right to interpose any defense in Texas

2009Indeed, in the seminal case of Morris v. Bailey, 398 S.W.2d 946, 947 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1966, writ refd n.r.e.), the court articulated that, in fulfilling his or her duty, an attorney has “the right to interpose any defense or supposed defense and make use of any right in behalf of such client or clients as [the attorney] deemed proper and necessary, without making himself subject to liability in damages.” See also Renfroe v. Jones & Assocs., 947 S.W.2d 285, 288 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).

2008To prevent such chilling of an attorney's faithful discharge of his "duty of zealously representing his clients within the bounds of the law," the attorney-immunity doctrine ensures that "[i]n fulfilling this duty, an attorney 'has the right to interpose any defense or supposed defense and make use of any right in behalf of such client or clients as [the attorney] deems proper and necessary, without making himself subject to liability in damages . . . .'" Bradt , 892 S.W.2d at 71 (quoting Morris v. Bailey , 398 S.W.2d 946, 947 (Tex. Civ.

2009App.—Austin 1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court articulated that, in fulfilling his or her duty, an attorney has “the right to interpose any defense or supposed defense and make use of any right in behalf of such client or clients as [the attorney] deemed proper and necessary, without making himself subject to liability in 6 damages.” See also Renfroe v. Jones & Assocs., 947 S.W.2d 285, 288 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).

2009Indeed, in the seminal case of Morris v. Bailey, 398 S.W.2d 946, 947 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1966, writ refd n.r.e.), the court articulated that, in fulfilling his or her duty, an attorney has “the right to interpose any defense or supposed defense and make use of any right in behalf of such client or clients as [the attorney] deemed proper and necessary, without making himself subject to liability in damages.” See also Renfroe v. Jones & Assocs., 947 S.W.2d 285, 288 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).

1997Id. at 71 (quoting Maynard v. Caballero, 752 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1988, writ denied) and Morris, 398 S.W.2d at 947 -48 and citing Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II, Ltd., 696 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ)) (alteration in original).

1994In fulfilling this duty, an attorney “ha[s] the right to interpose any defense or supposed defense and make use of any right in behalf of such client or clients as [the attorney] deem[s] proper and necessary, without making himself subject to liability in damages. ...” Morris v. Bailey, 398 S.W.2d 946, 947 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); accord Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II, Ltd., 696 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).

2008To prevent such chilling of an attorney's faithful discharge of his "duty of zealously representing his clients within the bounds of the law," the attorney-immunity doctrine ensures that "[i]n fulfilling this duty, an attorney 'has the right to interpose any defense or supposed defense and make use of any right in behalf of such client or clients as [the attorney] deems proper and necessary, without making himself subject to liability in damages . . . .'" Bradt , 892 S.W.2d at 71 (quoting Morris v. Bailey , 398 S.W.2d 946, 947 (Tex. Civ.

2008To prevent such chilling of an attorney’s faithful discharge of his “duty of zealously representing his clients within the bounds of the law,” the attorney-immunity doctrine ensures that “[i]n fulfilling this duty, an attorney ‘has the right to interpose any defense or supposed defense and make use of any right in behalf of such client or clients as [the attorney] deems proper and necessary, without making himself subject to liability in damages . . . .’” Bradt, 892 S.W.2d at 71 (quoting Morris v. Bailey, 398 S.W.2d 946, 947 (Tex. Civ.

2015Any other rule would act as a severe and crippling deterrent to the ends of justice for the reason that a litigant might be denied a full development of his case if his attorney were subject to the threat of liability for defending his client’s position to the best and fullest extent allowed by law, and availing his client of all rights to which he is 13 Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1999) (“At common law, the rule of privity limits attorney liability to third parties. . . .

1997Id. at 71 (quoting Maynard v. Caballero, 752 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1988, writ denied) and Morris, 398 S.W.2d at 947 -48 and citing Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II, Ltd., 696 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ)) (alteration in original).