxing state can establish such a nexus.’ [Citation.] If delivery occurs in California the transaction constitutionally may be taxed, regardless of any intent to subsequently ship the goods out of state. [Citations.]” (Satco, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 12,16 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 449 ]; Dept, of Treasury v. Wood Corp. (1941) 313 U.S. 62, 68 [ 85 L.Ed. 1188, 1193 , 61 S.Ct. 885 ].) Thus, California must exempt those sales which, though in other respects transacted in California, are consummated by delivery to the buyer outside the state.

1987Delivery within the taxing state can establish such a nexus.’ [Citation.] If delivery occurs in California the transaction constitutionally may be taxed, regardless of any intent to subsequently ship the goods out of state. [Citations.]” (Satco, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 12,16 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 449 ]; Dept, of Treasury v. Wood Corp. (1941) 313 U.S. 62, 68 [ 85 L.Ed. 1188, 1193 , 61 S.Ct. 885 ].) Thus, California must exempt those sales which, though in other respects transacted in California, are consummated by delivery to the buyer outside the state.

1983(See Young Life Campaign v. Patino (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 559, 568, fn. 7 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 23 ].) The interstate commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, article I, section 8 restricts the taxation of sales of goods in interstate commerce.

1983(See Young Life Campaign v. Patino (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 559, 568, fn. 7 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 23 ].) The interstate commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, article I, section 8 restricts the taxation of sales of goods in interstate commerce.

1980Co. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 988, 994 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 919 , 500 P.2d 1119 ].) In summary, for the reasons stated, we conclude that the legislative intent and purpose of the mandatory regulatory and licensing scheme embodied in section 12001 et seq. is to protect consumers from unfair dealings where the person who sells tangible goods weighs the goods and collects a charge based on the weight of the goods sold and does not apply when scales are used, as in the instant case, to determine a charge for a delivery service. 14 Having so concluded, we need not address plaintiff’s other contentions that the re

1980Co. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 988, 994 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 919 , 500 P.2d 1119 ].) In summary, for the reasons stated, we conclude that the legislative intent and purpose of the mandatory regulatory and licensing scheme embodied in section 12001 et seq. is to protect consumers from unfair dealings where the person who sells tangible goods weighs the goods and collects a charge based on the weight of the goods sold and does not apply when scales are used, as in the instant case, to determine a charge for a delivery service. 14 Having so concluded, we need not address plaintiff’s other contentions that the re

1974(See Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 U.S. 618, 630, fn. 8 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 612-613 ]; Kent v. Dülles, 357 U.S. 116 [ 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 , 78 S.Ct. 1113 ]; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 992 , 84 S.Ct. 1659 ].) In Shapiro , the court, without ascribing the right to a particular clause of the Constitution, declared that it has long recognized “that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulatio

1974(See Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 U.S. 618, 630, fn. 8 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 612-613 ]; Kent v. Dülles, 357 U.S. 116 [ 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 , 78 S.Ct. 1113 ]; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 992 , 84 S.Ct. 1659 ].) In Shapiro , the court, without ascribing the right to a particular clause of the Constitution, declared that it has long recognized “that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulatio

1969Code, §§6203 and 6204; 1 and Bank of America v. State Board of Equalization (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 780, 799-802 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 348 ]), violates the interstate commerce clause (art.

1969Code, §§6203 and 6204; 1 and Bank of America v. State Board of Equalization (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 780, 799-802 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 348 ]), violates the interstate commerce clause (art.