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7 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Wadegreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (holding that the defense counsel was required to be present at the lineup—a "critical stage"—absent an "intelligent waiver" by the defendant). [12] Additionally, counsel, relying on the previous experience, believed that the prosecution might change its position and make a plea offer after defendant talked to the police. [13] Although we hold that the federal district court should have applied the Strickland standard, we do not apply the Strickland test to the facts of this case or offer any opinion r 2007See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (holding that the defense counsel was required to be present at the lineup—a "critical stage"—absent an "intelligent waiver" by the defendant). [12] Additionally, counsel, relying on the previous experience, believed that the prosecution might change its position and make a plea offer after defendant talked to the police. [13] Although we hold that the federal district court should have applied the Strickland standard, we do not apply the Strickland test to the facts of this case or offer any opinion r | 1 | 1 |
Patricia Ann Carter v. Kathleen Holt, Wardengreen1 sentence1998See, e.g., LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure (Hornbook Series, 2d ed.), § 22.1(h), p. 961 (noting with regard to waiver of a jury trial that "[j]ury waiver tends to vary depending upon the offense category, and the pattern is similar to that for guilty pleas, suggesting that the motivations are similar: the expectation of a lesser sentence"); Carter v. Holt, 817 F.2d 699, 700 (C.A.11, 1987) (holding that the defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel although defense counsel advised the defendant to waive a jury trial in part on the basis of his belief that "the likely punishme | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Martin
green
2 sentences2017Martin, 150 Mich App at 640 . 2017Martin, 150 Mich App at 640 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Lafler v. Cooper
green
2 sentences2019So defendant declined the plea bargain because of that advice. 10 See Ginther, 390 Mich at 443 . 11 See Lafler v Cooper, 566 US 156 ; 132 S Ct 1376 ; 182 L Ed 2d 398 (2012); People v McCauley, 493 Mich 872 ; 821 NW2d 569 (2012). -25- Significantly, defendant asserts neither that defense counsel specifically advised him to decline the plea offer out of certainty that no conviction would result from trial, nor that defense counsel assured him that no charges could be drawn from the alleged incident other than the two CSC-I theories that counsel thought legally infirm or factually insufficient. 2019So defendant declined the plea bargain because of that advice. 10 See Ginther, 390 Mich at 443 . 11 See Lafler v Cooper, 566 US 156 ; 132 S Ct 1376 ; 182 L Ed 2d 398 (2012); People v McCauley, 493 Mich 872 ; 821 NW2d 569 (2012). -25- Significantly, defendant asserts neither that defense counsel specifically advised him to decline the plea offer out of certainty that no conviction would result from trial, nor that defense counsel assured him that no charges could be drawn from the alleged incident other than the two CSC-I theories that counsel thought legally infirm or factually insufficient. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Ginther
green
1 sentence2019So defendant declined the plea bargain because of that advice. 10 See Ginther, 390 Mich at 443 . 11 See Lafler v Cooper, 566 US 156 ; 132 S Ct 1376 ; 182 L Ed 2d 398 (2012); People v McCauley, 493 Mich 872 ; 821 NW2d 569 (2012). -25- Significantly, defendant asserts neither that defense counsel specifically advised him to decline the plea offer out of certainty that no conviction would result from trial, nor that defense counsel assured him that no charges could be drawn from the alleged incident other than the two CSC-I theories that counsel thought legally infirm or factually insufficient. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Farrington v. Total Petroleum, Inc.
green
2 sentences1998Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 210 ; 501 NW2d 76 (1993). 2 Because the advice and waiver procedures for subsequent proceedings are specifically referenced in MCR 6.445(D), but the advice and waiver procedures for initial criminal hearings are not referred to at all in the rest of the rule, it appears clear that the procedural safeguards set forth in MCR 6.005(D) were deliberately omitted for probation revocation cases. 1998Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 210 ; 501 NW2d 76 (1993). 2 Because the advice and waiver procedures for subsequent proceedings are specifically referenced in MCR 6.445(D), but the advice and waiver procedures for initial criminal hearings are not referred to at all in the rest of the rule, it appears clear that the procedural safeguards set forth in MCR 6.005(D) were deliberately omitted for probation revocation cases. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Jaworski
green
1 sentence1974That opinion has the clear impact of limit ing the advice on waiver to the specific rights enumerated in Jaworski, supra, prior to the adoption of GCR 1963, 785.7. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.