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10 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1956–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blankenship v. Stategreen2 sentences2002In order to ensure that the plea is entered “intelligently” and “knowingly,” “Boykin requires that the trial court ‘canvass[ ] the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences.’” Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244 , 89 S. Ct. at 1712 ). 2002Id. (citing Caudill v. Jago, 747 F.2d 1046, 1052 (6th Cir. 1984)). -3- The post-conviction court essentially determined that the trial court substantially complied with the advice requirement by finding that the Appellant was made aware of his constitutional rights, rendering the trial court's omission harmless. | 1 | 2 |
State v. McClintockgreen2 sentences2002The additional advice requirement was explained in McClintock, 732 S.W.2d at 273 , that it must be made clear to the defendant pleading guilty that the resulting judgment of conviction may be used to enhance the punishment for any subsequent offenses in a later proceeding. 1991In State v. McClintock, 732 S.W.2d 268, 273 (Tenn.1987), this court pronounced the additional advice requirement that it must be made clear to the guilty-pleading defendant that the resulting judgment of conviction may be used in a subsequent proceeding to enhance the punishment for subsequent offenses. | 1 | 2 |
Ross Caudill v. Arnold R. Jagogreen1 sentence2002Id. (citing Caudill v. Jago, 747 F.2d 1046, 1052 (6th Cir. 1984)). -3- The post-conviction court essentially determined that the trial court substantially complied with the advice requirement by finding that the Appellant was made aware of his constitutional rights, rendering the trial court's omission harmless. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Princegreen1 sentence1991See also State v. Prince, 781 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tenn.1989); State v. Newsome, 778 S.W.2d 34, 37 (Tenn.1989). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Newsomegreen1 sentence1991See also State v. Prince, 781 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tenn.1989); State v. Newsome, 778 S.W.2d 34, 37 (Tenn.1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences2010Id. 1992Thereafter, “the State may rebut the allegation with proof of substantial compliance with the advice requirement, which would show that the petitioner was made aware of his constitutional rights, or the State may alternatively show that the petitioner was aware of his constitutional rights and that therefore the trial court’s failure to give the mandated advice was harmless error.” Id. at 925 . | 7 | 1992–2010 |
Boykin v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2002In order to ensure that the plea is entered “intelligently” and “knowingly,” “Boykin requires that the trial court ‘canvass[ ] the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences.’” Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244 , 89 S. Ct. at 1712 ). 2002In order to ensure that the plea is entered “intelligently” and “knowingly,” “Boykin requires that the trial court ‘canvass[ ] the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences.’” Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244 , 89 S. Ct. at 1712 ). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Turner v. Leathers
green
2 sentences1956Turner v. Leathers, 191 Tenn. 292 , 232 S. W. (2d) 269 ; Miller v. Proctor, 24 Tenn. App. 439 , 145 S. W. (2d) 807 ; Roberts v. Chase, 25 Tenn. App. 636 , 166 S. W. (2d) 641 . (4) Mrs. Nippers contends that the certificate of deposit presents a case of a contract between Mrs. H. 1956Turner v. Leathers, 191 Tenn. 292 , 232 S. W. (2d) 269 ; Miller v. Proctor, 24 Tenn. App. 439 , 145 S. W. (2d) 807 ; Roberts v. Chase, 25 Tenn. App. 636 , 166 S. W. (2d) 641 . (4) Mrs. Nippers contends that the certificate of deposit presents a case of a contract between Mrs. H. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Miller v. Proctor
green
2 sentences1956Turner v. Leathers, 191 Tenn. 292 , 232 S. W. (2d) 269 ; Miller v. Proctor, 24 Tenn. App. 439 , 145 S. W. (2d) 807 ; Roberts v. Chase, 25 Tenn. App. 636 , 166 S. W. (2d) 641 . (4) Mrs. Nippers contends that the certificate of deposit presents a case of a contract between Mrs. H. 1956Turner v. Leathers, 191 Tenn. 292 , 232 S. W. (2d) 269 ; Miller v. Proctor, 24 Tenn. App. 439 , 145 S. W. (2d) 807 ; Roberts v. Chase, 25 Tenn. App. 636 , 166 S. W. (2d) 641 . (4) Mrs. Nippers contends that the certificate of deposit presents a case of a contract between Mrs. H. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Roberts v. Chase
green
2 sentences1956Turner v. Leathers, 191 Tenn. 292 , 232 S. W. (2d) 269 ; Miller v. Proctor, 24 Tenn. App. 439 , 145 S. W. (2d) 807 ; Roberts v. Chase, 25 Tenn. App. 636 , 166 S. W. (2d) 641 . (4) Mrs. Nippers contends that the certificate of deposit presents a case of a contract between Mrs. H. 1956Turner v. Leathers, 191 Tenn. 292 , 232 S. W. (2d) 269 ; Miller v. Proctor, 24 Tenn. App. 439 , 145 S. W. (2d) 807 ; Roberts v. Chase, 25 Tenn. App. 636 , 166 S. W. (2d) 641 . (4) Mrs. Nippers contends that the certificate of deposit presents a case of a contract between Mrs. H. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.